Symbolic Statues and Real Laws: The Pathologies of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and the Prison Litigation Reform Act by Tushnet, Mark & Yackle, Larry
TUSHNETPPFINAL.DOC 03/31/98 2:12 PM
1
 Duke Law Journal
VOLUME 47 OCTOBER 1997 NUMBER 1
SYMBOLIC STATUTES AND REAL LAWS: THE
PATHOLOGIES OF THE ANTITERRORISM
AND EFFECTIVE DEATH PENALTY ACT AND
THE PRISON LITIGATION REFORM ACT
MARK TUSHNET†
LARRY YACKLE††
INTRODUCTION
Criminals are not popular.  No politician in recent memory has
lost an election for being too tough on crime.  In 1996, the Republi-
can Congress and the Democratic President collaborated on two
major statutes affecting the legal protections available to criminals.1
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(AEDPA)2 modifies the habeas corpus statute in a number of ways,
affecting the disposition of federal post-conviction challenges to all
criminal convictions, not just those resulting in death sentences.3  The
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1. We use the word criminals because the statutes apply to people already convicted of
crimes.
2. Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 106(b)(3)(E), 110 Stat. 1214, 1221 (1996) (amending 28 U.S.C. §
2244(b) (1994)).
3. See infra pp. 21-47.
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Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA)4 addresses lawsuits filed by
prisoners challenging the conditions of their confinement. The PLRA
covers both suits dealing with the complaints of individual prisoners
and suits dealing more broadly with conditions at entire institutions
or in prison systems.5
We suggest that the AEDPA and PLRA may illustrate two
broad problems in statutory design and interpretation.  First, statu-
tory reform and judicial reinterpretation of existing law are alterna-
tive ways of revising existing law.  Sometimes efforts to revise exist-
ing law proceed along both tracks.  When the judicial train arrives at
the station before the legislative one, there is little reason to enact a
statute from a policy standpoint.  Nevertheless, there are often good
political reasons to do so: Legislators will have built up an investment
in the issue and will want to claim credit for doing something about a
problem to which they have been calling public attention.6
The enactment of statutory reforms that parallel judicial reinter-
pretations of existing laws poses an interpretive problem for the
courts.  Such statutes offer the opportunity for interpretations that lie
along a continuum.  At one end, the statutes may be read to make
dramatic changes that disrupt judicial innovations already completed
or largely underway.  Sometimes these changes raise serious constitu-
tional concerns.  At the other end, the statutes may be understood to
do little or nothing to alter the course the courts have chosen.  If the
courts interpret the statutes merely to restate existing law, they give
the statutes no practical effect.  But if they interpret the statutes to
modify or even to fundamentally alter existing law, they may actually
impose meanings these new laws cannot bear.  In such circumstances,
we hypothesize that courts will interpret the statutes to lie close to
the “little change” end of the continuum.  As the law develops, the
new statutes will tinker at the margins with previous judicial interpre-
tations, but are unlikely to effect large changes as a whole.
Second, sometimes, perhaps often, legislators enact statutes to
make a point, or to be able to tell their constituents that they have
4. Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3626,
28 U.S.C. § 1915, 28 U.S.C. § 1346, 42 U.S.C. § 1997, and other scattered sections).
5. See infra pp. 47-70.
6. Cf. Judith Resnik, Constraining Lawyers and Judges: Reflections on the Civil Justice
Reform Act, the Civil Jury, Rulemaking, and Congressional Control over the Federal Judiciary,
49 ALA. L. REV. 133 (1997) (describing process in which “Congress and the judiciary were
really only disputing . . . who should get credit for a new national rule regime trump[et]ed as a
‘reform’”).
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done something about a problem.  We call these symbolic statutes.7
Legislators may win politically by enacting symbolic laws, but courts,
bureaucrats, and others affected by the statutes—here, criminals—
may lose as they try to work out what the statutes mean.8  Symbolic
statutes are real laws, posing real problems of interpretation and ad-
ministration.
These observations are related.  Our case studies of the AEDPA
and the PLRA suggest that statutes enacted after substantial judicial
reconstruction of the law are likely to be largely symbolic.  The prior
judicial developments may induce legislators to be inattentive to de-
tails of statutory design,9 which leads to difficulties in integrating the
new statutes with the law the courts have developed.  These difficul-
ties may in turn induce the courts to interpret the statutes to make
only marginal changes in the law they themselves have fashioned.
But, we suggest, occasionally the result will be a freakish, almost ran-
dom result in particular cases, which serves no obviously defensible
public purpose.
We think that the AEDPA and PLRA are good examples of
these aspects of the legislative process.  As with all major pieces of
new legislation, the AEDPA and PLRA raise a host of interpretive
issues.  Courts will defuse those issues by reading the statutes to en-
dorse, and to some degree fortify, the reforms they have already ad-
vanced.
Part I of this Article examines a number of interpretive and con-
stitutional issues raised by the AEDPA and PLRA.  Section A pro-
vides some general background on both statutes.  Section B describes
the habeas corpus provisions in the AEDPA.  It begins with a brief
examination of the Supreme Court’s first confrontation with that Act
7. For a further discussion of the meaning of the term “symbolic statutes” see John P.
Dwyer, The Pathology of Symbolic Legislation, 17 ECOLOGY L.Q. 233 (1990) (citing § 112 of
the Clean Air Act as an example of a symbolic statute).
8. Cynical observers might suggest that legislators win no matter what, for legislators can
“run against” judges and bureaucrats who take the teeth out of symbolic laws.  If the legislators
prevail, of course, at some point the bill comes due, and they will have to enact another sym-
bolic statute.  The symbolic statute then becomes a real law, and the process starts again.  Cf.
DAVID R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION 130-36 (1975) (describing a
process whereby legislators create bureaucracies that they expect to be inefficient in order to
provide themselves with opportunities to supply services to constituents who will, in turn, grate-
fully support the legislators as they seek reelection).
9. As one court of appeals has observed, the PLRA “contains typographical errors, cre-
ates conflicts with the Rules of Appellate Procedure, and is internally inconsistent.  Moreover,
the year in its name, 1995, does not correspond to the date of its enactment, 1996.”  McGore v.
Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 603 (6th Cir. 1997) (citations omitted).
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in Felker v. Turpin10 to illustrate the suggestion that will recur
throughout our discussion: The more the statute alters or differs from
current law, the greater the constitutional questions about it, and in-
terpreting the statute to avoid those questions limits its practical im-
pact.
The remainder of Section B deals with other habeas corpus pro-
visions in the AEDPA.  We illustrate the pervasive tension between
interpreting the statute to make major changes in preexisting law and
interpreting it to tinker at the edges.  We argue that courts are likely
to harmonize the statute with court-crafted doctrine by choosing the
more limited interpretations.  Section C takes up the PLRA.  It ex-
amines that Act’s central provisions on institutional reform litigation,
and some of its provisions on limiting assertedly frivolous prisoner
lawsuits.  Again we show how and why courts are likely to limit the
statute’s impact.11
In Part II we offer a general account of the pathology of sym-
bolic statutes that are real laws.  We distinguish among three catego-
ries of statutes: instrumental, expressive, and symbolic.  We argue
that the mechanics and politics of statutory design should ordinarily
caution against enacting even expressive statutes, and caution more
strongly against enacting symbolic ones.  The fundamental difficulty
is that the expressive and symbolic dimensions of statutes typically
interfere with whatever instrumental goals they serve.  Writing in a
different context, John Rawls points out, “All ethical doctrines worth
our attention take consequences into account in judging rightness.
One which did not would simply be irrational, crazy.”12  So too with
statutes: Real laws must take consequences into account, and, we
suggest, symbolic statutes rarely do so in a sensible way.
I.  THE AEDPA AND THE PLRA: STUDIES IN INTERPRETATION
A.  General Background
In the 1970s and 1980s legal conservatives became uncomfort-
10. 116 S. Ct. 2333 (1996).
11. Our discussions of the statutes are sometimes quite detailed, in large measure because
we believe such detail is necessary to demonstrate that the narrow interpretations we anticipate
from courts are compatible with the statutes’ text when read against the backdrop of existing
law.  At the same time, however, readers should understand that we present only the outlines
of arguments that would be developed more fully in cases actually litigating the issues.
12. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 30 (1971).
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able with what they saw as expansive judicial intervention in the
criminal justice process.  This judicial intervention manifested itself
through the wide availability of habeas corpus as a method of chal-
lenging criminal convictions and through institutional reform litiga-
tion that led to significant changes in the conditions under which
criminals were confined.  In response, the conservatives proposed le-
gal reforms, to be adopted either by Congress or by the federal courts
through new interpretations of the habeas corpus statute and of the
law of equity regulating the issuance of institutional reform injunc-
tions.
1.  Habeas Corpus: Reform Proposals.  Conservative efforts to
restrict habeas corpus occurred in both the legislative and judicial
branches, in alternating sequence.  Early on, the Nixon admin-
istration proposed a bill that would have limited habeas by statute.13
When that plan stalled in Congress, Nixon’s appointees to the
Supreme Court developed new doctrines that curbed the writ’s
availability.14 Those doctrinal innovations addressed most conser-
vative objections to habeas well before the Reagan administration
advanced another plan for checking the writ legislatively.15  As the
Court’s campaign continued through the early 1990s, conservatives
no longer needed to amend the habeas statutes to achieve their policy
objectives; they could consolidate their position merely by turning
back legislative initiatives launched by congressional liberals and
moderates to counter the justices.16
By the time conservatives had sufficiently increased their num-
bers in Congress to pass the AEDPA in 1996, the only remaining
point to the exercise was to make a more pungent political statement.
As a result, the AEDPA could potentially unsettle the judicial deci-
sions that conservatives presumably meant to endorse and fortify.
We support this thesis by tracing the Court’s decisions regarding
three perennial problems attributed to the habeas system: 1) the de-
lays associated with federal habeas in the wake of state court consid-
eration of prisoners’ federal claims; 2) the inefficiencies associated
13. See S. 567, 93d Cong. (1973); Larry W. Yackle, The Habeas Hagioscope, 66 S. CAL. L.
REV. 2331, 2353-55 (1993) [hereinafter Yackle, Hagioscope].
14. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 72-73 (1977); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 493-
95 (1976).
15. See S. 2216, 97th Cong. (1982); Yackle, Hagioscope, supra note 13, at 2355-58.
16. In this, conservatives were successful, although some bills advanced by Democrats
came close to passage.  See Yackle, Hagioscope, supra note 13, at 2416-23.
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with prisoners’ failure to comply with state and federal procedural
rules; and 3) the ostensible redundancy of federal adjudication of
claims previously rejected in state court.
The delays attending federal habeas had long engaged conserva-
tives’ attention.  In the absence of a fixed filing deadline, prisoners
could postpone federal litigation for years—at best undercutting the
finality of state judgments and at worst compromising the state’s
ability to defend those judgments against collateral attack.17  The
problem of delay was complicated by the “exhaustion doctrine” in
habeas corpus, which typically required prisoners to pursue state
court opportunities to vindicate federal claims before they sought
federal habeas relief.18  The establishment of filing deadlines to dis-
courage delay would be in tension with the exhaustion requirement.
The Court responded on two fronts.  First, the Court promul-
gated a procedural rule for habeas cases, Rule 9(a), which authorized
a district court to dismiss a petition without considering the merits if
the prisoner had unduly delayed her filing to the state’s prejudice.19
That flexible rule discouraged procrastination, but avoided the diffi-
culties of reconciling a rigid filing deadline with the exhaustion doc-
trine’s conflicting demand for deliberate delay.  In addition, the
Court shaped the exhaustion requirement into a device for encour-
aging prisoners to aggregate claims for efficient federal adjudication.
In Rose v. Lundy,20 the Court held that if state remedies had not been
exhausted with respect to any single claim in a prisoner’s multiple-
claim petition, the district court should dismiss the petition in its en-
tirety even though other claims were ripe for federal consideration.21
Those innovations were controversial and created confusing
complexities of their own.22  They were, however, instrumental ad-
justments meant to accomplish real policy ends.  Some data suggest,
moreover, that they affected habeas practice much in the way the jus-
tices presumably anticipated.  Given Rule 9(a), prisoners as a group
may have begun filing for federal habeas relief sooner than they had
17. See Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 259 (1973).
18. See Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 510 (1982).
19. See Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts, Rule
9(a) (printed following 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1994)).
20. 455 U.S. 509 (1982).
21. See id. at 522.
22. For a discussion of the complications introduced by Lundy, see Larry W. Yackle, The
Exhaustion Doctrine in Federal Habeas Corpus: An Argument for a Return to First Principles,
44 OHIO ST. L.J. 393, 424-38 (1983).
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previously;23 given Lundy, prisoners had a powerful incentive to ag-
gregate their claims for earlier (and more fully dispositive) litigation
in both state and federal court.
The inefficiencies associated with procedural default excited
conservatives even more than did needless delay.  Under Warren
Court precedents, a prisoner who failed to preserve a federal claim
properly in state court could usually advance it in federal habeas
nonetheless.24  To the dismay of conservatives, a prisoner who failed
to raise a claim in one federal petition could often include it in a sec-
ond or successive application for federal relief.25  The specter of un-
scrupulous jailhouse lawyers deliberately engaging in piecemeal fed-
eral litigation often dominated conservative attacks on habeas.26
Here again, when congressional attempts to legislate change
foundered, the Court took the lead.  In a series of decisions beginning
with Wainwright v. Sykes27 in 1977, the Court established a set of rules
that often foreclosed federal habeas on the basis of a prisoner’s pro-
cedural default in previous state court litigation.28  The whole of the
matter is a mouthful, but the new (and now familiar) doctrine went
like this: If 1) there was a state procedural rule requiring a prisoner to
raise a federal claim in a particular way or at a particular time; 2) the
prisoner failed to comply with that rule; 3) for that reason, the state
courts refused or would refuse to consider the claim in later state
proceedings; and 4) the resulting state disposition of the matter
would constitute an adequate and independent state ground of deci-
sion that would forestall direct review in the Supreme Court of the
United States, then a federal habeas court would also typically refuse
to consider the claim.  The court would consider the claim, however,
if the prisoner either showed “cause” for his procedural default in
state court and “actual” prejudice resulting from that default,29 or the
prisoner demonstrated that the federal error that went uncorrected in
state court probably led to the conviction of an innocent person.30
23. See Richard Faust et al., The Great Writ in Action: Empirical Light on the Federal Ha-
beas Corpus Debate, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 637, 685-87 (1990-1991).
24. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 418 (1963).
25. See Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 15-19 (1963).
26. See OFFICE OF LEGAL POL’Y, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL ON FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS REVIEW OF STATE JUDGMENTS 51 (1988).
27. 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
28. See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 487 (1986).
29. See Sykes, 433 U.S. at 90-91.
30. See Murray, 477 U.S. at 496-97; see also Larry W. Yackle, Federal Evidentiary Hear-
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This judicially-crafted doctrine rested on the premise that fed-
eral habeas corpus, available in tandem with state court litigation,
should respect state rules that cut off claims because of procedural
irregularities.31  The Court’s doctrine did not constitute an independ-
ent body of federal rules governing the conduct of state litigation.  It
piggybacked on, and reinforced, state law by imposing an additional
federal sanction on prisoners who failed to press claims in state court
in the manner prescribed by state law.32  The federal default doctrine
thus promoted structural values associated with comity and federal-
ism by adding to the mix an instrumental device for encouraging
prisoners to comply with state procedural rules.
The Court’s doctrinal manipulations were controversial and, in
many ways, more rigid than the circumstances warranted.  The Court
took an extremely narrow view of the explanations that could count
as cause for default in state court.  For example, it originally ap-
peared that defense counsel’s negligence might suffice, but the Court
ultimately rejected that possibility, explaining instead that cause
would typically be found only if “some objective factor external to
the defense impeded counsel’s efforts to comply with the State’s pro-
cedural rule.”33  If a prisoner could not have been aware of a claim in
time to raise it properly and seasonably, cause was established;34  oth-
erwise, the prisoner would be saddled with the mistakes of her law-
yer.35
Democrats in Congress responded with bills that would have
made defense counsel’s “ignorance or neglect” the basis for cause.36
None of those initiatives succeeded, however, and the Court held
firm.37  The justices did recognize an exception when counsel’s error
amounted to ineffective assistance in the Fourteenth Amendment
sense, but that was because the state, rather than the prisoner, was
ings Under the New Habeas Corpus Statute, 6 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 135, 145 (1996) [hereinafter
Yackle, Evidentiary Hearings] (discussing fact situations that should allow a petitioner to obtain
a federal hearing).
31. See Sykes, 433 U.S. at 88.
32. See County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 148 (1979).
33. Murray, 477 U.S. at 488.
34. See id.; see also, e.g., Amadeo v. Zant, 486 U.S. 214, 222 (1988) (holding that a prisoner
had shown cause when the state had concealed material evidence from him); Reed v. Ross, 468
U.S. 1, 2 (1984) (holding that the novelty of a claim could establish cause).
35. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 133-34 (1982).
36. See, e.g., H.R. 4737, 101st Cong. § 7 (1990) (proposing that applicant could establish
cause based on certain failures by applicant’s counsel).
37. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 753-54 (1991).
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responsible for ensuring that its official processes met minimal consti-
tutional standards.38
This is not to say that the Court was indifferent to the injustices
its doctrine might produce.  The Court acknowledged that efficiency
goals could not justify the continued incarceration of an innocent
person.  That understanding accounts for the “or” highlighted in the
articulation of the doctrine quoted above.39  By using the disjunctive
in that way, the Court clearly and deliberately signaled that if the cir-
cumstances indicated that a prisoner was probably innocent, a federal
habeas court should overlook default even if the prisoner failed to
show cause.40  When the actual innocence of a prisoner was in ques-
tion, the Court found proof of “probable innocence” sufficient to
warrant consideration of a claim that would otherwise have been
procedurally barred.41  The Court was less generous to prisoners
challenging only the validity of their sentences (as opposed to their
underlying convictions).  In cases of that kind, the Court required
“clear and convincing” proof that would have persuaded any reason-
able factfinder that the prisoner was not legally eligible for the sen-
tence received.42
In the end, the justices were apparently satisfied that their prod-
uct struck the proper balance.  In Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes,43 they ap-
plied the same formulation to cases in which prisoners had raised
claims properly and seasonably in state court, but then failed to de-
velop the facts in support of those claims.44  In McCleskey v. Zant,45
they extended it to cases in which prisoners had failed to advance
claims in an initial federal petition and then attempted to press those
claims forward in a second or successive application.46  In this last
move, the Court neatly brought all the situations in which procedural
default figured in habeas practice under the control of a single doc-
trinal formulation, serving a single set of policy objectives.  Once
38. See id. at 754.
39. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
40. See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 316 (1995).
41. Id. at 323.
42. Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 348 (1992).  Both Schlup and Sawyer were successive
federal petition cases, not cases on the consequences of default in state court.  As we explain
below, however, the Court had previously explained that it would use the same standards in
both contexts.  See infra notes 184-93 and accompanying text.
43. 504 U.S. 1 (1992).
44. See id. at 8.
45. 499 U.S. 467 (1991).
46. See id. at 490.
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again, the Court acted instrumentally to erect the incentives it
thought would enhance the system’s efficiency.
The question whether the federal courts should second-guess the
state courts on the substance of prisoners’ claims was far less tracta-
ble.  At least since Brown v. Allen,47 federal habeas courts had exer-
cised de novo judgment on the merits of claims, regarding previous
state court decisions as, at most, persuasive precedent from another
jurisdiction.48  That made theoretical sense, inasmuch as a habeas pe-
tition initiated an independent civil action, exempt from ordinary
preclusion rules and the full faith and credit statute.49  Moreover, as a
pragmatic matter the raison d’être of habeas as a sequel to state court
review was intelligible largely on that basis.  If the federal courts
were to defer in any serious way to state court dispositions, the very
existence of their authority to consider claims at all would be drawn
into doubt.
Until well into the 1980s, the newly constituted Supreme Court
accepted the de novo standard as appropriate and built its procedural
reforms on that premise.50  Attempts to curtail the substantive scope
of the federal writ were concentrated in Congress, where conserva-
tives repeatedly tried to enact the Reagan administration’s proposal
to bar habeas relief on the basis of a claim that had been “fully and
fairly adjudicated”51 in state court.52  When that bill appeared des-
tined to fail, however, the Court itself fashioned a new approach to
this most important of all habeas questions.
The Court’s strategy was creative.  In light of the time required
for postconviction litigation, the constitutional principles ostensibly
applicable to a claim could develop during the period after a case left
state court and before it was ready for decision in federal habeas.
The Warren Court had regarded the “retroactive” effect of a “new
rule” of constitutional law as a property of the rule itself.53  Generally,
if a novel rule was sufficiently related to innocence, it could be given
47. 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
48. See id. at 458-60.
49. See Larry W. Yackle, Explaining Habeas Corpus, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 991, 998-1110,
1047-49 (1985).
50. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 730 (1991); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72,
80 (1977).
51. Yackle, Hagioscope, supra note 13, at 2358-59.
52. See id. at 2357-64.
53. See Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 249-51 (1969).
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effect in habeas.54  In Teague v. Lane,55 by contrast, the Rehnquist
Court held that, henceforth, “new rules” of constitutional law would
no longer be enforceable in habeas at all, save in two exceptionally
narrow circumstances.56
On first blush, that departure did not appear to be a serious
threat to the scope of habeas.  While such conservative justices were
on the bench, it seemed unlikely that the Court would announce
many breaks with the past.  In Teague itself and in subsequent cases,
however, the Court elaborated an extremely expansive definition of
what would count as “new” for habeas purposes.  A rule was new if it
“impose[d] a new obligation” on the government.57  A decision in an
individual case announced a new rule if the result had not been
“dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant’s conviction
became final,”58 but, instead, had previously been “susceptible to de-
bate among reasonable minds.”59  When lower courts had differed
over a proposition of federal law, a new rule was created with the
emergence of a single, authoritative understanding.60  A new rule of
law could be created in an evolutionary way, as older precedents
were applied in a “novel setting.”61
The expansive definition of new rules had obvious practical con-
sequences.  As the Teague doctrine’s implications became clear, the
Court was widely criticized in academic circles for simply contriving
to circumnavigate Brown v. Allen.62  In effect, Teague contemplated
that a federal habeas court could no longer award relief if a previous
state court decision on the merits was at all close to the mark.  For if
the state court had not made an egregious error when it held against
the prisoner, a district court would have to create a new rule of con-
stitutional law in order to find for the prisoner.
Initially, the Court appeared to acknowledge that it was treating
54. See Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 636-37 (1965) (declining to give the exclusion-
ary rule retroactive effect).
55. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
56. See id. at 309-13 (excepting rules that go to the state’s authority to criminalize behav-
ior and rules that fundamentally affect the truth-seeking process).
57. Id. at 301.
58. Id.
59. Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 415 (1990).
60. See Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U.S. 383, 393-95 (1994).
61. Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222, 228 (1992).
62. See James S. Liebman, More Than “Slightly Retro:” The Rehnquist Court’s Rout of
Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction in Teague v. Lane, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 537, 633
(1990-1991).
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ordinary applications of legal principles to the facts of cases as the
creation of wholly new rules of law.  Indeed, the Court explained that
the very purpose of Teague was to “validate reasonable, good-faith”
state decisions on the merits of federal claims.63  In time, however, in-
dividual justices parted ways.  Justice Thomas said in Wright v. West64
that, for his part, the Teague cases led plainly, and he thought prop-
erly, to the conclusion that the federal courts must ordinarily defer to
“reasonable” state court judgments on the merits.65  Others insisted
that Teague only controlled the availability of habeas relief when the
pertinent legal standard had actually changed.  In her own opinion in
West, Justice O’Connor insisted that a state court’s erroneous deci-
sion on a federal issue would not be allowed to stand on the ground
that it was “reasonable.”66  With matters in that posture, it is small
wonder that congressional Democrats also proposed to narrow the
definition of new rules for Teague purposes.67  Those efforts failed,
however, and when legislation finally was enacted it was in a quite
different form: the AEDPA of 1996.
2.  Prisoner Litigation: Developments and Reform Proposals.
Similar reform proposals were made in connection with institutional
reform litigation and assertedly frivolous prisoner lawsuits.
Republican governors elected in the early 1980s found their options
in addressing crime limited by restrictions federal courts had placed
upon the operation of prison systems.68  They could not simply add
new prisoners to prisons that the courts had held were
unconstitutionally overcrowded, and at least early in their terms they
were constrained politically to avoid substantial new expenditures on
prison construction.  The governors were particularly bothered by
63. Butler, 494 U.S. at 414.
64. 505 U.S. 277 (1992).
65. See id. at 291.
66. Id. at 305 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
67. See H.R. 3371, 102nd Cong. § 1104 (1991) (defining a new rule as a “clear break from
precedent . . . that could not reasonably have been anticipated at the time the claimant’s sen-
tence became final in State court”).
68. See, e.g., Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115 (5th Cir. 1982) (regulating operation of Texas
prison system).  For an early expression of concern regarding judicially-imposed restraints on
executive discretion, see Robert F. Nagel, Separation of Powers and the Scope of Federal Eq-
uitable Remedies, 30 STAN. L. REV. 661, 661-64, 706-18 (1978) and compare Michael W.
McConnell, Why Hold Elections? Using Consent Decrees to Insulate Policies from Political
Change, 1987 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 295, 297 (expressing concern that “executive officials in one
Administration can set policy today and bind their successors to comply with it tomorrow, by
settling a lawsuit on those terms”).
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consent decrees agreed to by their liberal predecessors, sometimes on
the eve of leaving office.  They sought ways to avoid the federal court
orders.  As Professor McConnell put it, opponents of these types of
consent decrees believed that they “should be repudiated before they
become a common part of the legal landscape.”69
These opponents found support among Republican leaders dur-
ing the Reagan years.70  Republican politicians had long campaigned
against judicial activism, and took court orders regulating prison con-
ditions as a prime example of judicial overreaching: The federal
courts, they asserted, were providing criminals with living conditions
far better than many law-abiding people enjoyed, and the courts were
micromanaging prisons down to the level of prescribing the tempera-
tures that had to be maintained in cells.71
The Reagan administration challenged existing institutional liti-
gation in several ways.72 It sought to reduce the legal resources avail-
able for such litigation by limiting the Legal Services Corporation’s
power to provide funds for prison conditions lawsuits, and by reduc-
ing the Department of Justice’s participation in prison litigation.73
The Reagan administration nominated judges to the federal courts
whom it expected to be receptive to arguments that judges should in-
tervene less frequently in prison administration.  Finally, it developed
legal challenges to institutional litigation.74
69. McConnell, supra note 68, at 297.
70. Writing in 1982, Senator Robert Dole asserted that “returning control of our prisons
and jails from the courts to our cities, counties, and states” was “the major issue for . . . the field
of corrections.”  Robert Dole, Reversing Court Control of Corrections, CORRECTIONS TODAY,
Feb. 1982, at 24, 24.  Senator Dole’s proposed solution was the Criminal Justice Construction
Reform Act, S. 186, 97th Cong. (1981), which sought to provide substantial federal financial
and planning assistance to improve prison conditions, so as to eliminate the basis for judicial
control.  See id.
71. See, e.g., Lewis v. Lane, 816 F.2d 1165, 1170 (7th Cir. 1987) (“An allegation of inade-
quate heating may state an Eighth Amendment violation.”).
72. For an early account, see generally Margaret Gentry, The Reagan Corrections Pro-
gram: Less Money, More States’ Rights, CORRECTIONS MAGAZINE, Dec. 1981, at 29, 30
(discussing Reagan administration proposals that would reduce federal interference with state
and local institutional action).
73. See, e.g., United States v. Michigan, 680 F. Supp. 270, 278 (W.D. Mich. 1988) (holding
that due process did not require prior hearing before “food loaf” diet was imposed upon pris-
oner as punishment for throwing food and human waste in cafeteria).
74. The administration also developed policy guidelines for federal agencies, describing
when they should enter consent agreements.  See, e.g., Peter M. Shane, Federal Policy Making
by Consent Decree: An Analysis of Agency and Judicial Discretion, 1987 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 241,
279-84 (discussing policy guidelines directed at the Justice Department).  According to Shane,
the guidelines “direct Justice Department lawyers not to consent, in the settlement of litigation,
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The legal challenges took three forms.75  First, courts were asked
to limit the class of plaintiffs who could obtain relief to those who
were currently suffering identifiable constitutional harm. The mere
possibility of problems arising in the future—the risk that over-
crowding would someday lead to prison riots, for example—would
not be enough to constitute identifiable harm.  Second, it was argued
that injunctions should be limited to remedying identifiable harms;
courts should avoid micromanagement by deferring to prison admin-
istrators’ judgment.  Third, courts were asked to modify existing in-
junctions to allow prison administrators more discretion.
a. Limiting relief to identifiable violations.  Since at least 1971 the
Supreme Court has emphasized that “judicial powers may be
exercised only on the basis of a constitutional violation,” and that the
“nature of the violation determines the scope of the remedy.”76  As
the Court stated in 1992, “[a] remedy is justifiable only insofar as it
advances the ultimate objective of alleviating the initial constitutional
violation.”77
The Court applied this analysis in Lewis v. Casey,78 which in-
volved a claim that Arizona’s system of providing access to legal re-
search materials deprived inmates of their constitutional right of ac-
cess to the courts.79  The Court held that a prisoner must show actual
injury to demonstrate a constitutional violation.  A prisoner might
to commitments that limit otherwise revisable policy-making discretion vested in the executive
branch by Constitution or statute.”  Id. at 279.  The guidelines were widely publicized and rep-
resented “significant expressions of [the administration’s] view of the Constitution.”  Id. at 280
(quoting Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Press Release 1 (Mar. 21, 1986)).
Shane argues that “the Guidelines were animated less by a precise legal theory than by a rela-
tively nondiscriminating ideological stance.”  Id. at 283.
One PLRA provision echoes a part of the guidelines. The guidelines allowed settle-
ment agreements that limited executive discretion so long as “the sole remedy for the depart-
ment or agency’s failure to comply with those terms . . . [was] the revival of the suit.”  Id. at
282-83.  PLRA section 802(a) similarly states, “Nothing in this section shall preclude parties
from entering into a private settlement agreement that does not comply with the limitations on
relief set forth in subsection (a), if the terms of that agreement are not subject to court en-
forcement other than the reinstatement of the civil proceeding that the agreement settled.”
Pub. L. No. 104-134, § 802(a), 110 Stat. 1321, 1368 (1996) (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3626
(c)(2)).
75. For an overview of the constitutional and political theory on which the administra-
tion’s challenges rested, see McConnell, supra note 68, at 317-22.
76. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971).
77. Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 489 (1992).
78. 116 S. Ct. 2174 (1996).
79. See id. at 2177-78.
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meet this requirement if “a complaint he prepared was dismissed for
failure to satisfy some technical requirement which, because of defi-
ciencies in the prison’s legal assistance facilities, he could not have
known.”80  Examining the record, the Court found that two prisoners
had indeed suffered “actual injur[ies],”81 but this was not enough to
justify a remedial order directed at the entire prison system.82
This actual injury requirement means that a prisoner cannot es-
tablish a constitutional violation simply by showing that prisoners as
a group face an unreasonable risk that some of their complaints will
be dismissed as a result of the prison library’s inadequacies.  At least
in dictum the Court indicated that this analysis would apply to health
and safety violations as well.  Courts “provide relief to claimants . . .
who have suffered, or will imminently suffer, actual harm,” the Court
wrote, but “it is . . . the role of . . . the political branches[ ] to shape
the institutions of government in such fashion as to comply with the
laws and the Constitution.”83  It followed, the Court said, that “[i]f . . .
a healthy inmate who had suffered no deprivation of needed medical
treatment were able to claim violation of his constitutional right to
medical care, . . . simply on the ground that the prison medical facili-
ties were inadequate, the essential distinction between judge and ex-
ecutive would have disappeared.”84
b. Limiting “micromanagement.”  In Lewis, Justice Thomas mounted
a substantial attack on the courts’ remedial role in institutional
reform litigation, arguing that it was “at odds with the history and
tradition of the equity power and the Framers’ design.”85 Justice
Thomas stated that the Court should go farther than limiting
prisoners’ rights to receive judicial assistance, because structural
decrees issued by the federal judiciary exceed the judiciary’s
constitutional powers.86 Justice Thomas sought to avoid judicial
micromanagement of prisons.  A court need not engage in micro-
management to remedy the use of instruments of torture.  The
80. Id. at 2180.
81. Id. at 2182.
82. See id. at 2184.
83. Id. at 2179.
84. Id.  (citation omitted).
85. Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 2038, 2067 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring); see also
Lewis, 116 S. Ct. at 2196-200 (Thomas, J., concurring) (opposing sweeping remedial decrees in
the context of prison administration).
86. See Lewis, 116 S. Ct. at 2187 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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courts’ role will be different, however, if the Eighth Amendment goes
farther than that.  For example, according to the Supreme Court, the
Eighth Amendment is violated when a prisoner is knowingly exposed
to an objectively unreasonable risk of serious injury to his health.87
To remedy that violation, the courts direct prison administrators to
reduce the risk to an acceptable level. There are, however, many
ways of satisfactorily reducing risk. An order embodying a remedy
designed to “alleviat[e] the initial constitutional violation”88 may well
contain details that look like micromanagement of the prison.  The
Court directed lower courts to give prison administrators substantial
deference in their response to situations posing threats of
constitutional violations.89  Nevertheless, the resulting decrees will
necessarily be highly detailed if they are to be more than mere
directives.
Lewis can be reconciled with the cases finding liability for expo-
sure to unreasonable risks if we emphasize that those cases did not
involve mere inadequacy of medical facilities.  The actual-injury re-
quirement that Lewis imposes, however, may alter the definition of
the constitutional violation in a way that decreases the likelihood that
a court remedying a constitutional violation would engage in micro-
management.
c.  Easing standards for modifying and lifting decrees.  Through the
1980s some lower courts held that a decree governing conditions of
confinement could be modified only if the party seeking to modify
the decree met the stringent standard of United States v. Swift & Co. 90
Swift required “a clear showing of grievous wrong evoked by new and
unforeseen conditions.”91  In Rufo v. Inmates of the Suffolk County
87. See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 36 (1993); see also Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.
825, 832 (1994) (indicating that a prison official may be liable under the Eighth Amendment if
he knows that inmates face a substantial risk of serious harm and nonetheless fails to abate the
risk by reasonable precautions).
88. Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 489 (1992).
89. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987); see also Lewis, 116 S. Ct. at 2185 (noting
that Turner’s principle of deference has particular force where the affected inmates are among
the most violent in a given prison system).
90. 286 U.S. 106 (1932).  See also, e.g., Paradise v. Prescott, 767 F.2d 1514, 1527 n.13  (11th
Cir. 1985) (citing Swift as the standard for modification of a consent decree).  In 1987, Professor
McConnell noted an “emerging consensus” that the Swift standard was too stringent for institu-
tional litigation.  McConnell, supra note 68, at 299 n.12.
91. Swift, 286 U.S. at 119.
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Jail,92 the Supreme Court considered what standard to use in
institutional reform cases.  Rufo involved a consent decree requiring
the county to build a new jail that would hold only one prisoner per
cell.93  Construction was delayed and the jail population grew faster
than expected.94  The county sought to modify the decree to allow the
jail to hold two prisoners in some cells.95  Justice White, writing for
the Court, said that district courts should apply a standard “more
flexible” than Swift.96  Later cases, Justice White wrote, indicated that
the Swift standard was not “talismanic.”97
The Court pointed to “[t]he upsurge in institutional reform liti-
gation” as another reason  justifying flexibility.98  Institutional decrees
remain in place for extended periods, and “a flexible approach is of-
ten essential to achieving the goals of reform litigation.”99  The Court
made several general statements about the scope of institutional re-
form decrees.  It suggested that modifications are appropriate if they
do not “violate the basic purpose of the decree,” which “was to pro-
vide a remedy for what had been found . . . to be unconstitutional
conditions.”100  It acknowledged that “[f]ederal courts may not order
States or local governments, over their objection, to undertake a
course of conduct not tailored to curing a constitutional violation that
has been adjudicated.”101  But, the Court continued, defendants can
settle cases “by undertaking to do more than the Constitution itself
requires,” and then parenthetically noted that “almost any affirma-
tive decree beyond a directive to obey the Constitution necessarily
does that.”102  Relief “clearly . . . related to the conditions found to of-
fend the Constitution” is permissible.103
According to Rufo, once a defendant shows that a modification
is warranted, the district court should develop a new remedy
92. 502 U.S. 367 (1992).
93. See id. at 375.
94. See id.
95. See id. at 376.  We note that the jail had been designed on the assumption that there
would be only one prisoner per cell.  See id. at 375.
96. Id. at 380.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 381.
100. Id. at 387.
101. Id. at 389.
102. Id.
103. Id.
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“suitably tailored to the changed circumstance.”104  The district court
“should not strive to rewrite a consent decree so that it conforms to
the constitutional floor,” but should instead focus on “whether the
proposed modification is tailored to resolve the problems created by
the change in circumstances.”105  But “the public interest” requires
that district courts “defer to local government administrators.”106
They should “keep the public interest in mind,” because “[t]o refuse
modification of a decree is to bind all future officers of the State, re-
gardless of their view of the necessity of relief.”107
Rufo dealt with the standard for modifying institutional decrees,
but defendants could obtain relief in another way.  They might con-
tend that they had complied with some parts of a decree and should
be relieved of judicial supervision of continued compliance with
those aspects of the order even though the defendants were not com-
plying with all the decree’s provisions.  Again, some lower courts re-
fused to withdraw from supervision in cases of partial compliance.
The Supreme Court directed them to do so in Freeman v. Pitts,108 a
school desegregation case.109  In Freeman, the district court found that
the school board had complied with the parts of its prior orders
dealing with student assignment policies and physical facilities, but
that the board still had not complied with the decree’s provisions
dealing with teacher assignments.110  The court of appeals held that
the district court could not relieve the board of a continuing obliga-
tion to comply with the student assignment provisions.111  The Su-
preme Court reversed, holding that the district court had discretion
to withdraw from supervision of those areas in which the school
board had complied with the decree’s requirements.112
One aspect of the Court’s analysis was that district courts could
withdraw from supervision of compliance with portions of their de-
crees if they were convinced that continued compliance was no
longer necessary to remedy any continuing constitutional violation.113
104. Id. at 391.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 392.
107. Id.
108. 503 U.S. 467 (1992).
109. See id. at 471.
110. See id. at 474.
111. See id. at 484.
112. See id. at 471.
113. See id. at 494 (“The school district bears the burden of showing that any current imbal-
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If continued supervision was necessary to ensure compliance with
other parts of the decree, however, the district court had to exercise
supervision.114  Finally, the Court held in Board of Education v. Dow-
ell115 that district courts could lift their injunctions entirely if they
found that defendants had complied with them in good faith, and that
the defendants were no longer violating the Constitution.116  By 1994,
advocates of prisoners’ rights could summarize the state of the law,
with only slight exaggeration, as: “Pay enormous deference to prison
administrators and do not intervene unless there is overwhelming
evidence of gross constitutional violations.”117
Even as the courts were revising the law, legislators, prodded by
state attorneys general, began to consider ways of limiting what they
regarded as frivolous lawsuits brought by prisoners.  Chief Justice
Warren Burger gave a series of widely publicized speeches in which
he criticized the courts for entertaining—or Congress for requiring
the courts to entertain—lawsuits by prisoners who wanted cheaper
cigarettes.118  By the 1990s the exemplary case of frivolous litigation
was the lawsuit by a prisoner who claimed that he was being treated
unconstitutionally because the prison would not serve him the right
kind of peanut butter.119  Vice President Dan Quayle’s Council on
ance is not traceable, in a proximate way, to the prior violation.”).
114. See id. at 497.
115. 498 U.S. 237 (1991).
116. See id. at 249-51.
117. J.D. Dolby & Mark Lopez, Prison Conditions Litigation—Past, Present, and Future:
View From the Plaintiffs’ Bar, CORRECTIONAL L. REP., June 1994, at 1, 15.
118. For one such case, see Russell v. Bodner, 489 F.2d 280, 281 (3d Cir. 1973).  For an an-
ecdotal report of Burger’s views, see Deborah Rhode, Letting the Law Catch Up, 44 STAN. L.
REV. 1259, 1260 (1992).
119. One well documented “peanut butter” case involved a Nevada prisoner who paid for
chunky peanut butter from the prison canteen with his own funds, but received creamy peanut
butter.  See Ashley Dunn, Flood of Prisoner Rights Suits Brings Effort to Limit Filings, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 21, 1994, at A1.  Apparently the prison officials did not offer to refund the pris-
oner’s money or provide him with what he had paid for until after the litigation began.  See id.
The peanut butter cases have some of the characteristics of so-called “urban legends.”  For ex-
ample, it is not clear from reports whether critics of frivolous prisoner litigation believe that
there were many peanut butter cases or whether all of the reports refer to a single episode.
Senator Robert Dole, apparently referring to this case, described it as one in which the prisoner
was “served creamy peanut butter.”  Congressional Press Release, Prison Litigation Reform
Act: Dole Provision Cracking Down on Frivolous Inmate Lawsuits Included in Omnibus Ap-
propriations Bill (Apr. 27, 1996), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, HILLPR File.  California
Attorney General Dan Lungren asserted that “he has had to employ 51 assistants to handle
prisoner lawsuits over such grievances as crunchy versus plain peanut butter.”  Richard A. Ser-
rano, Bid to Revamp Crime Bill Sparks Clash, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 20, 1995, at A4.  For comments
on the accuracy of the peanut butter anecdotes, see Kim Mueller, Comment, Inmates’ Civil
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Competitiveness convened a special working group chaired by Solici-
tor General Kenneth Starr to develop an “agenda for civil justice re-
form.”120  The agenda included a recommendation to “Reduce Frivo-
lous and Protracted Prisoner Litigation,” primarily by requiring the
pursuit of administrative grievance procedures.121  In the spring of
1994, the National Association of Attorneys General published mod-
el state legislation “designed to curtail frivolous inmate lawsuits.”122
Deliberately or not, politicians began to assimilate the attack on
these kinds of frivolous prisoner lawsuits to their challenges to insti-
tutional reform litigation on the ground that both raised questions
about the courts’ proper role in defining prisoners’ conditions of con-
finement.
Thus, even as courts began responding to arguments in favor of
changing the courts’ role, politicians continued to pursue programs of
legislative change to accomplish the same goals.  These were largely
programs designed to stake out a position rather than realistic politi-
cal proposals, because at the national level at least, the primary spon-
sors were Republicans who lacked the power to enact them.123  With
the arrival of the 104th Congress controlled by Republicans in both
House and Senate, however, those politicians could enact the pro-
grams they had proposed for a decade.
3.  Adoption of the Proposals.  The Republican Contract with
America included a proposed Taking Back Our Streets Act that
incorporated proposals concerning prisoner litigation.124  Arguing that
“most petitions are totally lacking in merit,” that “thousands upon
thousands of frivolous petitions clog the federal district court dockets
each year,” and that “prisoners on death row [could] almost
Rights Cases and the Federal Courts: Insights Derived from a Field Research Project in the East-
ern District of California, 28 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1255, 1283 n.114 (1995); Jon O. Newman,
Letter, No More Myths About Prisoner Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 1996, at A14.
120. The text of the Working Group’s recommendations is reprinted in Proposed Civil Jus-
tice Reform Legislation, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 977, 979 (1992).
121. Id. at 1005-06.
122. Jeffrey R. Maahs & Rolando V. Del Carmen, Curtailing Frivolous Section 1983 Inmate
Litigation: Laws, Practices, and Proposals, FED. PROBATION, Dec. 1995, at 53, 57.
123. But see infra note 247 and accompanying text (discussing the Helms Amendment to
the Violent Crime Control and Enforcement Act of 1994, enacted Sept. 13, 1994).
124. See CONTRACT WITH AMERICA: THE BOLD PLAN BY REP. NEWT GINGRICH, REP.
DICK ARMEY AND THE HOUSE REPUBLICANS TO CHANGE THE NATION 43-44, 53 (Ed Gilles-
pie & Bob Schellhas eds., 1994).
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indefinitely delay their punishment,”125 the Contract’s authors sought
to impose a one-year deadline for filing habeas corpus claims
generally, and a more stringent six-month deadline for capital cases.126
They also wanted to “force[ ] federal courts to consider federal
habeas petitions within a certain time frame.”127  The justification for
limiting prisoner lawsuits was confined to a single substantive
sentence: “States are forced to spend millions of dollars defending
prisoner lawsuits to improve prison conditions—many of which are
frivolous.”128  This treated institutional reform litigation as a version
of frivolous litigation.
The fact that the courts had already done most of what the Re-
publican legislation sought to accomplish was largely irrelevant from
a politician’s point of view.  The politicians expected that their con-
stituents would now see prisons operating without substantial federal
judicial interference.  They could also expect that constituents would
not readily distinguish changes in judicial supervision occasioned by
the courts themselves from those occasioned by a statute.  As with
the AEDPA, it made political sense to enact the PLRA even if it ac-
complished little as a matter of law.129  Legislators’ comments on the
PLRA rarely adverted to the judicial developments over the prior
decade and a half.130
Accepting the legislation made political sense to President Clin-
ton as well.  A so-called “new Democrat,” he had incorporated tradi-
tionally Republican criminal justice issues into his political positions
while governor of Arkansas and as a candidate for the presidency.
He vigorously supported the anti-terrorism provisions of the
AEDPA, and was at best indifferent to the inclusion of habeas cor-
pus revisions in the statute.  The PLRA was enacted as part of an om-
nibus appropriations bill, the signing of which represented Clinton’s
political victory over the Republican Congress that, he effectively
125. Id. at 44.
126. See id. at 43.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 53.
129. The PLRA’s primary sponsors in the Senate included Senators Jon Kyl of Arizona,
Arlen Specter of Pennsylvania, Spencer Abraham of Michigan, and Kay Bailey Hutchison of
Texas, all from states in which prison institutional litigation had become a major political issue.
(Other sponsors included Senator Robert Dole of Kansas, the majority leader, and Senator Or-
rin Hatch of Utah, the chair of the Committee on the Judiciary.)
130. There were few echoes of Senator Dole’s 1982 observation that “[r]ecently [the courts]
have moved back to a more measured approach in correctional litigation, balancing the inter-
ests of the prisoner against legitimate correctional objectives.”  Dole, supra note 70, at 25.
TUSHNETPPFINAL.DOC 03/31/98  2:12 PM
22 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 47 : 1
charged, had closed down the government in its prior budget efforts.
B.  The Habeas Corpus Revisions in the AEDPA
1.  Felker v. Turpin.  The Supreme Court made its first glancing
acquaintance with the AEDPA in Felker v. Turpin,131 and the Court’s
unanimous opinion may foreshadow the broader difficulties entailed
in interpreting the AEDPA and the PLRA.  The case involved a
provision that, interpreted one way, raised serious questions about
the scope of Congress’s power to regulate the Supreme Court’s
jurisdiction.  These  questions are among the most difficult to resolve
in constitutional law.132  The Court avoided addressing those
questions by reading the AEDPA to leave an alternative basis for
review in the Supreme Court intact.133
One section of the AEDPA deals with successive habeas corpus
petitions.134  A habeas petitioner filing a second or successive petition
must satisfy certain requirements concerning the nature of the claim.
Initial habeas petitions can be filed directly in the district court.  Un-
der the AEDPA, however, second or successive petitions must be
presented to the court of appeals for review. 135  The court of appeals
acts as a “gatekeeper,” deciding which petitions may be filed in the
district court.136  The court of appeals may grant leave to file only if
the petitioner “makes a prima facie showing that the application sat-
isfies” the statute’s requirements regarding the nature of the claim.137
The statute also provides that the court of appeals’ “grant or denial”
of leave to file “shall not be appealable and shall not be the subject of
a petition for rehearing or for a writ of certiorari.”138
Felker filed a motion for leave to file a second petition, which
the court of appeals denied.  Felker then applied to the Supreme
131. 116 S. Ct. 2333 (1996).  For a more detailed analysis of the Court’s opinion, see Mark
Tushnet, “The King of France With Forty Thousand Men:” Felker v. Turpin and the Supreme
Court’s Deliberative Processes, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 163.
132. See Felker, 116 S. Ct. at 2337-38 (discussing § 106(b)(3)(E) of the AEDPA).
133. See id. at 2338-39.
134. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, §
106, 110 Stat. 1214, 1220-21 (amending 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (1994)).
135. See id. § 106(b)(3), 110 Stat. at 1221.
136. See id.  The Court in Felker described those seeking leave to file as “prospective appli-
cants” because they have no right to file a habeas petition until they receive leave to do so.  116
S. Ct. at 2337.
137. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act § 106(b)(3)(C), 110 Stat. at 1221.
138. Id. § 106(b)(3)(E), 110 Stat. at 1221.
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Court for a writ of certiorari and for an original writ of habeas cor-
pus.139  The Court unanimously held that the AEDPA barred review
by writ of certiorari but did not cut off the possibility of an original
writ in the Supreme Court.140  A prospective habeas applicant denied
leave to file a second or successive petition by a court of appeals now
can file an application for leave to file an original writ in the Supreme
Court, instead of filing a petition for certiorari.
Felker limits the practical effect of eliminating the ordinary cer-
tiorari route to the Supreme Court.  Perhaps the 1996 Act changes
the standard for obtaining Supreme Court review.141  Alternatively,
the Court’s interpretation might mean that the AEDPA directs the
Court to substitute the AEDPA’s requirements for the unstructured
discretionary decision the Court would make in considering either a
certiorari petition or an application for an original writ of habeas
corpus.142  The AEDPA’s new requirements, the opinion says,
139. See Felker, 116 S. Ct. at 2337.
140. See id. at 2338-39.
141. In the absence of the AEDPA provision at issue in Felker, a prospective habeas peti-
tioner denied leave to file by a court of appeals would file a petition for certiorari.  In consid-
ering the petition the Court would apply its Rule 10, which states that certiorari is a matter “of
judicial discretion” and “will be granted only for compelling reasons.”  SUP. CT. R. 10.  Rule
20(4)(a), which deals with the original writ of habeas corpus, requires the petitioner to “show
that exceptional circumstances warrant the exercise of the Court’s discretionary powers,” and
states that “[t]his writ is rarely granted.”  SUP. CT. R. 20(4)(a). Perhaps there is a difference
between “compelling reasons” and “exceptional circumstances,” though the Felker opinion
does not make that difference apparent.
The standards in Rules 10 and 20 are both discretionary.  Perhaps the Court will come
to treat the standards differently: Rule 20 may be interpreted as being less stringent than Rule
10 if the justices come to believe that review in some cases is important, or Rule 20 may be in-
terpreted as being more stringent if they come to find the burdens of processing applications
for leave to file petitions for an original writ of habeas corpus burdensome.
Felker had filed a petition for an original writ of habeas corpus which the Court de-
nied, noting that his claims did not “materially differ” from claims by other habeas petitioners
that the Court had reviewed “on stay applications.”  Felker, 116 S. Ct. at 2341.  The claims, the
opinion said, did not satisfy “the requirements of the relevant provisions of the [1996] Act, let
alone the requirement that there be ‘exceptional circumstances’ justifying the issuance of the
writ.”  Id.  It is not clear that this language would not be equally appropriate in noting that a
petition for certiorari failed to establish “compelling circumstances” for granting review.  The
Court might examine the petition for leave to file an original writ to see if it made out a prima
facie case that the new statutory standards for filing a successive writ were satisfied.  If the
Court concluded that the petition did so, presumably it could transfer the petition to the appro-
priate district court which could determine whether the standards were in fact satisfied.  There
also remains the question of whether the Court will have less, or less usable, information in
making such an assessment than it would have in a petition for certiorari.
142. For example, a prospective habeas petitioner who was denied leave to file a successive
petition might seek review on the ground that the court of appeals had misinterpreted the
AEDPA’s requirement that “the factual predicate for the [new] claim could not have been dis-
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“inform our authority to grant” relief.143  The AEDPA could properly
“inform” the Court’s exercise of discretionary authority, however;
the Court itself has refashioned the writ of habeas corpus in part on
the ground that the courts ought to elaborate statutory details in light
of contemporary circumstances.144  So too with the original writ of ha-
beas corpus: Contemporary circumstances, evidenced by congres-
sional action, bear on the appropriate structure of the writ even if
Congress did not—and perhaps cannot—dictate that structure to the
Court.
A second way to read the AEDPA would be to hold that shifting
review from certiorari to the original writ changes the issues the
Court will consider.  On certiorari the Court would consider whether
the court of appeals properly applied the statutory standards for
granting leave to file a successive petition.  Perhaps on original ha-
beas the Court would consider only the merits of the underlying peti-
tion.  So, in Felker’s case, the Court would consider not whether the
federal court of appeals properly denied leave to file but whether the
state trial court gave unconstitutional jury instructions.145
A serious constitutional question lurked behind the scenes in
Felker.  Precluding review of court of appeals gatekeeper decisions
might be unconstitutional because it would impair the Supreme
Court’s ability to ensure the supremacy and uniformity of federal
covered previously through the exercise of due diligence,” 28 U.S.C.A. § 2244(b)(2)(B)(i)
(West Supp. 1997), in conflict with some other circuit’s interpretation of that requirement.  In
addition to asking whether the Court’s usual discretionary standards were satisfied, the
AEDPA might direct the Court also to ask whether “the facts underlying the claim, if proven
and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and
convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have
found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.” Id. § 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii).
143. Felker, 116 S. Ct. at 2339 (emphasis added).  “Inform” does not mean “dictate” or
“constrain,” as the opinion makes clear in its next paragraph: “Whether or not we are bound by
these restrictions, they certainly inform our consideration of original habeas petitions.”  Id.
The Court might have been so circumspect because interesting separation of powers questions
would arise if Congress purported to dictate the Court’s standards for exercising jurisdiction
conferred on it by statute.
144. See infra Part II.A.1.
145. In his concurrence, Justice Souter suggested that the question of the issues open to Su-
preme Court review would be important “if the Courts of Appeals adopted divergent interpre-
tations of the gatekeeper standard.”  Felker, 116 S. Ct. at 2342 (Souter, J., concurring).  We are
accustomed to thinking that one important role for the Supreme Court is to ensure that federal
statutes have the same meaning in Georgia that they have in North Carolina.  If the 1996 Act
required the Supreme Court to consider only the merits of Felker’s unconstitutional instruction
claim and ruled out other ways of obtaining review of questions about interpreting the gate-
keeper provision, the possibility of lack of uniformity would be real.
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law.146  This constitutional question is a difficult one, however, and it
is hardly surprising that the Court chose to interpret the statute in a
way that made it unnecessary to decide that constitutional issue.  In
avoiding the constitutional issues, the Court interpreted the statute to
make no more than minor changes to its own standards for reviewing
certain cases. The preclusion of review provision interpreted in
Felker expresses a mood, as symbolic statutes do. The provision, as
interpreted by the Supreme Court in Felker, does no more than
slightly tighten the Supreme Court’s standard for deciding whether to
consider a death penalty case involving someone who has already had
two shots at Supreme Court review. It also slightly restructures the
forms in which the Court can consider whether the court of appeals
properly interpreted the gatekeeper provision.  And it may do much
less than that.  This interpretive pattern will recur as we examine
other provisions in the AEDPA and PLRA.
2. Revising Habeas Corpus: Some Case Studies.  The AEDPA
amends preexisting provisions in Chapter 153147 and creates a new
Chapter 154, addressed exclusively to death penalty cases.148  The
AEDPA’s amendments to Chapter 153 became effective when the
President signed the AEDPA into law on April 24, 1996.149  Chapter
154 builds on an innovative model recommended by a committee of
the Judicial Conference of the United States, chaired by Justice
Lewis Powell.150  Its provisions apply only to cases arising in states
that provide indigent death row inmates with competent lawyers to
represent them in state postconviction proceedings.151
146. See Leonard G. Ratner, Congressional Power Over the Appellate Jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 157, 201 (1960).
147. See 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 2241-2255 (West Supp. 1997).
148. See id. §§ 2261-2266.
149. See Pub. L. No. 104-32, § 107(a), 110 Stat. 1214, 1221 (1996) (amending 28 U.S.C.A.
Ch. 153 (1994)).  But see Lindh v. Murphy, 117 S. Ct. 2059 (1997) (holding that the amend-
ments to Chapter 153 are inapplicable to cases that were already pending on April 24).
150. See Ad Hoc Comm. on Federal Habeas Corpus in Capital Cases, Judicial Conf. of the
U.S., Report and Proposal 5-7 (1989), reprinted in Report on Habeas Corpus in Criminal Cases,
45 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 3239, 3241-42 (Sept. 27, 1989) [hereinafter Powell Comm. Report].
151. The AEDPA specifies a variety of tests that states must meet to invoke Chapter 154.
As a baseline, a state must establish a “mechanism for the appointment, compensation, and
payment of reasonable litigation expenses of competent counsel” for indigent capital prisoners
in state postconviction proceedings.  28 U.S.C.A. § 2261(b) (West Supp. 1997).  The state must
also establish “standards of competency” for the lawyers assigned to capital cases.  Id.  It is not
enough, then, that a particular prisoner was given good counsel in state court.  The state can
take advantage of the provisions in Chapter 154 in an individual case only if it has a system to
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The AEDPA’s provisions concerning delay, procedural default,
and merits adjudication lend themselves to alternative interpreta-
tions. Some constructions would severely disrupt the Supreme
Court’s own recent innovations and would occasionally raise consti-
tutional questions.  Other plausible interpretations would leave the
Court’s work largely undisturbed.  We anticipate that courts will
typically reject the former in favor of the latter: Courts will eschew
sharp breaks with judicially developed reforms and will prefer more
modest adjustments in the system.
In the process, courts will recognize that the AEDPA’s symbolic
function was complete on the date of enactment.  When the AEDPA
is on the books and must be made to fit into a workable and working
adjudicatory system, courts are likely to provide a more moderate,
pragmatic assessment of the new law’s consequences for the real
cases at hand. The AEDPA will have serious consequences, and
those consequences will be deadly for prisoners who fall victim to its
many caprices. Yet we believe that courts will preserve the over-
arching framework from the kind of devastating impact that the most
dramatic interpretations of the AEDPA would entail.152
a. Delays and Timetables.  The AEDPA addresses the problem of
delay by establishing two kinds of timetables: It fixes filing deadlines
for prisoners seeking federal habeas relief and it instructs federal
courts to act on petitions within fixed time periods.
(1) Filing deadlines for prisoners.  In an amendment to Chapter
153, section 2244(d), the AEDPA requires prisoners in both capital
and noncapital cases to file in federal court within one year after the
latest of several events: the date on which direct review is concluded;
the date on which a state impediment to filing is removed; the date
on which the Supreme Court first recognizes the “right” the prisoner
seeks to vindicate (provided the right has been “made retroactively
applicable to cases on collateral review”); or the date on which the
ensure that all indigent death row inmates have competent lawyers.  At this writing, no state
has satisfied the AEDPA’s standards and the “mechanisms” in several states have been held
(or have been conceded to be) inadequate.  See Death Row Prisoners v. Ridge, 106 F.3d 35, 36
(3d Cir. 1997) (Pennsylvania); Mata v. Johnson, 99 F.3d 1261, 1266-67 (5th Cir. 1996) (Texas).
152. The AEDPA also establishes filing deadlines and procedural bar rules for prisoners
attacking federal convictions pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255.  See Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 105,
110 Stat. 1214, 1221 (1996) (amending 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West Supp. 1997)).  Federal law
sometimes treats habeas actions by state prisoners differently from section 2255 motions by
federal prisoners.  We do not consider the AEDPA’s provisions regarding the latter.
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facts underlying the prisoner’s claim can be discovered.153  The one-
year period is tolled while a “properly filed” application for state
postconviction relief is pending.154
In a section of Chapter 154, applicable only to capital cases in
states meeting the standards for invoking that chapter, the AEDPA
establishes a filing period that is only half as long and appears to op-
erate more relentlessly—without safeguards for state interference,
newly established rights, and newly discovered facts.155  At the base-
line, section 2263 provides that a prisoner attacking a death sentence
must file in federal court within 180 days after “final State court af-
firmance . . . on direct review.”156  That 180-day period can be tolled,
but only while the prisoner seeks certiorari review of a conviction in
the Supreme Court of the United States, while the state courts con-
sider the prisoner’s “first” application for state postconviction relief,
and for an additional period, not to exceed thirty days, if the prisoner
demonstrates “good cause.”157
These new provisions raise a host of interpretive questions.  The
new filing deadlines will have crushing consequences if courts resolve
those questions against prisoners.  The impact will be much less se-
vere if courts adopt a more balanced approach.  Indeed, the system
may change very little from what it was under Rule 9(a).158  For illus-
trative purposes, we consider only three issues that arise with respect
to section 2244(d) and two issues with respect to section 2263.
Initially, courts must determine the temporal reach of section
2244(d)’s one-year filing deadline.  The implications will be dramatic
if that deadline applies to all cases, without regard to the circum-
stances.  A prisoner whose conviction was affirmed years ago, and
who previously might have sought federal habeas relief at any time
consistent with Rule 9(a), would simply be cut off by operation of the
new deadline.  A prisoner who has already filed a federal petition
would suffer dismissal if she acted more than a year after direct re-
view was complete.  A prisoner who has not yet filed, but whose con-
viction was affirmed some months before April 24, would have to file
on short notice.
153. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2244(d)(1).
154. See id. § 2244(d)(2).
155. See id. § 2263.
156. Id. § 2263(a).
157. See id. § 2263(b).
158. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
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We doubt that courts will read the section 2244(d) deadline to
produce results like these. Well-established precedent holds that
Congress cannot unilaterally extinguish or impair preexisting rights
of action by implementing a new filing deadline.159  Accordingly, the
federal habeas courts will allow prisoners a “reasonable” time after
April 24160 in which to file.161  The best measure of that reasonable
time is the one-year period contemplated by section 2244(d) itself.162
We anticipate, then, that few federal habeas corpus petitions filed by
April 23, 1997, will be dismissed as untimely under section 2244(d).163 
Next, courts will have to define when “direct review” ends for
purposes of starting the one-year period running in typical cases.
That will be a more difficult task.  The states have divergent appel-
late schemes for criminal prosecutions, and the proper construction
of this federal provision may sometimes depend on the peculiarities
of each state’s law.  On the whole, however, the key issue is likely to
be whether direct review includes certiorari proceedings in the
United States Supreme Court.  Obviously, section 2244(d) does not
explicitly spell that out and it would be possible to interpret the
“conclusion” of direct review to occur when the highest state court
affirms a prisoner’s conviction.  That construction would give prison-
ers contemplating a federal habeas application relatively little time in
which to act.
Here again, courts are likely to reach a result rather more favor-
able to prisoners.  They will take it as significant that the parallel
provision in Chapter 154, section 2263, runs that chapter’s 180-day
filing period from the state courts’ affirmance of the prisoner’s con-
viction and then tolls the period during certiorari proceedings in the
Supreme Court.  Courts are likely to determine, then, that the gen-
159. See Sohn v. Waterson, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 596, 598 (1873); Landgraf v. USI Film Prods.,
511 U.S. 244, 272 n.29 (1994).  Of course, the enactment of a new filing deadline cannot upset
judgments that are already final.  See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, 115 S. Ct. 1447, 1463 (1995)
(holding that Article III bars Congress from ordering federal courts to reopen judgments).
160. April 24, 1996, is the effective date of the AEDPA.  See Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 903(a),
110 Stat. 1214, 1318 (1996).
161. See Peterson v. Demskie, 107 F.3d 92, 92 (2d Cir. 1997) (giving prisoners a “rea-
sonable” time to file after the effective date of the AEDPA); cf. Block v. North Dakota, 461
U.S. 273, 286 n.23 (1983) (indicating that a reasonable grace period is constitutionally re-
quired).
162. See Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 856, 866 (7th Cir. 1996), rev’d on other grounds, 117 S.
Ct. 2059 (1997).
163. Prisoners whose reasonable period rightly begins to run from the date on which a new
(and retroactively applicable) right is established or new evidence is discovered will have still
more time.
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eral reference in section 2244(d) to the “conclusion” of direct review
extends to proceedings before the Supreme Court of the United
States.  This reading would contribute to a coherent interpretation of
the AEDPA as a whole by harmonizing the key features of the filing
period sections.  To put it another way, courts will hesitate to con-
strue legislation ostensibly meant to streamline federal habeas actu-
ally to make it more complex by establishing different accounts of
similar legal events.164
Finally, courts must resolve the tension between the new filing
deadline in section 2244(d) and the exhaustion doctrine—the very
conflict that Rule 9(a)’s relative flexibility was designed to finesse.165
The filing deadline encourages prisoners to file early, while the ex-
haustion doctrine demands that they postpone federal habeas peti-
tions until state court opportunities for litigation have been tried.166
That obvious conflict of purpose is exacerbated in cases in which
prisoners have multiple claims, the state remedies for which are ex-
hausted at different times.  In cases of that kind, the Lundy decision
contemplates that prisoners will forbear federal litigation until all
claims are ripe for federal adjudication.167  If the new filing deadline is
claim-specific, multiple-claim cases can go one of two ways, neither of
which is attractive.
One possibility is that on the eve of the filing deadline, prisoners
will be forced to file federal habeas petitions advancing claims that
are ready for federal adjudication as well as claims for which some
viable state remedy remains available.  That result runs full tilt into
Lundy’s prohibition on “mixed” petitions (containing both
“exhausted” and “unexhausted” claims).  The other possibility is that
prisoners will be forced to split their federal actions, filing one peti-
164. In a like manner, this construction of section 2244 would be consistent with the defini-
tion the Supreme Court gives to “final” judgments in this general field—which includes season-
able proceedings on certiorari.  See Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 321 n.6 (1987).  To date,
the courts that have acknowledged this second interpretive question have apparently seen the
matter precisely this way.  See, e.g., Alexander v. Keane, No. 97 Civ. 2526(SS) 1998 WL 17737,
at *4 nn.1-2 (S.D.N.Y.  Jan. 16, 1998) (stating that “[t]he timeliness of a prisoner filing is meas-
ured from the date the papers were given to prison authorities for mailing” and rejecting re-
spondent’s argument that “the statute of limitations begins to run from the time the Court of
Appeals affirmed the conviction without adding the ninety days in which a petition for certio-
rari could have been filed.” (citations omitted)).
165. The AEDPA retains the exhaustion doctrine and, indeed, recodifies it. See 28
U.S.C.A. § 2254(b)-(c) (West Supp. 1997).
166. See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
167. See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
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tion containing claims ready for federal adjudication and another
(and perhaps another still) when state remedies have been exhausted
with respect to other claims.  That result would also conflict with
Lundy, whose point is to force prisoners to aggregate all their claims
in a single federal petition.
Courts will immediately perceive the folly of starting the filing
period at the conclusion of direct review without regard for the ex-
haustion doctrine.  And they will accordingly search for an interpre-
tation that achieves some rough peace between section 2244(d) and
the exhaustion requirement.  There is a ready way to do it.  Courts
can hold that the filing period in section 2244(d) begins to run when
direct review is concluded, but is tolled while any state postconviction
proceeding is pending with respect to any claim touching the judg-
ment.  If a prisoner has exhausted state remedies with respect to
some claims when direct review is completed, a federal habeas peti-
tion advancing those claims still need not be filed within one year.
As long as a state postconviction remedy remains available for any of
the prisoner’s claims, the filing period for all claims will be tolled
while the prisoner pursues a remedy for that isolated claim.  The fil-
ing period will begin running again when all state remedies for all
claims have been exhausted.168
We anticipate that courts will resolve two additional questions
touching the 180-day filing period established by section 2263 in a
similar way.  That is, courts will reject draconian constructions of the
AEDPA in favor of pragmatic interpretations that are comparatively
prisoner-friendly.  First, courts will have to decide whether the 180-
day period begins to run as soon as direct review in state court is
168. This result is not only plausible and sensible, but it is true to the text and structure of
the AEDPA as well.  The tolling provision in section 2244(d) expressly states that “any period
of limitation” established by that section is tolled while an application for state postconviction
review “with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim” is pending.  28 U.S.C.A. § 2244(d)(2)
(West Supp. 1997) (emphasis added).  Clearly, then, the one-year filing period is not
(necessarily) claim-specific.  While a state postconviction proceeding is under way with respect
to a particular claim, the filing period regarding that claim is certainly tolled.  Yet the filing pe-
riod with respect to any claim is also tolled while a prisoner is pursuing state postconviction
relief on the basis of a separate claim going to the same judgment.
This is not to suggest, of course, that prisoners can defeat the filing deadline by filing
frivolous applications for state postconviction relief regarding trumped-up claims.  The tolling
provision demands a “properly filed” application in state court, id., and courts will be wary of
strategic behavior.  Then again, hard cases will arise in which prisoners have relied on postcon-
viction applications pressing some claims to toll the filing period with respect to all—and state’s
attorneys later contend that those postconviction applications were either procedurally flawed
or insufficiently meritorious to count.
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complete, even if counsel has not yet been appointed to represent the
prisoner.  On first blush, section 2263 explicitly has it just that way.
That new section states that the filing period runs from the date on
which the state courts affirm a prisoner’s conviction on direct review
and is ostensibly indifferent to whether, and when, the state provides
the prisoner with a lawyer.169  If courts interpret section 2263 in that
manner, the AEDPA will collapse the time allowed to initiate federal
habeas proceedings for some of the most compelling petitioners
imaginable—indigent death row inmates who, for lack of professional
representation, may not even be aware that the clock is ticking
against their access to federal court.
Courts charged with implementing the AEDPA will almost cer-
tainly balk at imposing a tight filing deadline on death-sentenced
prisoners who cannot hope to comply.  The short filing deadline in
section 2263 depends on the rationale offered by the Powell Commit-
tee: Capital habeas litigation might be expedited via a 180-day filing
deadline if (and only if) the states agreed to appoint attorneys to rep-
resent the affected inmates in state postconviction litigation.170  As-
signed counsel would not be responsible for satisfying the filing
deadline in federal court, but their involvement in prior state pro-
ceedings would enable prisoners to marshal their claims sooner and
thus to get to federal court within the prescribed time.  In service of
that rationale, the Powell Committee recommended that a 180-day
filing period should run from the date on which counsel was ap-
pointed.171
The Powell Committee’s idea was that a 180-day filing deadline
was workable (and could be justified) because the states concerned
would provide a quid pro quo in the form of assigned counsel. Start-
ing the clock when direct review is complete, rather than when coun-
sel is appointed, neglects that underlying rationale and, with it, the
new scheme’s very integrity.  Courts, we think, will reconcile section
2263 with the Powell Committee’s theory.  They will either read that
section to mean that the filing period begins to run when direct re-
view is complete only if counsel is appointed at that time, or they will
hold that the filing period is tolled until counsel is provided.172
169. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2263(a).
170. See Powell Comm. Report, supra note 150, at 18.
171. See id.
172. This result, too, is true to the AEDPA’s text and structure.  It makes sense that the
filing period should run only when the state has kept its part of the bargain and provided the
professional representation that makes such a short filing period workable.  In addition, this
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The second question facing courts is raised by section 2263’s
failure to repeat the safety valve exceptions contained in the general
filing deadline provision, section 2244(d).  Recall that section 2263
makes no mention of newly established rights and newly discovered
evidence, but rather appears to mandate that the 180-day filing pe-
riod will run relentlessly from its starting point, regardless of any
late-breaking events—even in capital cases, in which it might be an-
ticipated that the law would be more generous to prisoners, not less.
Down in the trenches, courts will resist reading the AEDPA to
dictate such arbitrary results.  We anticipate that in egregious circum-
stances, courts will hold that the Constitution commands the flexibil-
ity necessary to ensure fundamental fairness.  The likely scenarios are
easy enough to construct.  If, for example, the Supreme Court were
to establish a new rule of constitutional law just as a prisoner’s dead-
line was about to expire, a federal court would find a way to allow the
prisoner time to build a claim based upon that new rule into a federal
petition.  A federal court would similarly give the prisoner more time
if new evidence supporting a solid claim were discovered as the
deadline approached.  At the very least, courts will regard events of
this kind as sufficient cause for a thirty-day extension.
To be sure, if courts resolve these questions regarding filing
deadlines in the ways we anticipate, they will sacrifice the symbolism
of breakneck speed at any price in order to arrive at a coherent,
pragmatic construction of the AEDPA as it must operate in the real
cases that arise.  Yet we scarcely suggest that the AEDPA will have
no effect at all.  It will have significant implications for federal habeas
adjudication, and most of the time those implications will not serve
prisoners’ interests.  Some prisoners will suffer for no discernible
policy goal.  Our claim is only that courts will find sensible ways to
assimilate a largely symbolic enactment into a feasible framework for
litigation.
(2) Timetables for federal court action.  The AEDPA also pre-
scribes timetables for federal court action on petitions.  Under sec-
tion 2244(b)(3)(D), a panel of circuit judges has thirty days in which
construction accounts for another, otherwise unrelated, provision in the AEDPA.  In section
2265(c), the AEDPA refers back to previous sections on the appointment of counsel and ex-
plains that the 180-day filing period will begin running only after assigned counsel receives a
transcript of the prisoner’s trial.  See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2265(c) (West Supp. 1997).  That provision
seems plainly to assume that the filing period ordinarily runs from the date of counsel’s ap-
pointment—and not (necessarily) the date when direct review is concluded.
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to perform the gatekeeping function at issue in the Felker decision.173
Section 2266 establishes 120-day timetables for district and circuit
court action on habeas petitions in capital cases arising in states that
have invoked Chapter 154, subject only to thirty-day extensions on
narrowly prescribed grounds.174  These timing rules appear to aug-
ment the filing deadlines that prisoners must meet by expediting con-
sideration of petitions once they are filed.  Here again, an emphasis
on speed is evident.
In the real world of adjudication, however, symbolism will give
way to moderation and pragmatism.  Courts are likely to find consti-
tutional reasons aplenty for construing the new timetables to allow
time for responsible judicial action.  Significantly, neither section
2244(b)(3)(D) nor section 2266 specifies alternatives for a court that
cannot reach a decision within the time prescribed.  Although three
possibilities suggest themselves, only the third is genuinely viable.
First, a court might be compelled to decide the relevant question
against the state.  That action would sacrifice obvious state interests,
but it would have the virtue of ensuring that prisoners are not erro-
neously denied a judicial forum.  Nevertheless, these new timetables
would be unconstitutional were they read to mandate any such per-
emptory judicial action.  Once an Article III court is given jurisdic-
tion to decide a legal issue, Congress has no power to compromise
that court’s ability to decide it lawfully.175  Second, a court might be
compelled to decide the relevant issue against the prisoner without
actually adjudicating the prisoner’s claim.  That response would raise
even larger constitutional problems.  It would implicate the same Ar-
ticle III concerns, and the court’s lawless treatment of the prisoner
would be a flagrant due process violation.176
173. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2244(b)(3)(D) (West Supp. 1997).
174. See id. § 2266.
175. See United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 147 (1871).  Other statutes mandate
only that judicial proceedings must be initiated (not completed) within a fixed time.  The
Speedy Trial Act, for example, specifies only that trial must “commence” within a prescribed
time.  18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1), (2) (1994).  In any event, section 3161 contains numerous tolling
provisions and exceptions.  Sometimes the Constitution itself requires expeditious adjudication.
See, e.g., Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 59 (1965) (holding that prior restraints on speech
must be subject to prompt judicial review).  Yet those cases turn on the existence of other,
competing constitutional values.
176. Cf. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 433 (1982) (holding that a state
cannot terminate an individual’s claim simply because a hearing has not been held within a
specified time and that the individual is entitled to an “opportunity to present his case and have
its merits fairly judged”).
TUSHNETPPFINAL.DOC 03/31/98  2:12 PM
34 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 47 : 1
Inevitably, then, courts will turn to the third possibility: If a
court has tried and failed to reach a reasoned judgment within the
time allotted, the court can simply say so, take the additional time
necessary to perform its judicial function, and then render judgment
when it can.  This understanding is not only constitutionally com-
pelled, but is (as usual) consistent with the text of the AEDPA.  Pur-
suant to various subsections of section 2266, the states are authorized
to “enforce” the timetables by petitioning for a writ of mandamus.177
An appellate court, in turn, can do no more than order a lower court
to decide the question properly before that court; it cannot direct the
lower court to reach a particular outcome.178  Courts will, accordingly,
read the AEDPA’s reference to mandamus enforcement actions to
reinforce the conclusion that section 2266, and by extension section
2244(b)(3)(D), only encourage courts to act as quickly as possible to
discharge their Article III duties.179
b.  Procedural Bar Rules.  In light of the Supreme Court’s previous
decisions, which had been consistent and predictable in their
treatment of procedural default, one might have expected the
AEDPA to contain a single comprehensive provision designed to
govern all situations in which default figures in habeas law.  Instead,
the AEDPA addresses default in as many as five separate sections,
which not only fail to achieve uniformity but, taken literally, appear
to create inconsistency. The AEDPA’s principal provision on default,
section 2244(b), deals with successive federal application cases like
McCleskey.180  This is not surprising at all, of course, given
conservatives’ longstanding objection to multiple petitions from the
same prisoner.  Another new provision in Chapter 153, section
2254(e), treats default in prior state court proceedings, but only with
177. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2266(b)(4)(B), (c)(4)(B).
178. See Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 98 n.6 (1967).
179. Courts will also find this to be consistent with the provisions in section 2266 calling on
the Administrative Office of United States Courts to file periodic reports on compliance with
the timetables.  See 28 U.S.C. § 2266(b)(5), (c)(5).  Mechanically, a circuit court may enter a
place-keeping order that either authorizes or denies a prisoner’s attempt to file another petition
in the district court, but may stay that order pending further study.  Then, when the court is
able to dispose of the application, it can revisit the initial order sua sponte and substitute a final
order.  This result is not inconsistent with the Act’s prohibition on petitions to rehear circuit
court “gatekeeping” decisions.  That provision can fairly be read only to bar one of the parties
from asking the court to reconsider a decision, but not to disturb the court’s ordinary authority
to act sua sponte.  See Triestman v. United States, 124 F.3d 361 (2d Cir. 1997).
180. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
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respect to the facts that underlie claims—the kind of default the
Court considered in Tamayo-Reyes.181  A third new provision, section
2264, addresses common cases, such as Sykes, in which prisoners
completely fail to raise claims in state court.182  Yet since that section
is located in Chapter 154, it reaches only capital cases.183
When courts turn to these new provisions on default, we think
the pattern we have been describing will again be apparent. Courts
will reject interpretations that would disrupt the Court’s doctrine and
will choose instead constructions that make more modest adjust-
ments in the habeas system.  In the process, courts will construe the
many disparate provisions in a way that secures some measure of
consistency.
(1) Default in successive petition cases.  The standards estab-
lished in section 2244(b) could hardly be more demanding.  Initially,
a claim presented in a prior federal petition but offered again in a
second or successive petition “shall be dismissed.”184  A claim raised
for the first time in a second or successive petition may be consid-
ered, but only in narrow circumstances.185  The prisoner must prove
181. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
182. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
183. The other two provisions touching default, sections 2255 and 2262(c), address cases in
which prisoners file multiple challenges to federal convictions and cases in which stays of exe-
cution issued on behalf of state prisoners expire.  Of course, it is also true that the conditions
attending the filing periods established by section 2244(d) and section 2263 are effectively de-
fault provisions as well.
There is no provision dealing forthrightly with noncapital cases like Sykes, in which
prisoners serving prison terms fail to comply with state rules requiring claims to be raised in
state court at a particular time or in a particular manner.  The explanation for this surprising
gap is almost certainly politics.  Conservative proponents of the Act focused exclusively on
capital cases and scarcely considered ordinary habeas actions at all.  See generally Larry W.
Yackle, A Primer on the New Habeas Corpus Statute, 44 BUFF. L. REV. 381 (1996) [hereinafter
Yackle, Primer].  Recall, too, that in the wake of Sykes and related cases, congressional liberals
proposed legislation that would have made defense counsel’s negligence a basis for finding
cause.  See supra note 36 and accompanying text.  Conservatives responded by simply defend-
ing the status quo against those measures.  See Yackle, Primer, supra, at 383.  When conserva-
tives then obtained the upper hand and were able to advance their own version of habeas
“reform” legislation, they did not regroup and propose an amendment on the Sykes issue per
se, but simply left that ground to be covered by the Court’s decisions—decisions that the con-
servatives had been defending for years.
184. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2244(b)(1) (West Supp. 1997).  If this is read literally, a federal court
must dismiss a claim that was raised in a prior petition but was dismissed only because the ap-
plicant had failed to exhaust state remedies.  Inasmuch as a dismissal for want of exhaustion is
not on the merits, courts have held that this new section allows prisoners to return to federal
court after they have met the exhaustion doctrine’s requirements.  See Camarano v. Irvin, 98
F.3d 44 (2d Cir. 1996).
185. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2244(b)(2).
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either: (A) that the claim rests on a “new rule of constitutional law”
that “the Supreme Court” has made “retroactive to cases on collat-
eral review;”186 or (B) that the petition’s “factual predicate” could not
have been discovered earlier and that “the facts underlying the claim,
if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole,” would es-
tablish “by clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional
error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty
of the underlying offense.”187
These standards exceed those previously set by the Supreme
Court as necessary to discourage multiple trips through the federal
courts.188  Recall that in McCleskey the Court held that if a prisoner
offered exculpatory evidence, a federal habeas court should overlook
his inability to demonstrate cause for failing to raise the claim in a
prior application.189  Under the new formulation in section 2244(b), by
contrast, a prisoner must show both that the factual basis for a claim
could not have been discovered earlier and must demonstrate evi-
dence undermining factual guilt.  Moreover, under the Court’s prior
decisions, a prisoner attacking the validity of a conviction could file a
second or successive petition if she offered evidence of “probable”
innocence.190  Yet under section 2244(b), such a prisoner must pro-
duce “clear and convincing” evidence that would have persuaded any
reasonable jury to acquit.191  The Supreme Court had previously re-
served that standard for claims that go to the validity of a death sen-
tence.  In addition, of course, the AEDPA erects the new gatekeep-
ing arrangement the Supreme Court considered in Felker.192
No doubt these new rules and procedures will bring about the
dismissal of almost all successive applications for federal relief.  Yet
the same conclusion might have been drawn from prior Supreme
Court decisions like McCleskey.  There is a real sense, then, in which
section 2244(b) will be ineffectual, if only because the successive-
petition door had already been closed by judicial decision.  If cases
exist in which McCleskey would have allowed a successive petition,
but in which section 2244(b) will not, there is every reason to think
that courts will find the new statute so egregiously rigid as to raise
186. Id. § 2244(b)(2)(A).
187. Id. § 2244(b)(2)(B).
188. See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
189. See supra notes 30, 46, and accompanying text.
190. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
191. See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
192. See supra notes 136-45 and accompanying text.
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constitutional questions.  The likely candidate is a case in which a
prisoner plainly demonstrates probable innocence, but section
2244(b) purports to demand clear and convincing evidence.  A judge
who thinks that the weight of the evidence establishes that a prisoner
is probably innocent is also likely to think that the same evidence is
sufficiently clear and convincing to persuade a reasonable jury to ac-
quit.193
(2) Default with respect to fact development.  The standards es-
tablished by the AEDPA for default in factfinding cases depart from
the Supreme Court precedent of Tamayo-Reyes.194  Under section
2254(e)(2), a prisoner who failed to develop the facts in state court
can obtain a federal hearing only on a showing that: (A) the claim
rests either on a “new” rule of “constitutional” law that “the Su-
preme Court” has made “retroactively applicable to cases on collat-
eral review” or on a “factual predicate” that could not have been dis-
covered previously and (B) those facts “would .  .  .  establish  .  .  .  by
clear and convincing evidence” that but for constitutional error, “no
reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty.”195
This formulation initially appears to track the standards the
AEDPA employs in section 2244(b) to dispose of second or succes-
sive petitions from a single prisoner.  On close examination, however,
the rules here are more demanding.  Under section 2244(b)(2)(A), a
prisoner who wishes to file a second habeas application may do so if
his claim rests on a “new” and “retroactive” rule of constitutional
law, whether or not the claim is related to innocence.196  Under sec-
tion 2254(e)(2), by contrast, if a prisoner seeks a federal hearing on
the ground that a claim relies on a new and retroactive rule, the
“facts underlying the claim” must clearly and convincingly demon-
strate innocence.197
The rigidity of this new formulation conveys the now-familiar
symbolic message that, henceforth, prisoners must turn square cor-
ners if they hope to obtain a foothold in federal court.  Read expan-
sively, section 2254(e)(2) might occupy the field previously held by
case law.  Under that interpretation, the federal courts would be
193. Cf. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2117 (1995) (stating that strict
scrutiny need not always be “fatal in fact” (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519
(1980))).
194. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
195. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(e)(2) (West Supp. 1997).
196. Id. § 2244(b)(2)(A).
197. Id. § 2254(e)(2).
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barred from investigating facts that were not fully explored in state
court, except in the narrow circumstances prescribed in paragraphs
(A) and (B).  Thus Congress would have done by statute what the
Court itself has always declined to do: Congress would have estab-
lished a free-standing federal law of default that bars the federal
courts from determining factual questions, whether or not the state
courts refused or would refuse to consider them.198
Such a construction would be extraordinary.  It would eliminate
an elaborate body of settled doctrine with no explicit warrant either
in new statutory language or in legislative history.  We think courts
will hesitate to read section 2254(e)(2) that way.  Instead, courts will
construe this new provision to presuppose the familiar environment
and to adjust the Court’s default doctrine within that framework.
Courts will read section 2254(e)(2) to proceed from the premise that
a prisoner’s ability to litigate factual issues has been, or would be,
foreclosed in state court on the basis of default.  Symbolism aside,
courts will read the AEDPA to leave this basic feature of the preex-
isting landscape in place.
In other respects, of course, section 2254(e)(2) does break with
the Court’s treatment of default regarding factfinding.  Given the
striking ramifications of some constructions, however, courts are
likely to conclude that even those departures are relatively modest.
The crucial question will be the circumstances that will excuse a pris-
oner’s default with respect to the development of facts in state court
and thus make a federal evidentiary hearing available.  This is the
concept that the Court’s doctrine attempts to capture in the idea of
cause.
The text of section 2254(e)(2) does not mention cause but, in-
stead, specifies that a prisoner can overcome default only if he or she
relies on a “new rule” of “constitutional” law or shows that he or she
could not have discovered the factual basis of a claim earlier.199  These
new statutory standards reflect some, but not all, of the instances in
which the Court has found cause in the past.200  On first reading, the
differences appear significant. On reflection, however, courts are
likely to conclude that no revolutionary change is afoot.
The word “cause” is a term of art in habeas law, and if that term
had been used in section 2254(e)(2), courts would plainly understand
198. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
199. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(e)(2).
200. See supra notes 13-67 and accompanying text.
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that the statute incorporates the meaning the Court has assigned to
cause.  Yet the absence of an express reference to cause need not
carry the opposite implication.  Rather than employing a term of art
in hopes its definition will draw the appropriate distinctions, section
2254(e)(2) may simply articulate the circumstances in which incom-
plete factfinding in state court should not preclude supplemental fact-
finding in federal habeas corpus.  That, we think, is the way that
pragmatic courts will see the matter.
It is surely telling that section 2254(e)(2) is, by its own terms, ad-
dressed only to cases in which “the applicant has failed to develop”
facts in state court.  That express language connotes some ascription
of responsibility for flawed state court factfinding to the prisoner who
later seeks a more thorough exploration of the facts in the federal fo-
rum.  That, in turn, is consistent with the fundamental idea in all the
familiar default cases: a habeas petitioner may fairly bear the conse-
quences of inadequate state court litigation only where the responsi-
bility can be ascribed to the prisoner.201
If the facts were not developed for some reason beyond the pris-
oner’s control, it would be inconsistent with the central purpose of a
default rule to visit a forfeiture on the blameless petitioner.  We
doubt that courts would listen very long to an argument that a federal
hearing is precluded in a case in which a tornado interrupted a pris-
oner’s attempt to litigate facts in state court.  Likewise, it would make
little sense to foreclose federal factfinding if the state’s own agents
caused evidence to be overlooked in state proceedings.
This is what the Supreme Court meant when it said that cause
would be found for default if something “external to the defense” in-
terfered with counsel’s efforts to comply with state procedural
rules.202  The same theory undergirded the Court’s acknowledgment
that cause could be found if counsel’s error constituted ineffective as-
sistance in the constitutional sense.  In that kind of case, too, the
prisoner would not be responsible for the shortcomings in state pro-
ceedings.203
On this basis, courts are likely to conclude that many of the in-
stances in which the Court found cause in prior cases warrant federal
factfinding under the new statute even though they are not captured
by the standards explicitly established by section 2254(e)(2).  The
201. See supra notes 33-38 and accompanying text.
202. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
203. See supra notes 33-38 and accompanying text.
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only difference is this: The Court found cause in cases in which state
court factfinding was inadequate for reasons that could not be as-
cribed to the petitioner (and thus considered the flawed state pro-
ceedings in those cases excusable).  The new statute, by contrast,
folds its treatment of situations like that into the baseline condition
for its application to any case, namely, the understanding that “the
applicant” must have been responsible for the lack of adequate fact
development in the first instance.204  If the prisoner was not responsi-
ble, then section 2254(e)(2) is inapplicable, and the availability of
federal factfinding continues to turn on the Court’s preexisting doc-
trine.
In the end, courts are likely to read section 2254(e)(2) to
authorize federal evidentiary hearings in most of the same circum-
stances in which hearings were conducted in the past.  Some cases
will not implicate the new statute at all, because the petitioner bears
no fault for deficient state factfinding.  Others will fit within section
2254(e)(2)’s two categories of excused defaults ascribable to the pris-
oner.205
(3) Default in death penalty cases.  The formulation in section
2264 allows federal courts to overlook default in state court in cir-
cumstances that more closely track the Supreme Court’s cases on
cause.206  Subject to those exceptions, however, section 2264 explicitly
restricts the federal courts to claims (and a fortiori the facts underly-
ing claims) that were both “raised” and “decided on the merits” in
state court.207
If section 2264’s reference to decisions on the merits is taken lit-
erally, federal courts would be unable to consider claims that were
not the subject of default in state court at all—claims that were
204. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(e)(2) (West Supp. 1997).  The President made precisely this
point in his signing statement when he said that “[section 2254(e)] applies to situations in which
‘the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis’ of his or her claim.  Therefore, [section
2254(e)] is not triggered when some factor that is not fairly attributable to the applicant pre-
vented evidence from being developed in State court.”  President’s Statement on Signing the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 32 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 719
(Apr. 24, 1996).  Several circuits have already taken this view.  See Jones v. Wood, 114 F.3d
1002, 1013 (9th Cir. 1997); Love v. Morton, 112 F.3d 131, 135 (3d Cir. 1997).
205. See Yackle, Evidentiary Hearings, supra note 30, at 142-49 (discussing other features of
section 2254(e)(2) and suggesting alternative constructions that would require only modest
adjustments in preexisting doctrine).
206. Conspicuously absent, however, is the Supreme Court’s rule that a prisoner need not
have a good reason for default in state court, if the prisoner shows that he is probably innocent.
See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 322-24 (1995).
207. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2264(a).
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pressed on the state courts according to state law, but were never-
theless ignored in the ultimate disposition.  Paradoxically, the federal
courts would be authorized to examine claims that were not raised in
state court (for the reasons section 2264 lists as sufficient excuses for
default), but they would not be authorized to hear all manner of
other claims that were raised, but were not decided on the merits.
We think courts will summarily reject that construction because
it both conflicts with the ordinary policies attending default doctrine
and produces unconstitutional results.  Obviously, the drafting in this
instance is even worse than usual.  The notion that claims should be
denied a federal hearing in the absence of default can scarcely be
squared with the rest of section 2264, which, again, specifies circum-
stances excusing default.  The core purpose of section 2264 is plainly
to prescribe the kinds of default that will not foreclose federal adju-
dication, and courts will interpret it accordingly.208
Moreover, the proposition that the federal courts might be
barred from examining claims that were simply neglected by state
courts would trigger serious due process concerns.  Even the most
grudging assessments of the Fourteenth Amendment concede that
the states must provide some “corrective process” for violations of
fundamental rights.209  It is inconceivable, then, that the literal text of
section 2264 should insulate the states from federal habeas review
when they blithely ignore properly preserved federal issues.  Here
again, courts will give the AEDPA an interpretation that is sensible
and workable.  They will read section 2264’s reference to state deci-
sions on the merits to assume that the state courts have addressed
properly presented claims, and they will not read it to cut off claims
when that assumption is unwarranted.
c.  Previous State Court Judgments on the Merits.  The AEDPA plai-
nly address the attention that federal habeas courts must pay to prior
state court determinations of the merits.  Yet it does so in ambiguous
terms.  Section 2254(d)(1), applicable to both capital and noncapital
cases, bars federal habeas relief on the basis of a claim that was
previously “adjudicated on the merits”210 in state court, unless the
208. The Powell Committee Report, which provided the model for Chapter 154 and this
new section, recommended that the scope of federal review be limited to federal claims that
were “actually raised and litigated” (not decided) in state court.  Powell Comm. Report, supra
note 150, at 3245 (emphasis added).
209. See Frank v. Magnum, 237 U.S. 309, 335-36 (1915).
210. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d) (West Supp. 1997).
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state adjudication “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal
law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.”211
When courts grapple with that new language, they will have difficult
choices to make.  Again, we anticipate that they will settle on a
construction that leaves fundamental prior arrangements in place.
Specifically, we think courts will read this crucial new provision
essentially to codify the Teague doctrine as articulated by Justice
O’Connor.212
Obviously, section 2254(d)(1) departs from the process-based
approach to habeas advocated by the Reagan and Bush administra-
tions.213  Nothing in section 2254(d)(1) suggests that the federal ha-
beas courts should accept state court results if the state courts em-
ployed “full and fair” procedures in adjudicating prisoners’ federal
claims.214  Rather, section 2254(d)(1) plainly contemplates that the
federal courts will examine the substantive outcomes the state courts
have produced.  The precise character of that examination, however,
is unclear.  At least three options are available.
First, section 2254(d)(1) may plausibly be read to damage the ef-
ficacy of federal habeas as a vehicle for adjudicating claims previ-
ously rejected by the state courts.  After all, this new section estab-
lishes a baseline rule that federal relief is no longer available unless a
case fits within one of two exceptions.  Those exceptions, in turn, may
be read narrowly.  Courts may construe the reference to state deci-
sions that were “contrary” to “clearly established” federal law to im-
plicate only decisions based on a serious misapprehension of the ab-
stract legal standard applicable to a prisoner’s claim.  And they may
construe the reference to state decisions that involved an
“unreasonable application” of “clearly established” law to encompass
only cases in which the state courts correctly perceived the applicable
legal principle, but grossly miscalculated the impact of that standard
on a particular case and thus produced a decision that was not only
wrong, but unreasonably wrong.
Reducing the federal courts’ role so severely would be startling,
but not unprecedented.  When citizens sue state executive officers for
211. Id. § 2254(d)(1).  Section 2254(d) also permits federal habeas relief if a prior state ad-
judication “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts
in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.”  Id. § 2254(d)(2).
212. See Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 304 (1992) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
213. See infra notes 230-31 and accompanying text.
214. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 489 (1976).
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damages, the federal courts can respond favorably only if the defen-
dant flagrantly disregarded constitutional rights of which any reason-
able officer would have been aware.215  The official immunity that
shields state officials in those cases is replicated in the language of
section 2254(d)(1).  Specifically, defendants can avoid liability for
damages, unless they acted unreasonably “in light of the legal rules
that were ‘clearly established’ at the time [their allegedly unlawful ac-
tion] was taken.”216  Recall, too, that Justice Thomas has taken the
view that Teague and its progeny have already undermined Brown v.
Allen, so that the federal habeas courts must defer to “reasonable”
state decisions applying constitutional standards to the circumstances
of individual cases.217  In this vein, courts may read section 2254(d)(1)
simply to take up the question the Court left open in Wright v. West
and to side decisively with Justice Thomas rather than Justice
O’Connor.218
An interpretation along those lines would be plausible, but
highly unlikely.  After all, most of the habeas provisions in the
AEDPA make (or attempt to make) procedural changes in the way
the federal courts adjudicate cases.  All those procedural provisions
would be unintelligible if this single section of the Act desiccated the
federal courts’ authority to determine the merits of claims when they
are presented in the proper procedural posture.  It is hardly necessary
to infer from section 2254(d)(1)’s ambiguous language that Congress
has arbitrarily lifted a standard out of the immunity cases for use in
this entirely different context, and there is no reliable legislative his-
tory on the point.219  Nor are courts obliged to leap to the conclusion
215. See Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 562 (1978).
216. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639 (1987) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457
U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).
217. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
218. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
219. The Court’s reasons for protecting state officers from liability for damages are inappo-
site in habeas cases.  Indeed, the Court has often distinguished habeas from the official immu-
nity cases, where “special federal policy concerns” explain the deference the federal courts give
to state officials operating in the field.  See Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, 514 U.S. 749, 758
(1995).  Qualified immunity is limited to cases in which public officials are faced with the
“specter of damages liability for judgment calls made in a legally uncertain environment.”  Ry-
der v. United States, 515 U.S. 177, 185 (1995).  The threat of trials and liability in other than
extraordinary circumstances might discourage competent people from accepting executive po-
sitions or, having done so, from aggressively discharging their duties.  See Harlow v. Fitzgerald,
457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982).  Moreover, if executive officers could be forced to defend themselves
at trial, “society as a whole” would have to bear “the expenses of litigation” and “the diversion
of official energy from pressing public issues.”  Id.
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that section 2254(d)(1) embraces Justice Thomas’s extension of the
Teague doctrine.  The text of the new law scarcely tracks Justice
Thomas’s opinion in West.  Certainly, there is no legislative history to
suggest that anyone had Justice Thomas’s position in mind.
By contrast, we think a much more convincing case can be made
for an interpretation at the other polar extreme.  Judged by its text,
and the legislative history behind that text, section 2254(d)(1) may
reinforce the traditional scope of the writ.  Far from embracing Jus-
tice Thomas’s view that Teague somehow upsets Brown v. Allen, the
new statute may actually disclaim any such extension of Teague and
instead confirm Brown’s principle of independent federal adjudica-
tion.  Thus the federal habeas courts may grant relief whenever they
conclude that a prisoner’s claim is meritorious, no matter what view
the state courts previously took.
Briefly stated, the argument goes like this.  The new statute bars
federal habeas relief unless a prior state court “decision” either was
“contrary” to “clearly established” law “as determined by the Su-
preme Court” or “involved an unreasonable application” of that
law.220  Taken literally, that disjunctive formulation makes the refer-
ence to “unreasonable” applications of federal law superfluous.221  All
the action is in the previous reference to state court decisions that are
“contrary to” federal law.  That reference, in turn, covers both errors
of pure law and errors in the application of law.222  A state court
“decision” can be “contrary to” federal law because the state court
invoked an incorrect legal standard or because it applied the correct
During the Senate floor debates on AEDPA, the floor leader did refer to the Harlow
case on one occasion, see 141 CONG. REC. S7848 (daily ed. June 7, 1995) (statement of Sen.
Hatch), but he scarcely explained that the bill was meant to import the immunity model into
habeas.  For more on the analogy to official immunity, see Yackle, Primer, supra note 183, at
403-07.
220. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d)(1) (West Supp. 1997).
221. The legislative history suggests that this is precisely what the chief proponents of the
AEDPA meant to achieve—and in fact were required to achieve in order to win sufficient
votes on the floor of the Senate.  See Yackle, Primer, supra note 183, at 435-43.
222. By this account, section 2254(d)(1) draws no simplistic distinction between state court
errors regarding abstract legal rules, on the one hand, and errors regarding the application of
legal rules in individual cases, on the other.  Nothing in section 2254(d)(1) separates issues out
in that way.  By its literal terms, section 2254(d)(1) bars the federal courts from awarding relief
with respect to a claim, unless a prior state court “decision” was flawed.  Obviously, a
“decision” embraces both a court’s identification of the applicable legal standard and the
court’s application of that standard to the facts in a particular case.  See Yackle, Primer, supra
note 183, at 433-35 (discussing an unsuccessful bill in the House that would have lent itself
more readily to a distinction between state court errors of law and state court errors of law ap-
plication).
TUSHNETPPFINAL.DOC 03/31/98  2:12 PM
1997] SYMBOLIC STATUTES 45
standard but still reached an erroneous result in the case at bar.223 If a
state court acts “contrary to” federal law whenever it decides a case
incorrectly, this new statute preserves the independence of the fed-
eral habeas courts’ judgment on the merits of claims.  Suffice it to
say, section 2254(d)(1) creates no general rule of deference to
“reasonable” state decisions on questions of federal law or on mixed
questions of law and fact.224
By this account, section 2254(d)(1) changes habeas law primarily
by shifting the focus of the federal courts’ work.  The new statute di-
rects the federal courts to a begin their analysis at a different base-
line.  Previously, federal courts followed the traditional model of ha-
beas corpus and focused their attention on the validity of the
prisoner’s current detention.225  They went immediately to the merits
of the prisoner’s claim, without taking any particular (or necessary)
account of what the state courts might have said about that claim in
the past.226  Under this new provision, however, the federal habeas
courts must take a previous state court judgment as the starting point
for federal adjudication.  The federal adjudication remains independ-
ent, but the question on which independent federal judgment is exer-
cised is no longer the traditional question whether the prisoner’s cus-
tody is valid.  Instead, the question is now whether, after adjudicating
the merits of the claim, the state courts reached the correct conclu-
sion.  In this sense, section 2254(d)(1) incorporates the conventional
appellate understanding of de novo review into habeas corpus.
In addition, section 2254(d)(1) underscores that the federal ha-
beas courts can properly hold the state courts only to constitutional
principles established by the Supreme Court itself.  The lower federal
courts have no hierarchical authority over the state courts.  Accord-
ingly, their decisions are not entitled to the same allegiance.227  If
anyone missed this point before, the new statute spells it out.  When
the federal habeas courts focus on prior state court judgments under
223. Cf. 28 U.S.C.A. § 636(b)(1)(A) (West 1994) (using the same “contrary to” formulation
to describe the standard that a district court applies when reviewing a magistrate judge’s judg-
ment on a legal issue).
224. The legislative history supports this reading.  Previous attempts to establish such a rule
of deference to the state courts were unsuccessful.  Accordingly, proponents made a calculated
decision to drop those attempts in order to win passage of a general habeas bill in the 104th
Congress.  See Yackle, Primer, supra note 183, at 422-43.
225. See Walker v. Wainwright, 390 U.S. 335 (1968) (stating that the primary historic use of
habeas corpus is to test the legality of a prisoner’s current detention).
226. See Yackle, Primer, supra note 183, at 403 (explaining prior practice).
227. See Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 376 (1993) (Thomas, J., concurring).
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section 2254(d)(1), they now ask only whether the state courts
reached the correct conclusion in light of federal law as it has clearly
been established “by the Supreme Court of the United States.”228
Of course, courts invariably resist interpretive options that entail
convulsive change in any direction.  Accordingly, courts are likely to
reject both of these constructions of section 2254(d)(1).  Under the
first option, Article III courts would become rubber-stamps for pre-
vious state court judgments; under the second option they would re-
sume the posture they had before the Supreme Court began devel-
oping the Teague doctrine.  We anticipate that courts will gravitate
toward a third option, the middle ground that Justice O’Connor’s un-
derstanding of Teague now occupies.229 They will read section
2254(d)(1) essentially to codify Teague as a choice-of-law rule.  Un-
der the new statute, the federal habeas courts will exercise independ-
ent judgment regarding the merits of claims, but they will do so in
light of the law as it was clearly established by Supreme Court prece-
dents at the time the state courts acted.230
228. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d)(1) (West Supp. 1997).  This does not mean, of course, that lower
federal court decisions are irrelevant.  They typically provide the state courts with excellent
guidance regarding the meaning of the Supreme Court’s principles.
229. See Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 304 (1992) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
230. Lower court discussions of section 2254(d)(1) have, to date, been inconclusive.  Most
of those cases appeared before the Supreme Court held that section 2254(d)(1) did not apply to
cases already pending on the date of enactment.   See supra note 149.  Two of these treatments
have attracted attention.  Writing for an en banc court in Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 856 (7th
Cir. 1996), rev’d on other grounds, 117 S. Ct. 2059 (1997), Judge Easterbrook dismissed the
suggestion that the statute establishes a general rule of deference to state judgments and dis-
claimed reliance on any analogy to the official immunity cases.  See id. at 869-70.  He also rec-
ognized that section 2254(d)(1) focuses attention on the Supreme Court’s own precedents,
rather than on decisions rendered by the lower federal courts.  See id. at 869.  He stated that in
deciding whether a prior state decision is “contrary to” the law as determined by the Supreme
Court, the federal habeas courts are required to “listen carefully” to what the state courts have
to say, but then must themselves decide whether the state courts have correctly understood the
Supreme Court.  Id.  Perhaps even more importantly, however, Judge Easterbrook stated that
section 2254(d)(1)’s reference to “unreasonable” applications means that the federal courts
cannot award habeas relief unless a prior state court “unreasonably” applied the correct legal
standard to a particular case.  Id. at 870.
Judge Easterbrook was (deliberately?) vague regarding the relationship between sec-
tion 2254(d)(1) and Teague.  He stated that the statute “extends” Teague inasmuch as it focuses
the federal habeas courts on state court adherence to Supreme Court precedents alone.  Id. at
869.  He also stated that it is unlikely that a habeas court would face “a different kind of inter-
pretive challenge” when deciding whether the Supreme Court had “clearly established” a rule
at the time the state court acted, instead of the question presented under Teague (i.e., whether
a judgment for the prisoner was compelled by then-existing law).  Id.  Coming to the
“unreasonable application” standard, Easterbrook stated initially that the statute might
“perhaps” be understood as “another variation on Teague.”  Id.  That is, it might require the
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Once again, another of the AEDPA’s provisions produces mar-
ginal results.  This is only to be expected. Symbolic statutes must
nonetheless fit into the legal landscape.  The AEDPA associates
Congress with restrictive initiatives already undertaken by the Court.
Small wonder that when the AEDPA’s contributions are stirred into
the mix, they change the flavor rather little.  Some courts, however,
may fail to do the interpretive work they should and, instead, may in-
terpret the statute to embed Congress’s mood in the statute books.  If
that happens, some criminals will fail to receive the relief they de-
serve under the statute as properly interpreted.
C.  The Prison Litigation Reform Act
The Prison Litigation Reform Act231 has two components.  The
first, originally labeled the Stop Turning Out Prisoners Act, appears
to define the circumstances under which courts may enter injunctions
against unconstitutional prison conditions such as overcrowding and
federal courts to respect “reasonable” state judgments without pausing to determine whether
they comport with more recent decisions.  Id. at 870.  Later he intimated that federal relief
should be denied if the state courts gave the prisoner “a full opportunity to litigate” a claim and
thus suggested the kind of process-based approach to habeas that section 2254(d)(1) seems
plainly to have discarded.  Id. at 871.  Still, Judge Easterbrook plainly did not state that the
“unreasonable application” language in the statute codifies Justice Thomas’s opinion in Wright
v. West or that it revives the failed Reagan administration approach.
Writing for a divided panel in Drinkard v. Johnson, 97 F.3d 751 (5th Cir. 1996), cert.
denied, 117 S. Ct. 1114 (1997), Judge Jolly followed more or less the first approach we discussed
in the text.  He stated that section 2254(d)(1) distinguishes state court treatments of legal and
mixed questions and, with respect to the latter, bars federal habeas relief unless the state courts
“unreasonably applied” a clearly established legal standard to a particular case.  Id. at 767-68.
Such an unreasonable application should be found, he said, only if “reasonable jurists consid-
ering the question would be of one view that the state court ruling was incorrect.”  Id. at 769.
That, in all fairness, suggests that Judge Jolly reads section 2254(d)(1) to establish the very
general rule of deference that Judge Easterbrook eschews.  See id. at 767 n.21 (finding it ironic
to suggest that “after all the years of failed attempts by Congress to adopt a deferential stan-
dard of review in this area,” this new provision “represents no more than the codification of
existing Supreme Court precedent”).  Yet even Judge Jolly declined explicitly to hold that sec-
tion 2254(d)(1) embraces Justice Thomas’s argument in West.  See id. at 778-79 (Garza, J., dis-
senting) (insisting that section 2254(d)(1) cannot be read to upset the de novo standard estab-
lished in Brown).  Moreover, in a subsequent Fifth Circuit case, Judge Wiener stated: “In
effect, a reasonable, good faith application of Supreme Court precedent will immunize the state
court conviction from federal habeas reversal, even if federal courts later reject that view of the
applicable precedent.  The AEDPA essentially codified the Supreme Court’s current position on
the scope of the Great Writ.”  Mata v. Johnson, 99 F.3d 1261, 1268 (5th Cir. 1996) (emphasis
added).
231. Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.A. § 3626(d), 28
U.S.C.A. § 1346, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1997 and other scattered sections).
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inadequate medical care.232  The second component addresses indi-
vidual suits by prisoners, and the alleged problem of frivolous pris-
oner litigation.233
1.  Restricting Institutional Litigation: The Statute.
a.  Introduction.  As with the AEDPA’s habeas corpus provisions,
one cannot understand the interpretive issues posed by the PLRA
without viewing it against the backdrop of the law in effect at its
enactment.  Harmonizing the AEDPA’s provisions with preexisting
law, we argued, was likely to lead courts to interpret those provisions
to make marginal changes.  The Constitution plays a somewhat larger
role in supporting a similar conclusion about the PLRA.  To avoid
constitutional questions, we suggest, courts are likely to interpret the
PLRA’s institutional litigation provisions to make similarly marginal
changes to preexisting law. 234
b.  General Considerations.  The PLRA applies to litigation surrou-
nding conditions of confinement brought in both federal and state
courts.235  Yet state courts have rarely micromanaged their own state’s
prisons and jails, and the rhetoric of the PLRA’s sponsors never
focused on problems they saw in state court litigation.  The PLRA’s
232. See id. § 802, 110 Stat. at 1321-65 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.A. § 1626 (West
Supp. 1997)).
233. See id. § 803(d), 110 Stat. at 1321-71 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1997e
(West Supp. 1997)).
234. The House Committee on the Judiciary’s report regarding the bill that was eventually
incorporated into the 1996 budget agreement as the PLRA states that its requirement that re-
lief be granted “only if that prisoner can prove a violation of his own federal rights . . . is in
complete harmony with federal standing requirements,” and “remind[s] courts that standing
must be the threshold inquiry in prison cases . . . .”  H.R. REP. NO. 104-21, at 23 (1995).  The
report also asserts that the statute’s substantive standard for relief, that the relief “extend no
further than necessary to remove the conditions that are causing the deprivation,” is “not a de-
parture from current jurisprudence concerning injunctive relief” and “codif[ies] the existing
Supreme Court law that is being trampled by some courts.”  Id. at 14, 21.
235. The PLRA’s savings clause provides that “[t]he limitations on remedies in this section
shall not apply to relief entered by a State court based solely upon claims arising under State
law.”  18 U.S.C.A. § 3626(d) (West Supp. 1997).  The natural inference is that the limitations
do apply to relief entered in state court based on claims arising under federal law.  Compare 18
U.S.C.A. § 3626(a)(3)(A) (“In any civil action with respect to prison conditions, no prisoner
release order shall be entered unless [certain conditions are satisfied].”) with 18 U.S.C.A. §
3626(a)(3)(B) (“In any civil action in Federal court with respect to prison conditions, a prisoner
release order shall be entered only by a three-judge court . . . .” (emphasis added)).  See also
infra note 298 and accompanying text (describing possible effects of interpreting consent de-
crees as contracts enforceable under state law).
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application to state court procedures raises no general constitutional
questions, because the statute prescribes procedures for dealing with
federal constitutional and statutory claims.236  It does, however, sug-
gest that something relatively unusual motivated the PLRA’s
enactment—symbolism more than substance.
Two PLRA provisions do raise interesting federalism questions,
and the ease with which a Congress devoted to returning power to
the states enacted them again illuminates the deeper problems of
legislative process that concern us.  These provisions change the con-
tours of prison litigation.  The first provision bars consent decrees
unless they comply with the PLRA’s substantive standards.237  Under
these standards, plaintiffs and prison administrators can no longer
agree to address arguably unconstitutional conditions unless the ad-
ministrators consent to the entry of an order that the conditions are
indeed unconstitutional.238  Perhaps the rationale is that prison ad-
ministrators agreed too readily to remedy conditions that they found
troubling as professionals, even though the conditions did not violate
the Constitution.  Prison administrators are bureaucrats, among other
things, and they may not seriously oppose an order from a federal
court that would prod the legislature into appropriating more money
236. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.A. § 3626(a)(3) (West Supp. 1997) (setting forth the requirements
for entering a prisoner release order). Cf. Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 139-40 (1988) (holding
that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 preempts state procedures in civil rights cases litigated in state courts).
237. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3626(c)(1) (West Supp. 1997).
238. See id. § 3626(a)(1)(A).  We note the litigation difficulties that attend the raising of
these federalism objections.  A state official who wants to enter a consent agreement that does
not concede liability but is unwilling to agree to the entry of a judgment that does concede li-
ability can raise the federalism objection.  The provision’s theory, however, is that there are
political costs to making a high visibility decision, and the motion containing the federalism
objections would carry with it nearly the same political costs. Given the statute’s effects on de-
fendants’ incentives, few, if any, state officials will raise the federalism objection.
We think that a plaintiff could raise the federalism objection as well.  Federalism is a
set of structural guarantees, held by the nation’s people in their capacity as state citizens, not by
state officials.  Cf. Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944-46 (1983)
(noting that one president’s signature on statute creating legislative veto cannot “waive” later
objections to the statute, which can be asserted by individuals as well as by executive officials).
The clearest case would be if a plaintiff alleges that a state was willing to enter a consent decree
prior to PLRA but is unwilling to agree to the entry of a judgment expressly finding liability
post-PLRA.  We think this raises the same questions as when a state moves for relief from a
prior consent decree, but we acknowledge that courts are not as likely to favorably view a
plaintiff who raises a federalism objection to a course of conduct that state officials appear
quite willing to pursue.  Cf. Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2372 (1997) (suggesting that
states may agree to comply with a congressional directive that would violate the Constitution if
it were imposed on unconsenting state officials).
TUSHNETPPFINAL.DOC 03/31/98  2:12 PM
50 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 47 : 1
to improve the prisons.239
Barring consent decrees changes the context of litigation.  Prison
administrators unschooled in the law may fear that admitting liability
might expose them to personal damage suits.240  More likely, settle-
ment negotiations will be more difficult if the administrators have to
acknowledge publicly that their prisons have unconstitutional condi-
tions.  Such acknowledgments may be difficult to make for both per-
sonal and political reasons.
A second PLRA provision of interest here confers standing and
a right to intervene in pending litigation on a wide range of state and
local officials, including prosecutors and legislators, to “oppose the
imposition or continuation in effect” of orders directing the release of
prisoners, and to “seek termination of such relief.”241  This provision
responds directly to a circuit court’s denial of standing to Philadel-
phia prosecutor Ronald Castille, and his successor Lynne Abraham,
to challenge an order structuring admissions to Philadelphia’s jails.242
Congress appears to have told state officials that no matter how
they assess their situation, they may not consent to the entry of an
order against them if the order lacks certain characteristics.  Congress
has also apparently authorized intervention in pending litigation by
officials who, under state law, may have no interest in the litigation,
and indeed who may be denied authority to intervene by state law.243
239. Cf. R. SHEP MELNICK, BETWEEN THE LINES: INTERPRETING WELFARE RIGHTS 148
(1994) (“‘Changes sought through litigation may be very similar to directions the party named
as ‘defendant’ has tried to achieve. . . . Litigation (or the threat of litigation) may be used as a
lever to bring about the action desired by both the potential defendant and the plaintiff.’”
(quoting Alan Abeson, Litigation, in PUBLIC POLICY AND THE EDUCATION OF EXCEPTIONAL
CHILDREN 240 (Frederick J. Weintraub et al. eds., 1977)) (omission in original)).
240. Such a fear would be unrealistic, though, because the Court’s official immunity doc-
trine would almost certainly shield individual administrators from liability for unconstitutional
conditions resulting from inadequate appropriations.  Cf. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 311
(1990) (suggesting that inadequate appropriations might be a defense to a finding of an indi-
vidual constitutional violation).
241. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3626(a)(3)(F).
242. See Harris v. Pernsley, 820 F.2d 592, 602-03 (3d Cir. 1987).
243. According to the Third Circuit, the “scope” of an official’s interest “is defined by the
scope of his duties under . . . [state] law.”  Id. at 597 (holding that a local prosecutor had no re-
sponsibility for the prison conditions that led the district court to issue its order structuring the
admission of prisoners).  After the Third Circuit denied intervention because state law did not
give the prosecutor an interest in orders of that kind, see id. at 604, Pennsylvania adopted a
statute expressly stating that prosecutors had such an interest.  See Harris v. Reeves, 946 F.2d
214, 217 (1987).  The Third Circuit again affirmed an order denying intervention, this time on
the ground that the statute did not actually grant the prosecutor new authority (independent of
its purported effect on her right to intervene).  See id. at 222-24.
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It does not stretch the metaphor to suggest that both provisions
commandeer state officials in a way analogous to that held unconsti-
tutional in New York v. United States and Printz v. United States.244
The intervention provision arguably alters the states’ decisionmaking
processes directly.  Although a state might prefer to reduce the
sources of political pressure on its prison administrators, particularly
from local prosecutors, Congress, through the PLRA, has apparently
displaced the state’s authority to allocate some responsibilities to
prison administrators and others to local prosecutors.245
The provision barring consent decrees arguably alters state deci-
sionmaking processes indirectly.  It changes the political incentives
that local officials have for choosing among courses of conduct.  Con-
gress may alter local officials’ incentives by offering financial in-
ducements in the form of conditional spending statutes.246  The theory
of state autonomy underlying New York and Printz may be that
states must be able to organize themselves so that their citizens
clearly understand who has political responsibility for the choices
state officials make.  This suggests that Congress may not alter state
officials’ political incentives to induce the state officials to change
their conduct.  In New York, the problem may have been that New
York’s citizens would be unable to get a clear answer to the question
“Why did you dump this nuclear waste here rather than there?”  Un-
der the PLRA’s approach to consent decrees, a state’s citizens might
not be able to get a clear answer to the questions, “Why did you go
through such an expensive lawsuit, which you lost, rather than work-
244. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 161 (1992) (holding that the federal gov-
ernment cannot compel states to enact regulatory programs); Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct.
2365, 2383 (1997) (holding that the federal government cannot compel state executive officials
to enforce national law).
245. Where state law gives the designated officials an interest in the litigation, pre-PLRA
law gave them standing and a right to intervene if asserted in a timely manner.  See 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 3626(a)(3)(F) (West Supp. 1997).  The PLRA provision therefore changes existing law only
when state law does not give the officials such an interest.  A state might attempt to sanction a
local prosecutor who exercised her federal right to intervene.  The claim that the PLRA pre-
empts such a sanction would directly raise the constitutional federalism issue described here.
The federalism difficulty is exacerbated by the fact that the statute allows intervention
only by the designated officials if they seek to oppose prisoner releases. See 18 U.S.C.A. §
3626(a)(3)(F) (West Supp. 1997).  It is not difficult to imagine legislators or even prosecutors
with constituencies such that they would wish to intervene to support a release order.  Congress
appears to have placed its weight on one side of internal political controversies.  If one-sided
intervention is constitutionally problematic, either on federalism or equal protection grounds,
presumably the remedy is to allow automatic intervention by the designated officials no matter
which side they wish to support.
246. See New York, 505 U.S. at 171-73.
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ing out some sort of consent decree much earlier and more cheaply?”
As the Court put it in New York, federalism requires that the public
know on whom to place “the brunt of  .  .  . disapproval.”247 Whom
should the people blame if the state engages in expensive litigation—
the officials or Congress?
The Court’s federalism jurisprudence is in flux, and we do not
contend that the Supreme Court would in fact find these PLRA pro-
visions unconstitutional.  These provisions do suggest, however, that
the statute is something other than an ordinary exercise of lawmaking
authority by a Congress purportedly committed to devolving power
to the states.
c. Prospective Relief Generally, Including Modification.  The PLRA
begins with a statement of the substantive standard for granting relief
against unconstitutional conditions of confinement. The relief
awarded must be “narrowly drawn,” “extend[ ] no further than
necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right,” and be “the
least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the Federal
right.”248  This provision follows the model of the Helms Amendment
to the Violent Crime Control and Enforcement Act of 1994, which
provided that a federal court “shall not hold prison or jail
overcrowding unconstitutional . . . except to the extent that an indivi-
dual plaintiff proves that the crowding causes the infliction of cruel
and unusual punishment of that inmate.”249  Facially, neither the
Helms Amendment nor the PLRA provision do much more than
restate existing law.250
The Court expressed its understanding of the application of the
Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment to prison
confinement conditions in Rhodes v. Chapman.251  According to Rho-
des, plaintiffs challenging prison conditions must show that the condi-
tions either involve “the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain,”
or that the conditions are “grossly disproportionate” to the prisoner’s
crime.252  The Court later explained that these requirements can be
247. Id. at 169.
248. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3626(a)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1997).
249. 139 CONG. REC. S10,426 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1993).
250. See Smith v. Arkansas Dep’t of Correction, 103 F.3d 637, 647 (8th Cir. 1996) (“[W]e
are satisfied, and the parties agree, that the Act merely codifies existing law and does not
change the standards for determining whether to grant an injunction.”).
251. 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981).
252. Id.
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satisfied if a prisoner is “exposed . . . to a sufficiently substantial [risk
of harm].”253  Constitutional violations that consist of exposing pris-
oners to such risks can be remedied only by eliminating the risks.
The PLRA requires that relief can be granted to correct only
violations of “a particular plaintiff[’s]” rights.254  This provision, how-
ever, does not restrict relief unless the definition of rights is restric-
tive as well.  In Helling v. McKinney, the Court refused to adopt such
a restrictive definition.255  In Helling, a prisoner claimed that his pro-
longed exposure to second-hand smoke in his cell violated his consti-
tutional right to be free of cruel and unusual punishment because the
second-hand smoke posed a real threat to his health.256  The Court
agreed, holding that the Constitution protected prisoners from expo-
sure to risks of severe medical harm.257
The PLRA’s substantive standard also requires that a court or-
dering relief “shall give substantial weight to any adverse impact on
public safety or the operation of a criminal justice system caused by
the relief.”258  Initially, one might think that public safety considera-
tions are irrelevant to a determination of whether a particular pun-
ishment is cruel and unusual.  Turner v. Safley259 held that federal
courts should defer to prison authorities in determining whether
prison regulations are unconstitutional, because “[r]unning a prison is
an inordinately difficult undertaking that requires expertise, plan-
ning, and the commitment of resources.”260  The Court made it clear
in Lewis v. Casey261 that this requirement applies to injunctive orders
about conditions of confinement.262  It would be natural to interpret
253. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 843 (1994); see also Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S.
25, 33-34 (1993) (explaining that harm need not have occurred as long as there is great likeli-
hood of serious harm).
254. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3362(a)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1997).
255. See Helling, 509 U.S. at 35.
256. See id. at 28.
257. See id. at 35.
258. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3626(a)(1)(A).
259. 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
260. Id. at 84-85.
261. 116 S. Ct. 2174 (1996).
262. See id. at 2185 (applying the Turner standard).  Lewis involved a claim that prison
regulations restricted prisoners’ access to the courts in violation of their First and Sixth
Amendment rights.  See id. at 2177.  A fair reading of the opinion makes it clear, however, that
the Court would apply a similar approach to claims that prison conditions violate the Eighth
Amendment.  See id. at 2185 (noting that courts should respect the limits of their roles and al-
low “‘[p]rison administrators [to] exercis[e] wide discretion within the bounds of constitutional
requirements.’” (quoting Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 832-33 (1977) (alterations in origi-
TUSHNETPPFINAL.DOC 03/31/98  2:12 PM
54 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 47 : 1
the PLRA’s substantive standard as a restatement of Turner’s re-
quirement that courts defer to the judgment of prison administrators.
There may be some tension between the PLRA’s requirement
that relief “extend[ ] no further than necessary to correct the viola-
tion”263 of federal rights, and Rufo’s assertion that consent decrees
that require more than direct compliance with the Constitution nec-
essarily “do more than the Constitution itself requires.”264 A detailed
consent decree, that is, might “extend no further than necessary”
even though it contains requirements not themselves spelled out in
the Eighth Amendment or the Due Process Clause.
Much here turns on the meaning of “necessary.”  No particular
remedial provision is ever necessary in the strictest sense.  Consider a
remedy directed at the accumulation of human waste in cells that is
so severe as to pose serious threats to the health of inmates.  The
waste disposal problem could be remedied by installing new toilets,
or by making sure that the existing toilets operate properly.  Surely a
defendant could not reasonably contend that an order directing the
installation of new toilets was not necessary because an equally effi-
cacious remedy existed.  As Justice White suggested in Rufo, defining
necessary in its strictest sense would require courts to enter orders
that said no more than that the defendant had to comply with the
Constitution.265
What then should necessary mean?  It makes sense to look to
McCulloch v. Maryland266 for guidance.  In McCulloch, the Court re-
jected the argument that the Necessary and Proper Clause limited
Congress to that means “which is most direct and simple.”267  Rather,
in interpreting the word necessary, the Court allowed Congress to
choose methods that were “convenient, or useful, or essential.”268
It is also unclear how courts will apply the PLRA to the stan-
dards governing institutional decrees.  The PLRA allows defendants
nal))).
263. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3626(a)(1)(A).
264. Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 389 (1992).
265. See id. at 387.
266. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
267. Id. at 413.  Of course McCulloch involved interpreting a constitutional provision, and
Chief Justice Marshall famously emphasized, albeit in connection with another argument, that
“we must never forget, that it is a constitution we are expounding.”  Id. at 407.  Still, we believe
that McCulloch’s discussion of possible meanings of the word necessary illuminates the inter-
pretive problem in the PLRA.
268. Id. at 413.
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to seek to terminate injunctive orders two years after they were first
entered, and at one-year intervals thereafter.269  Under pre-PLRA
law, of course, defendants could seek modification, including termi-
nation, at any time.  The PLRA’s standard for termination restates
the substantive standard for prospective relief, with one important
qualification.  Termination is required “if the relief was approved or
granted in the absence of a finding by the court” that the PLRA’s
substantive standards were satisfied.270  Termination is not required,
however, “if the court makes written findings . . . that prospective re-
lief remains necessary to correct a current or ongoing violation” and
otherwise satisfies the PLRA’s substantive standards.271  This provi-
sion probably requires defendants to move for termination or modifi-
cation, after which the district court would hold a hearing to deter-
mine whether to make the required findings.
Consider first a case in which a defendant claims that it has com-
plied with portions of an institutional decree.  Freeman v. Pitts272 pro-
vides the standard for obtaining relief: a district court has discretion
to lift this part of its order if it concludes that continued supervision is
no longer necessary to ensure compliance with the Constitution.273
According to the Court, district courts could lift the order, because
partial compliance eliminated the constitutional violation with re-
spect to the provisions at issue.274  Nevertheless, continued relief is
justified when there are continuing violations.  Substantively this is
no different from the PLRA’s acknowledgment that district courts
may not terminate relief if they find that “prospective relief remains
necessary to correct a current or ongoing violation.”275
Suppose, however, that the defendant admits that it has not
complied with some part of a remedial order but contends that com-
pliance with that portion of the order is not necessary, in the appro-
priate sense, to remedy a current constitutional violation.  The de-
fendant might argue, for example, that the relief was broader than
necessary from the outset.  In cases litigated to judgment, the re-
sponse is straightforward: Appeals exist so that such issues may be
raised.  Allowing a defendant to obtain relief when circumstances
269. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3626(b)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1997).
270. Id. § 3626(b)(2).
271. Id. § 3626(b)(3).
272. 503 U.S. 467 (1992).
273. See id. at 489.
274. See id. at 491.
275. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3626(b)(3).
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have not changed would render the initial order meaningless, reduc-
ing it, once again, to a simple statement that defendants have to com-
ply with the Constitution.  If the PLRA actually directed district
courts to grant the defendants’ motion, it would raise serious separa-
tion-of-powers concerns, as we discuss in the next subsection.
One can readily avoid these difficulties by interpreting the
PLRA to restate existing law in large measure.  Nevertheless, there is
one difference between the existing law regarding altering decrees
and the PLRA’s approach.  Under the Court’s pre-PLRA holdings,
district courts had discretion to grant partial relief or a similar reme-
dial measure.  The PLRA requires them to do so.  We are uncon-
vinced that this makes much practical difference.  It would be the
rare district judge, and the even more rare court of appeals, that
found Freeman’s standards satisfied but found it a sound exercise of
discretion to continue to supervise compliance.276  To the extent that
the PLRA converts a discretionary decision into a mandatory one, it
has some legal effect but rather little practical effect.
Finally, the PLRA prescribes a preferred sequence when courts
order prisoners released to eliminate unconstitutional overcrowding.
First, the statute says, the court must enter a “less intrusive”277 order.
The defendant must have been given “a reasonable amount of time
to comply”278 with such an order.  If the constitutional violation per-
sists, a three-judge court can order prisoners released only if it finds
“by clear and convincing evidence”279 that overcrowding is “the pri-
mary cause”280 of the constitutional violation, and that no other relief
will remedy the violation.281  The three-judge court provision, of
276. When a consent decree, by its terms, requires full compliance before judicial modifica-
tion, see, e.g., Heath v. DeCourcy, 992 F.2d 630 (6th Cir. 1993) (holding that district court
lacked authority to terminate its supervision over prison compliance with consent decree), the
statute may have an effect.
277. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3626(a)(3)(A)(i).
278. Id. § 3626(a)(3)(A)(ii).
279. Id. § 3626(a)(3)(E).
280. Id. § 3626(a)(3)(E)(i).
281. One might note some drafting problems here.  Under the basic substantive standard
courts must order “the least intrusive” remedy of any sort.  Id. § 3626(a)(1).  When a court en-
ters a prison release order, it must be the least intrusive remedy.  How, then, could “a less in-
trusive remedy,” id. § 3626(a)(3)(A)(i), have failed?  More curiously, the statute’s definition of
prisoner release order, “any order  . . . that directs the release from  . . . a prison,” id. §
3626(g)(4), would appear to encompass ordinary habeas corpus orders.  It would, however,
make hash of the three-judge court requirement, see id. § 3626(a)(3)(B), to interpret the defini-
tion in this way; the conditions on entering a prisoner release order include a required finding
that “crowding is the primary cause of the violation of a Federal right,” id. § 3626(a)(3)(E)(i),
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course, is an innovation, although prior experience with three-judge
courts suggests that it is unlikely to be a happy one.282  No court had
yet described the prescribed sequence of relief in precisely the terms
Congress did, but it is surely implicit in the Court’s decisions re-
viewed above.  For example, in Lewis, the Court criticized the district
court’s approach.  The district court found a constitutional violation,
had a special master prepare a plan, and incorporated into its order a
set of provisions that had been used successfully, according to the dis-
trict court, in parallel litigation.283  “This,” the Supreme Court said,
“will not do,”284 quoting an earlier case stating that the states must be
given “the first opportunity to correct [their] own errors.”285
Suppose, however, that the PLRA’s substantive provisions do
more than restate existing law because, for example, public safety
needs are irrelevant in determining when the Eight Amendment has
been violated.286  Then it might be unconstitutional.  The argument
comes in two parts.  It is a premise of judicial review that “[i]t is em-
phatically the province and duty of the [courts] to say what the law
is.”287  Congress may not override the Court’s own definitions of the
substance of constitutional rights.288  If public safety concerns are ir-
relevant to determining when prison conditions violate the Eighth
Amendment, Congress’s direction to take such concerns into account
in making such a determination is inconsistent with the premises of
judicial review.
which would never be possible in an ordinary habeas corpus action.
282. One familiar with practice under the now-repealed general three-judge court statute,
see 28 U.S.C. § 212 (1940) (amended at 28 U.S.C. § 212 (1948)) (codifying decision of U.S. Su-
preme Court in Textile Mills Securities Corp. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 314 U.S. 326
(1941), which held that a panel of a U.S. Court of Appeals could consist of more than three
judges; the revised section 212 stated that courts could sit with more than three judges only if
they had provided for a hearing en banc), could quickly enumerate some of the administrative
problems likely to arise under this provision. May a single judge enter a temporary restraining
order?  If the three-judge court finds a release order unnecessary, may it nonetheless enter
some other form of relief?  To what court would a non-release order entered by a three-judge
court be appealed?
283. See Casey v. Lewis, 834 F. Supp. 1553, 1569 (D. Ariz. 1993).
284. Lewis v. Casey, 116 S. Ct. 2174, 2186 (1996).
285. Id. (quoting Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 492 (1973)).
286. As another example, perhaps courts would not require that a constitutional violation
be established by clear and convincing evidence, but only by a preponderance of the evidence.
287. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
288. See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2160-72 (1997) (holding the Relig-
ious Freedom Restoration Act unconstitutional on the ground that Congress has no power un-
der section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to specify the substantive scope of constitutional
rights); see also supra notes 216-19 and accompanying text.
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Second, most of the PLRA’s provisions do not purport to alter
the judicial definition of the underlying constitutional right to be free
from cruel and unusual punishment.  Rather, they purport to pre-
scribe the procedures by which remedies for constitutional violations
can be obtained.  It is hornbook law that Congress has substantial
power to define remedies for constitutional violations.289  That power,
however, runs up against one key limit: The courts will determine
whether the remedies Congress prescribes are effective to remedy the
constitutional violation.290
One would think that, as an initial matter, the courts would not
have developed a law of remedies that went beyond what was neces-
sary to remedy constitutional violations.  If so, however, statutory
provisions restricting remedies more than existing law does would
violate the Constitution.291
There is one caveat: As we saw, the Court in Felker suggested
that its interpretation of the scope of the original writ of habeas cor-
pus might be influenced though not dictated by statutory limits on
the scope of habeas corpus.292  Similarly, the courts might conclude
that their judgment about what remedies were constitutionally re-
quired could be appropriately influenced, though not dictated, by
statute.  On this assumption whatever changes the PLRA makes in
the standards governing relief might go a bit beyond existing law, and
the courts would accept the changes.
Note, however, that the courts retain the power to conclude that,
in their judgment, the statutory changes go too far.  Whatever the
PLRA achieves, then, cannot be very far different from what existing
law prescribes—or what the courts would themselves prescribe were
they faced with some of the issues the statute addresses.  The basic
standard set out in the PLRA with respect to prison conditions litiga-
tion either restates existing law, is unconstitutional, or changes exist-
ing law in minor ways.
289. See, e.g., CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 10, at 43 (5th ed.
1994) (stating that “[Congress] can take away from the courts power to grant a particular rem-
edy”).
290. See, e.g., Battaglia v. General Motors Corp., 169 F.2d 254, 257 (2d Cir. 1948) (“[W]hile
Congress has the undoubted power to give, withhold, and restrict the jurisdiction of courts
other than the Supreme Court, it must not so exercise that power as to deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law . . . .”).
291. Cf. Plyler v. Moore, 100 F.3d 365, 372 (4th Cir. 1996) (stating that the “[PLRA] pro-
vides only the standard to which district courts must adhere, not the result they must reach”).
292. See supra notes 140-41 and accompanying text.
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In sum, the PLRA establishes a timetable that does not substan-
tially differ from the existing time requirements.  Both the PLRA and
existing law require motions by defendants before district courts will
consider modifying decrees; further, the PLRA specifies substantive
standards for modification that differ from existing law only on the
margins.  A district court not inclined to modify a decree under pre-
PLRA standards would not be compelled to do so now.
d. Modifying Decrees Now in Force.  The PLRA’s termination
provisions apply retroactively to injunctive orders that were in force
when it was enacted.293  Not surprisingly, few of those orders contain
the “findings”294 that the PLRA requires, although to the extent that
the PLRA restates existing law such findings would be implicit in the
decision to issue injunctive relief.  Must a district court terminate its
injunction unless it makes the required findings?
This question is made even more urgent because of additional
PLRA procedural requirements.  The statute directs courts to rule
“promptly” on motions to terminate relief.295  To prod the courts into
action, the statute also provides that existing relief “shall be auto-
matically stayed” after 30 days have passed, unless the district court
makes the required findings.296  One can imagine a district court en-
tering a prompt order pro forma, reciting the required findings and
stating that they were implicit in the existing order.  But nothing in
the existing order can establish that its provisions “remain[ ] neces-
sary.”297  Given the complexity of this type of litigation, it is unrealis-
tic to believe that judges can make that finding within 30 days.
In practice, then, the PLRA appears to direct federal courts to
dissolve nearly all existing injunctions against unconstitutional prison
conditions, subject to a requirement that for all practical purposes
cannot be satisfied within the time period Congress prescribes.  Sub-
stantial constitutional arguments can be mounted against attributing
such a power to Congress.
For example, the requirement that existing relief be stayed un-
less the court makes the required finding within a short time may
violate the core procedural due process right to a hearing.  Existing
293. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3626(b)(1)(A)(iii) (West Supp. 1997).
294. Id. § 3626(a)(1)(C)(2).
295. Id. § 3626(e)(1).
296. Id. § 3626(e)(2)(A)(1).
297. Id. § 3626(b)(3).
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injunctions give their beneficiaries a presumptive right to continued
relief, which can be taken away from them only after a hearing that
allows them a realistic opportunity to establish that they remain enti-
tled to relief.298  The short time limit created by the automatic stay
provision seems unlikely to offer such an opportunity.
More fundamentally, the requirement that injunctive orders be
terminated unless the prescribed findings are made may violate the
core separation-of-powers concept the Supreme Court enforced in
Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc.299  Plaut held unconstitutional a statute
that effectively reopened cases in which final judgments had been en-
tered.  According to the Court, this violated the “fundamental princi-
ple” that the Constitution gives the judiciary “the power, not merely
to rule on cases, but to decide them conclusively, subject to review
only by superior courts in the Article III hierarchy.”300
When a federal court enters a judgment obligating state authori-
ties to alter prison management and operations, the court appears to
have decided a case.  The PLRA’s termination provisions appear to
deprive the federal courts of the power that, according to Plaut, Arti-
cle III gave them.
There is one large difference between the statute at issue in
Plaut and the PLRA.  The former affected actions for damages that
would historically have been brought at law, while the latter affects
equitable actions.  The decrees covered by the PLRA remain open to
modification or termination, and so may not seem “final” in the sense
used in Plaut.  Further, in its opinion, the Court distinguished Plaut
from earlier cases that upheld the congressional power to alter in-
junctive decrees. 301  The key case is Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Bel-
mont Bridge Co.302  In 1852, the Supreme Court affirmed a judgment
enjoining the bridge’s construction, on the ground that it would be a
public nuisance, obstructing navigation on rivers subject to congres-
298. See Benjamin v. Jacobson, 124 F.3d 162, 179-80 (2d Cir. 1997) (requiring a hearing
prior to termination).  Beneficiaries of consent decrees might also argue that the decrees give
them a vested right in the relief they have obtained that cannot be taken away without violating
their substantive rights, except in accordance with standards existing at the time the right was
created.  Cf. Patrick Woolley, Rethinking the Adequacy of Adequate Representation, 75 TEX. L.
REV. 571, 586-89 (1997) (arguing that individual plaintiffs “have a constitutionally protected
[property] interest in a structural decree” because the “legal obligation to enter an injunction
consistent with the obligations of the law . . . creates a constitutionally protected interest”).
299. 514 U.S. 211 (1995).
300. Id. at 219.
301. See id. at 232.
302. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421 (1855).
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sional regulation.303  A few months later, Congress enacted a statute
declaring that the bridge was “lawful.”304  The Supreme Court held
that the earlier injunction had to be dissolved in light of the statute.305
Plaut described Wheeling Bridge as a case in which Congress had
“altered the prospective effect of injunctions entered by Article III
courts,” and said that Plaut did not call that decision into question.306
But Plaut’s analysis suggests that Wheeling Bridge cannot stand for
the broad proposition that Congress may alter any injunction what-
soever.  That broad proposition would mean that the fundamental
separation-of-powers principle articulated in Plaut does not apply to
injunctive actions at all.  But nothing in the Court’s statement of the
principle suggests why congressional interference with actions at law
is more problematic than congressional interference with equitable
remedies.307
The Court in Plaut indicated the way out.  Those defending the
statute at issue pointed to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b),
which authorizes the federal courts to relieve parties from a final
judgment for specified reasons.  They argued that Rule 60(b) demon-
strated that there was no absolute bar to a legislative directive that
some cases—those falling within the Rule’s terms—be reopened.
One might say that Rule 60(b) shows that even judgments in damage
cases are not final for separation-of-powers purposes, because the
Rule allows any judgment to be reopened when its conditions are
satisfied.  Justice Scalia distinguished Rule 60(b): It “does not impose
any legislative mandate-to-reopen upon the courts, but merely re-
flects and confirms the courts’ own inherent and discretionary
power.”308
303. See id. at 429-30.
304. Id. at 429.
305. See id. at 435-36.
306. Plaut, 514 U.S. at 232; see also Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc’y, 503 U.S. 429, 439
(1992) (explaining that Congress may “change” statutes in a way that requires courts to dis-
solve existing injunctions).  The Court in Plaut also distinguished Counsel v. Dow, 849 F.2d 731
(2d Cir. 1988), as involving “a court-entered consent decree [which had] not yet [been] fully
executed” when Congress enacted a law authorizing attorneys’ fees awards. Plaut, 514 U.S. at
236.  The statute became effective before the 30-day period for filing appeals from the consent
decree expired, so Counsel did not involve a final judgment in any sense.  See Counsel, 849 F.2d
at 734 (stating that the statute became retroactively effective for all cases filed after July 4,
1984; Counsel did not file case until 1985, with consent decree entered in 1986).
307. But see Plyler v. Moore, 100 F.3d 365, 371 (4th Cir. 1996) (“A judgment providing for
injunctive relief . . . remains subject to subsequent changes in the law.”); Gavin v. Branstad, 122
F.3d 1081 (8th Cir. 1997) (stating that a consent decree is never really final).
308. Plaut, 514 U.S. at 233-34.
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The Court’s emphasis on judicial discretion, which might be un-
derstood in this context as an essential attribute of the judicial power
protected by Plaut’s separation-of-powers holding, explains the limits
of Wheeling Bridge’s holding.  In Wheeling Bridge the interstate
commerce clause gave Congress the power to declare that the bridge
did not interfere with interstate commerce.309  But Congress lacks the
power to change the underlying law of the Eighth Amendment in
prison conditions cases.  It follows that the courts, which do have the
authority to develop the underlying law in that area, also have the
power to determine the criteria for modifying injunctive decrees.
The PLRA, in contrast, deprives the courts of their discretionary
power to modify consent decrees pursuant to judicially-developed
standards.  Finally, the distinction between rules Congress has the
power to change and those it does not—the distinction between
statutory and constitutional rules—responds directly to the separa-
tion-of-powers principle in Plaut, while the distinction between dam-
age and equitable relief does not.310
These constitutional arguments are not sure winners in the ab-
stract, but they are also not inconsequential.  Under these circum-
stances we would expect judges to interpret the PLRA in a way that
would not require automatic termination of existing decrees.  A
number of courses seem possible.  Under the PLRA relief need not
be terminated if there is “a current or ongoing violation of the Fed-
eral right.”311  What is this federal right?  The term on its face seems
to refer to more than a violation of the prisoners’ constitutional or
statutory rights.  Beneficiaries of existing decrees can argue, albeit
with some strain, that those decrees confer a federal right on them,
and that noncompliance with any provision of an existing decree
amounts to an ongoing violation of that federal right.312
309. See Wheeling Bridge, 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 430-31.
310. But see Plyler, 100 F.3d at 372 (stating that the “[PLRA involves] the authority of the
district court to award relief . . . greater than that required by the Eighth Amendment”).  The
argument here is that Congress may not have the power to alter the underlying law of the
Eighth Amendment, but that it may require courts to confine themselves to that law as they
elaborate it.  See Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 389 (1992) (emphasizing
that courts cannot encourage parties to enter consent judgments unless such judgments provide
relief by the parties’ “undertaking to do more than the Constitution itself requires . . . [and]
also more than what a court would have ordered absent the settlement”).  To the extent that
Rufo’s encouragement of consent judgments rests on a judicially developed rule, Congress may
not have the power to alter it either.  Cf. id. at 391 (holding that “a consent decree is a final
judgment that may be reopened only to the extent that equity requires”).
311. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3626(b)(3) (West Supp. 1997) (emphasis added).
312. The Department of Justice initially took this position.  See Letter from Senator Orrin
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More ingeniously, the Second Circuit held, in an opinion by
Judge Calabresi, that the termination provisions are constitutional,
but only because an existing consent decree creates rights under state
law that are enforceable in state court.313  According to the Second
Circuit, the PLRA alters the remedial consequences of such a con-
sent decree, directing its enforcement in state rather than federal
court, but does not alter the decree itself.314
Alternatively, judges may hold that: i) the PLRA’s substantive
provisions substantially restate existing law; ii) that the required
findings were therefore implicit in the existing orders; iii) that the
burden of establishing that the relief is no longer necessary lies with
state defendants; and iv) that until the district judge finds that the de-
fendants have satisfied their burden the relief remains necessary.315
Judges who find the constitutional arguments against automatic ter-
mination substantial may be inclined to pursue one of these alterna-
tives, to avoid holding these parts of the PLRA invalid.
G. Hatch, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, et al., to Janet Reno, Attorney Gen-
eral, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 2 n.5 (July 23, 1996) (on file with author).  It withdrew its position
after eighteen Senators sent a letter to the Attorney General expressing their “great dismay” at
the position, which the Senators said “threatens to undermine . . . promising developments” as
district judges began to vacate existing orders.”  Id.  In Plyler, 100 F.3d at 370, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit stated that this interpretation would make the
automatic termination provision “nonsensical because under it, the district court would never
be able to terminate a consent decree.”  This is an overstatement: Courts could terminate con-
sent decrees if judicial standards for termination were satisfied; they simply need not automati-
cally do so when the existing decree fails to incorporate the findings the PLRA requires.  The
proposed Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1997, S. 3, 105th Cong. § 902(7)(G) (1997), would
explicitly provide that “[t]he term ‘violation of a Federal right’ does not include a violation of a
court order that is not independently a violation of a Federal statutory or Federal constitutional
right.”
313. See Benjamin v. Jacobson, 124 F.3d 162, 170 (2d Cir. 1997), followed by Inmates of
Suffolk County Jail v. Rouse, 129 F.3d 649 (1st Cir. 1997).  But see Dougan v. Singletary, 129
F.3d 1424 (11th Cir. 1997) (declining to follow Benjamin).
314. See id.  One might fairly wonder about the scope of this holding.  Judge Calabresi
pointed out that state courts cannot discriminate against state law rights created in a federal
consent decree by refusing to enforce such rights, see id. at 179 & n.24, and we assume that no
state will have a general rule refusing to enforce all consent decrees.  Suppose, however, that a
state court enforcing a consent decree provides more vigorous enforcement than a federal court
would.  To the extent that the PLRA directs enforcement in the state forum, which is (by hy-
pothesis) less effective in protecting the rights under the decree than the federal court would
be, is the PLRA unconstitutional?  In this scenario, would the prisoner be able to invoke fed-
eral jurisdiction notwithstanding the PLRA?
315. The proposed Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1997, S. 3, 105th Cong., would provide
that the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing the necessity for retention of relief by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence. See id. § 902(2)(A).
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2.  Limiting Frivolous Litigation.  Frivolous litigation played a
far larger role in congressional discussions of the PLRA than did
institutional reform litigation.  By creating a category of “prisoner
lawsuits” that encompassed both individual and institutional reform
litigation, conservatives won the battle of sound bites: law suits
focusing on peanut butter sandwiches and premium cable became the
central images rather than lawsuits that attempted to keep cells free
of raw sewage.  Yet the PLRA’s provisions dealing with frivolous
individual litigation probably will have even less practical impact
than its revisions in institutional reform litigation.  The reason is
simple: The reforms are mainly designed to increase the costs and
decrease the benefits of filing a lawsuit.  But there is not much reason
to believe that the demand for this kind of litigation is significantly
sensitive to price.316  As in prior sections, we focus on only a few
provisions to illustrate the theme that symbolic statutes may not have
systematic real-world effects.
The PLRA’s major provision alters the in forma pauperis (ifp)
filing system for prisoners.  Ordinarily persons filing ifp lawsuits must
demonstrate by affidavit that they are unable to pay court filing fees,
which range from $105 to $120.  The PLRA now requires prisoners to
file “a certified copy of the trust fund account statement” for the six-
month period prior to the filing, “obtained from the appropriate offi-
cial of each prison at which the prisoner is or was confined.”317  Pris-
oners are no longer entitled to file without ever paying filing fees.  In-
stead, prisoners must pay fees in installments.  The courts are to
collect an initial partial fee, which is to be one-fifth of the greater of
the prisoner’s average monthly deposits or average monthly balance
in the preceding half year.318  Then the prisoner must make “monthly
payments of 20 percent of the preceding month’s income credited to
the prisoner’s account.”319 This obligation is administered by “[T]he
316. One report shows a significant decline in the rate of increase of prisoner lawsuits in
1996. Reform Act Cuts Prisoner Suits,  NAT’L L.J., Aug. 18, 1997, at A10.  This may be attribut-
able to the effects of the PLRA, passed in April of 1996, but we think that evidence from a
more extended period of time is necessary before one could confidently attribute such a decline
to the statute.
317. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1915(a)(2) (West Supp. 1997).
318. See id. § 1915(b)(1).  The provision is modeled on an Arizona statute.  See Maahs &
Del Carmen, supra note 122, at 57.  Other provisions in the PLRA are drawn from the National
Association of Attorneys General’s model statute.  See Recent Legislative Developments in
Utah Law, 1996 UTAH L. REV. 1335, 1367 n.43 (discussing similarity of goals between model
statute and PLRA).
319. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1915(b)(2).
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agency having custody of the prisoner,” which must forward pay-
ments “each time the amount in the account exceeds $10 until the
filing fees are paid.”320  Finally, these duties are released if “the pris-
oner has no assets and no means by which to pay the initial partial
filing fee.”321
These provisions force prisoners to choose between the ameni-
ties they can purchase from their institutional accounts, which typi-
cally hold only small amounts of money, and the benefits they receive
from filing lawsuits.322  Some courts may find that these provisions
raise substantial questions about violations of the prisoners’ constitu-
tional rights.323 They also impose a substantial administrative burden
on state prisons, which are hardly equipped to make the monthly cal-
culations and payments the statute requires.324  Again the language of
“commandeering” does not seem out of place: Congress has forced
state prisons to devote nontrivial resources in the service of a federal
320. Id.
321. Id. § 1915(b)(4).
322. Other PLRA provisions make whatever monetary relief a prisoner gets subject to pre-
existing legal obligations, such as an order of restitution.  Section 807 requires that compensa-
tory damages be “paid directly to satisfy any outstanding restitution orders,” with the balance
forwarded to the prisoner.  Pub. L. No. 104-134, § 807, 110 Stat. 1321, 1321-75 to 1321-76
(1996).  Section 808 requires that reasonable efforts be made to notify “the victims of the crime
for which the prisoner was convicted and incarcerated” that the prisoner is about to receive
compensatory damages, id. § 808, 110 Stat. at 1321-76, presumably so that the victims may
make whatever claims they have against the prisoner.  As in many victims’-rights statutes, ques-
tions will inevitably arise about who falls within the class of victims.
323. Creating a system in which prisoners are required to pay filing fees in installments
when no one else must do so might be thought to raise an equal protection question.  If the dis-
tinction is tested by rationality standards, imposing the requirement only on prisoners might
not be minimally rational.  The question would be whether the states’ argument that the exis-
tence of institutional trust accounts makes it easier to collect fees in installments from prisoners
than from others who lack funds to pay the full fee up front is sufficient.  An additional reason,
that prisoners file more frivolous lawsuits than others who seek in forma pauperis status, is
more questionable, though perhaps sufficient to satisfy the Court’s loose rationality standard.
Further, the provision might be tested against a more stringent standard because it impedes
access to the courts.  Cf. M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 117 S. Ct. 555, 569-70 (1997) (holding that since a
proceeding for the termination of parental rights worked such a unique form of deprivation
against the litigant, she must be allowed to appeal in forma pauperis).
324. For descriptions of the administrative problems, see, for example, Leonard v. Lucy, 88
F.3d 181, 187 (2d Cir. 1996) (enumerating the administrative requirements to obtain appellate
filing fees and the steps the court took to minimize administrative difficulties); In re Prison
Litigation Reform Act, 105 F.3d 1131, 1133, 1138-39 (6th Cir. 1997) (discussing problems inher-
ent in keeping up with prisoner trust accounts and with assessing filing fees to prisoners re-
leased before they finish paying); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604-8 (6th Cir. 1997)
(discussing the trust fund system and the nature of the problems that may arise); FEDERAL
JUDICIAL CTR., RESOURCE GUIDE FOR MANAGING PRISONER CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION,
WITH SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON THE PRISON LITIGATION REFORM ACT (1996).
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policy of discouraging prisoner lawsuits.
Another PLRA provision may, however, violate a prisoner’s
constitutional rights, although we doubt that the issue will be well-
litigated.325  Adapting the popular “three strikes and you’re out” rule,
the PLRA automatically makes ifp status unavailable to a prisoner
who has brought three or more prior actions as a prisoner that were
“dismissed on the grounds that [they were] frivolous, malicious, or
fail[ed] to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the
prisoner [was] under imminent danger of serious physical injury.”326
This provision deals with a group of prisoners known pejoratively in
the courts and attorneys generals’ offices as “frequent filers.”327
325. Another provision deserves note as well.  Section 803(d) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. §
1997e(e)) provides: “No Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner . . . for mental or
emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury.”  42
U.S.C.A. § 1997e(e) (West Supp. 1997).  In Hudson v. McMillian, the Supreme Court held that
the use of excessive physical force against a prisoner violates the Eighth Amendment even
though the prisoner does not suffer serious injury.  See 503 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1992).  According to
the Court’s analysis, “When prison officials maliciously and sadistically use force to cause
harm, contemporary standards of decency always are violated.”  Id. at 9.  It was concerned that
any other standard would allow “diabolic or inhuman” uses of force, calculated to inflict pain
without crossing some “arbitrary” threshold.  Id.  This concern seems equally applicable to the
statute’s threshold requirement of physical injury.  The Court agreed that the Eighth Amend-
ment “excludes from constitutional recognition de minimis uses of physical force, provided that
the use of force is not of a sort ‘repugnant to the conscience of mankind.’” Id. at 9-10 (quoting
Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327 (1986)); see also Siglar v. Hightower, 112 F.3d 191, 193
(5th Cir. 1997) (holding that statute requires showing of more than de minimis, but not neces-
sarily significant, injury). The Court’s proviso suggests that even some de minimis uses of force
may violate the Eighth Amendment.  Read as a limitation on remedies rather than an elimina-
tion of a cause of action, the statutory provision appears to deprive those subject to cruel psy-
chological punishment (for example, extreme sexual harassment) of their only effective rem-
edy; neither nominal damages nor injunctive relief would seem sufficient for someone who has
suffered such punishment.  The statute’s reference to “Federal civil action[s]” may be read as a
jurisdictional provision, routing these cases to state courts, although there is no indication in
the legislative history that Congress was interested in shifting the burden of hearing these cases
from federal to state courts.  The proposed Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1997, S. 3, 105th
Cong. § 903(a)(6) (1997), would eliminate the jurisdictional interpretation by replacing the
phrase with “civil action arising under federal law.”  For a general discussion of the statutory
provision, see Stacey Heather O’Bryan, Closing the Courthouse Door: The Impact of the Prison
Litigation Reform Act’s Physical Injury Requirement on the Constitutional Rights of Prisoners,
83 VA. L. REV. 1189 (1997).
326. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1915(g) (West Supp. 1997).  For an example of how courts have inter-
preted this “imminent danger” standard, see Gibbs v. Roman, 116 F.3d 83, 85-87 (3d Cir. 1997)
(holding that “imminent danger” proviso was satisfied by allegations of past attacks six months
before suit was filed and allegations that plaintiff’s “life is in constant danger”).
327. We note that Pearly Wilson and Dee Farmer, the petitioners in two important Su-
preme Court cases, are frequent filers.  See Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 296 (1991)
(concerning petitioner Wilson’s allegations of cruel and unusual punishment); Farmer v. Bren-
nan, 511 U.S. 825, 835 (1994) (concerning Farmer’s suit under the Eighth Amendment against
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The Constitution requires that prisoners, like the rest of us, have
access to the courts, at least to file challenges to their convictions or
“to challenge the conditions of their confinement.”328  An absolute
ban on filing a prisoner lawsuit would presumably violate the Consti-
tution.  Congress did not go that far, however.  Note that under the
PLRA every prisoner must pay the complete filing fee.  Some may do
so in installments.  The statute allows others to do so in a single ad-
vance payment.  And, notably, the statute allows any prisoner who
can pay the complete filing fee in advance to file as many frivolous or
malicious lawsuits as she wants.  Perhaps the distinction between rich
prisoners who file frivolous lawsuits and indigent ones who file
equally frivolous lawsuits is itself an unconstitutional violation of
equal protection: What reason is there to place an obstacle in the way
of impecunious prisoners who frequently file frivolous lawsuits but
not rich ones?329
The response, we suppose, is that Congress has no obligation to
subsidize frivolous litigation even though it may not block those who
can afford to purchase access to the courts from doing so.330  That re-
sponse, however, suggests another difficulty with the “three strikes
and you’re out” provision.  Conceding that Congress need not subsi-
dize access to the courts, a prisoner might contend that the provision
prison officials for their alleged “deliberate indifference” to the threat of serious harm to him
from other inmates).  For courts of appeals cases involving Wilson and Farmer, see, for exam-
ple, Wilson v. Schwarz, No. 96-3264, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 27561, at *1 (6th Cir. Oct. 24,
1996) (mem.); Wilson v. Lane, No. 95-4185, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 11631, at *1 (6th Cir. April
17, 1996) (mem.); Farmer v. Haas, 990 F.2d 319, 322 (7th Cir. 1993) (describing Farmer as “an
experienced litigator”).
328. Lewis v. Casey, 116 S. Ct. 2174, 2182 (1996).
329. Cf. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18-19 (1956) (holding that the Constitution is vio-
lated by a requirement, applicable to impecunious defendants, that all convicted defendants
purchase trial transcript); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 380-81 (1971) (holding that the
Constitution is violated by requiring a filing fee for divorce of both indigents and others).  But
see United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 446 (1973) (holding that the Constitution is not violated
by requiring a filing fee for bankruptcy; the Boddie decision was distinguished on the ground
that it involved a subject—divorce—over which state government had exclusive authority).
The Constitution may, however, require that impecunious prisoners be allowed to pay court
fees in installments when they file some particularly important claims, other than those seeking
relief from imminent physical danger.  Cf. M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 117 S. Ct. 555, 556  (1996) (holding
that the Constitution requires states to allow indigents to appeal without paying the cost of pro-
viding a transcript in an action terminating parental rights).
330. The courts of appeals have so far unanimously upheld the ifp provisions against equal
protection and due process attacks.  See Nicholas v. Tucker, 114 F.3d 17, 19-21 (2d Cir. 1997);
Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997); Roller v. Gunn, 107 F.3d 227, 234 (4th
Cir. 1997); Norton v. Dimazana, 122 F.3d 286, 292-93 (5th Cir. 1997); Hampton v. Hobbs, 106
F.3d 1281, 1286-88 (6th Cir. 1997).
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actually obstructs his or her access.  After all, by incarcerating the
prisoner the state itself has made it effectively impossible for her to
accumulate the resources to pay the filing fee in advance.331  In Lewis
v. Casey, the Court held that a prisoner would establish a constitu-
tional violation if a state’s inadequate prison library “hindered his ef-
forts to pursue a legal claim.”332  Incarceration coupled with the “thr-
ee strikes and you’re out” provision seems to constitute just such a
hindrance unless, as the Court in Casey said, the prisoner’s inability
to earn enough money to pay filing fees “is simply one of the inciden-
tal (and perfectly constitutional) consequences of conviction and in-
carceration.”333
These constitutional concerns suggest that courts may well inter-
pret this provision narrowly.334  Two possibilities suggest themselves.
The more obvious has a limited scope: Because prisoners who filed
frivolous lawsuits before 1996 had no reason to believe that their
choices would forever bar them from filing again without prepayment
of filing fees, the statute’s sanctions should be invoked only after a
prisoner files three frivolous post-PLRA actions.  Indeed, to the ex-
tent that the sanctions are designed to deter, they can sensibly be in-
voked only in such cases.  Landgraf v. USI Film Products335 defined
the standard for determining when legislation is to be applied retro-
actively: New statutes will not be applied retroactively, without clear
congressional direction, if they would “increase a party’s liability for
past conduct.”336  This appears to be a fair description of the effect of
counting pre-PLRA dismissals as strikes.337
331. Cf. Myers v. Hundley, 101 F.3d 542, 545 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that a prison policy
limiting “idle pay” to $7.70 per month, which prisoners may use for hygiene supplies and for
stamps and supplies for legal mail, may violate right of access to courts of prisoners who can
show that amounts “left over . . . after purchasing personal necessities” actually prevented them
from filing claims).
332. Lewis, 116 S. Ct. at 2180.
333. Id. at 2182.  In the context of Lewis, the Court did not spell out what the incidental
consequences of incarceration are.  Presumably the inability to earn a market wage is such a
consequence.  The inability to earn enough to pay court filing fees might not be, although we
confess to puzzlement about how courts could actually go about distinguishing between inci-
dental and nonincidental consequences of incarceration.
334. But see Carson v. Johnson, 112 F.3d 818, 821 (5th Cir. 1997) (rejecting constitutional
challenge to “three strikes” provision, without considering interpretive issues).
335. 511 U.S. 244 (1994).
336. Id.  at 280.
337. But see Green v. Nottingham, 90 F.3d 415, 420 (10th Cir. 1996) (ruling that pre-PLRA
dismissals count as strikes because section 1915(g) is not retroactive in effect because it simply
“imposes stricter requirements for proceeding in forma pauperis in future actions on those
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Another possibility arises from the statute’s apparent stringency.
We begin with the standard for determining when a prisoner’s claim
is frivolous.  Courts might look to the law they have developed to en-
force Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, which authorizes courts to
impose sanctions338 on attorneys who file pleadings not “warranted by
existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modifi-
cation, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law.”339
Rule 11 creates an objective test for frivolity, but as the law has de-
veloped the courts “are reluctant to set clear boundaries stating
which legal arguments are substantively frivolous.  Instead, they pre-
fer to . . . ask whether [lawyers] have done the necessary research,
cited the relevant authorities, and presented a cogent, well-thought-
out argument.”340  There appears to be a concern that classifying an
argument as substantively frivolous runs the risk of freezing the law
in its present state.
Two aspects of the focus on process in Rule 11 cases suggest how
courts may interpret the PLRA’s standard.  First, courts may be in-
clined to say that a prisoner who has done all that could reasonably
be asked, given the prisoner’s circumstances,341 has not filed a frivo-
lous claim.  Second, the concern about freezing the law may have par-
ticular bite with respect to claims that prison conditions violate the
Eighth Amendment.  The Court has repeatedly said that the constitu-
tional standard here “draw[s] its meaning from the evolving stan-
dards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”342
Courts must be concerned that denominating a particular claim as
substantively frivolous might impede the responsiveness of future
courts to changing social norms.
Courts may sensibly interpret the PLRA’s standard to mandate
an inquiry into the objective reasonableness of the prisoner’s efforts
prisoners who have shown a propensity toward filing meritless lawsuits in the past”). See also
Abdul-Wadood v. Nathan, 91 F.3d 1023, 1025 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that pre-PLRA dismiss-
als count as strikes); Adepegba v. Hammons, 103 F.3d 383, 385-87 (5th Cir. 1997) (same);
McKibben v. Parsons, No. 96-1468, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 20674, at *5 (10th Cir. Aug. 5, 1997)
(relying on Green).  We are not sure why “imposing stricter requirements” predicated on infer-
ences from past behavior is not “increasing a party’s liability for past conduct.”
338. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c).
339. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(2).  Other federal provisions referring explicitly or implicitly to
frivolous claims are collected in Linda Ross Meyer, When Reasonable Minds Differ, 71 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1467, 1480 n.40 (1996).
340. Meyer, supra note 339, at 1485.
341. Including substantial limits on resources for legal or factual research.
342. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
TUSHNETPPFINAL.DOC 03/31/98  2:12 PM
70 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 47 : 1
to frame a constitutional claim, taking the prisoner’s circumstances
into account.  There seems to be little reason to impose a sanction on
a litigant who pursued a non-frivolous but legally mistaken claim.343
This is particularly so when the litigant is proceeding pro se and may
have difficulty formulating her claim in the way that courts accept.344
Courts may, therefore, interpret the provision to refer to claims that,
though neither frivolous nor malicious, are plainly insubstantial.
Doing so, however, might undermine the provision.  Invoking
the sanction when prior claims were dismissed for failure to state a
claim responds to concerns about judicial behavior, not prisoner be-
havior.  Judges aware of, and uncomfortable with the “three strikes
and you’re out” provision, may be reluctant to dismiss claims as
frivolous.  They might choose instead to dismiss for failure to state a
claim.  In the end, we think that judges may fairly interpret the stat-
ute in light of constitutional concerns to refer to a category of insub-
stantial claims that would be encompassed within the set of cases
dismissed for failure to state a claim.345
II.  THE AEDPA AND THE PLRA AS CASE STUDIES IN
LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL PROCESS
The AEDPA and the PLRA suggest a broader perspective on
questions of statutory design and implementation. Part I offered what
might be described as a legal process account of the course we be-
lieve courts will follow in interpreting these statutes.  On that accou-
nt, the need to integrate the statutes with prior decisional law pro-
343. We note that no sanctions are applied to nonindigent plaintiffs, including corporations,
that file numerous actions dismissed for failure to state a claim.
344. For example, prisoners continue to be caught short by Heck v. Humphrey, which re-
quires that constitutional claims that effectively, though not explicitly, challenge the prisoner’s
criminal conviction be dismissed unless the conviction has been reversed, expunged, declared
invalid, or “called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” 512
U.S. 477, 487 (1994).  Because the distinction between claims that effectively call a conviction
into question and those that do not is sometimes obscure, it seems quite harsh to count a claim
dismissed pursuant to Heck as a “strike” under the “three strikes and you’re out” provision.
345. Cf. Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682 (1946) (stating that a claim may be sufficiently sub-
stantial to support federal jurisdiction, but still may fail to state a claim).  We must add an im-
portant caveat.  These provisions of the PLRA differ from the institutional reform provisions
because these cases will be pressed by prisoners acting pro se, while institutional reform cases
are brought by prisoners with lawyers.  Judges are nearly as impatient with frivolous prisoner
suits as state attorneys general are.  See Green v. Nottingham, 90 F.3d 415, 418 (10th Cir. 1996)
(applying three strikes provision to a prisoner described as “the most prolific prisoner litigant
in recorded history”).  Thus, they are unlikely to search for creative ways to interpret the stat-
ute to avoid constitutional difficulties.
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vides the structure for the courts’ interpretations. In Section A of this
Part, we supplement that account with one drawn from positive po-
litical theory.  Both accounts are informal “social scientific” predic-
tions about the courts’ likely behavior, and may therefore illuminate
more general questions about the legislative and judicial processes.
Section II.B then identifies three categories of statutes: instru-
mental, expressive, and symbolic.  We argue that although the
AEDPA and the PLRA may not substantially alter the course the
courts were already following, they may produce some freakish re-
sults, virtually random impositions of severe harm on individuals,
without substantial policy justifications.  We argue that this pathology
results from the fact that the statutes are largely symbolic; even
though courts will attempt to integrate them with the rest of the law,
they will find some places where the statutes simply do not fit well.
At those places, irrational harm will result.346
A.  Accounting for the Judicial Responses
Positive political theory treats public policy as the result of re-
peated interactions among legislatures, executives, and courts.347  For
expository purposes, it adopts the radically simplifying assumption
that each branch, including the judiciary, simply aims to achieve the
policy outcome it prefers; it gives no weight to doctrinal concerns,
such as judicial deference to majority will, except insofar as doctrinal
concerns are part of the judiciary’s policy preferences.348 Drawing on
positive political theory,349 we will first provide an informal explana-
tion of why courts are likely to follow that course.350  Then we will de-
346. It may be that the pathology results because Congress acted in areas that are already
heavily judicialized, not because it enacted largely symbolic statutes.  We suspect, however,
that statutes dealing with such areas are likely to be largely symbolic, making it difficult to sort
out the effects of the two possible sources of pathology.
347. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, The Article I, Section 7 Game, 80 GEO.
L.J. 523, 528 (1992).
348. Concerns for stability in the law, concerns about judicial management of cases, and
concern about preserving the courts’ reputation and role may be among the judiciary’s policy
preferences.
349. See generally Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 347, at 528-56 (explaining a model of
government action where statutes reflect the preferences of the median legislator, the Presi-
dent, and the courts and where the status quo changes depending on the alignment of the
branches of government).
350. We could translate the account we offer into the formal language of positive political
theory, but we think that the formalization would actually obscure the intuitions that make the
positive political theory account plausible.
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scribe some general methods that the courts may use to achieve our
anticipated results.
1.  Two Positive Accounts.  A positive political theory account
begins with the state of the law on the eve of the adoption of the
AEDPA and the PLRA.  There are two scenarios.  (a) Unconstrai-
ned, the courts would have adopted more stringent rules: Habeas
corpus would have been more limited, and remedies in institutional
reform litigation would have been more restricted.  The courts,
however, were concerned about the response of a Congress con-
trolled by Democrats to such stringency.  The courts therefore went
as far as they could without facing a legislative reaction, but not as far
as the judges’ policy preferences alone would have taken them.351
Under this scenario, the courts would welcome new statutes
sponsored by conservative Republicans and the opportunity new
statutes presented to curtail prisoners’ access to the federal courts.
Accordingly, they would interpret the AEDPA and the PLRA to
make dramatic changes consistent with the judges’ preferences, which
they earlier were unable to embody in decisional law.
We think this scenario does not fairly represent the political re-
alities.  Democrats in Congress had not succeeded in enacting legisla-
tion to respond to the Supreme Court’s gradual tightening of habeas
corpus over the decades that preceded 1996.  Moreover, the Demo-
cratic Congress was not the only player.  The President had the
power to veto any further congressional efforts to frustrate judicially
inspired limits on the writ.  We believe that Presidents Reagan or
Bush would have vetoed any Democratic reactions to stringent Court
decisions.  Finally, some key justices expressed concern that the
Court had already gone too far in its revisions of habeas corpus,352
which suggests that the Court’s policy preferences were not far from
the doctrines it had created by 1996.
That, then, is the second scenario: (b) The law on the eve of the
new statutes’ adoption fairly represented the courts’ policy prefer-
ences.  In this scenario, the courts would interpret the AEDPA and
the PLRA generally to endorse the policies the Supreme Court had
already established and, at most, to command only minor variations
351. Proponents of this scenario would explain the acceleration of change in decisional law
after President Reagan took office by noting that he was more likely to veto any liberal legisla-
tive response to the Supreme Court’s initiatives.
352. See, e.g., Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1992) (O’Connor, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the Court has become excessively deferential to state procedures).
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on familiar themes.353  As in the first scenario, the risk of congres-
sional reaction would be small.  Again the President played a role.
Because both the habeas corpus revisions and the PLRA were bun-
dled together with provisions President Clinton cared deeply about,
he might not sign free-standing legislation that went much further
than the courts were willing to go.354  Under this scenario, then, the
courts would interpret the new statutes to chart no new directions,
and their interpretations would stick.
2.  Methods of Interpreting the Statutes as Stabilizers of the Law.
The courts are likely to view the AEDPA and the PLRA through
several lenses.
a. The “constitutional” lens.  Although constitutional concerns about
Congress’s power to restrict the Supreme Court’s appellate
jurisdiction lurked in the background of Felker, the court avoided a
discussion of the issues by interpreting the preclusion of review
provision in a way that substantially reduced its impact.355  The
retroactivity issues in the PLRA raise similar problems and may meet
similar responses, as may the prospective consent decree provisions.
b. The “administrative” lens.  Courts will have to deal with cases
under these statutes for the indefinite future.  They have an interest
in interpreting them to reduce any new administrative burdens.356
Judges are interested in assuring that the law they administer makes
sense as a whole.  They will therefore be inclined to interpret
353. The courts hold in reserve the power to find new statutes unconstitutional, thereby
increasing the size of the majority needed to establish Congress’s policy preferences as law.
For reasons we discuss in the text, we think it unlikely that courts will use that power.  See su-
pra p. 2.
354. We note that President Clinton’s signing statement expressed concern about some as-
pects of the AEDPA.  See Statement on Signing the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996, 32 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 719, 720-21 (Apr. 24, 1996).  Yet his ultimate deci-
sion to sign the bill shows that he was unwilling to expend much political capital on these issues.
355. See Felker v. Turpin, 116 S. Ct. 2333, 2337-39 (1996) (interpreting review preclusion
provisions narrowly).
356. The provision requiring that special masters in prison cases be paid from the federal
courts’ budget is an example.  See infra notes 376-79 and accompanying text.  One might think
that this provision would give federal judges an incentive to refrain from appointing special
masters.  It differs from the provision requiring prisoners to pay filing fees, see supra notes 327-
30 and accompanying text, however, in one important way: Federal judges, unlike prisoners,
control the provision’s interpretation.  If judges have independent reasons to want to appoint
special masters, they are likely to interpret the provision narrowly.
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statutes, particularly symbolic statutes, in ways that harmonize the
new provisions with preexisting law.357  The interaction between the
AEDPA’s filing deadlines and the exhaustion requirement is a good
example of how and why harmonization is likely to occur.
c. The “policy” lens.  In at least some instances, federal judges may
disagree with the policies enacted by Congress.  Most dramatically,
various provisions in both statutes reflect congressional suspicion that
federal district judges have given too little weight to federalism and
crime control.358  The statutes impose procedural barriers designed to
induce judges to give appropriate weight to those matters.  But the
statutes cannot confront the problem that the very judges of whom
Congress is suspicious will interpret the statutes.
d. The “realistic” lens.  Judges may treat these statutes as symbolic
laws.  They may believe that the statutes achieve their ends by the
mere fact of having been enacted.  Judges may be comfortable in
interpreting the statutes to do rather little, because, seen through this
lens, they were not designed to have significant effects.359
B.  Instrumental, Expressive, and Symbolic Statutes
As we have suggested, we believe that courts will interpret the
AEDPA and the PLRA to require few dramatic changes to be made
in the law as a whole.  But the statutes will have some effects that we
believe can fairly be described as pathological.  To explain the pa-
thologies, we think it helpful to distinguish three categories of stat-
utes.  Instrumental statutes take their targets’ preferences and values
as given, and alter the costs and benefits associated with courses of
action taken pursuant to those preferences and values.360  For exam-
ple, a statute that doubles the penalty for embezzlement is ordinarily
357. For a discussion of this issue in a related context, see Frank Michelman, Saving Old
Glory: On Constitutional Iconography, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1337, 1360-61 (1990) (contrasting fed-
eral statutes and constitutional amendments as means of outlawing flag desecration).
358. See supra notes 139-51 and accompanying text; note 245 and accompanying text.
359. In their extreme version, these interpretive strategies might lead to the effective nulli-
fication of the statutes.  See Dwyer, supra note 7, at 304-06 (describing judicial nullification).
We do not believe that we have described a recipe for nullification. The interpretations we
have suggested courts might adopt are compatible with the statutes’ language, and often are the
most plausible reading.
360. For further discussion of instrumental statutes and their meaning, see Edward L. Ru-
bin, Legislative Methodology: Some Lessons From the Truth-In-Lending Act, 80 GEO. L.J. 233,
298 (1991).
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nearly purely instrumental: The existing penalties already express
moral judgments, and the change in penalties is designed almost en-
tirely to change the cost-benefit analysis undertaken by potential
embezzlers.
Expressive statutes also alter costs and benefits, but they do so
while simultaneously attempting to change their targets’ values and
preferences.361  For example, statutes creating liability for race-based
denials of housing opportunities have an expressive element: Their
enactment signals social disapproval of such discrimination, in the
hope that the signal will itself change values.
Symbolic statutes simply make a statement.  They do not have
targets as instrumental and expressive statutes do.  Instead, they de-
fine for the public what its own values and preferences are.362  Stat-
361. See Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of the Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021,
2022 (1996) [hereinafter Sunstein, Expressive Function].  Although we would prefer to call
these statutes second-order instrumental statutes, Professor Sunstein uses the term expressive,
and we think it best to attempt to standardize usage.  See id; see also Richard Pildes, The De-
struction of Social Capital Through Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2055, 2057-58 (1996) (describing
Sunstein’s analysis in instrumental terms). Unfortunately, scholars in other fields sometimes
use the term expressive to describe what, constrained by Sunstein’s terminology, we call sym-
bolic actions.  See, e.g., Robert P. Abelson, The Secret Existence of Expressive Behavior, in THE
RATIONAL CHOICE CONTROVERSY: ECONOMIC MODELS OF POLITICS RECONSIDERED 25, 27
(Jeffrey Friedman ed., 1996) (“I intend ‘expressive’ to refer to spontaneous enjoyment or
value-expressive action, performed for its own sake, with no apparent rational consideration of
material consequences for the actor.” (emphasis added)); Michael Taylor, When Rationality
Fails, in id. at 223, 230 (stating that “commitment-derived behavior is expressive of a self consti-
tuted by commitments”).  For an example of our usage of “symbolic” actions, see JOSEPH
GUSFIELD, SYMBOLIC CRUSADE: STATUS POLITICS AND THE AMERICAN TEMPERANCE
MOVEMENT 4 (1963) (“Even if the law is not enforced or enforceable, the symbolic import of
its passage is important to the reformer.  It settles the controversies between those who repre-
sent clashing cultures.”).
Sunstein is sometimes ambiguous as well.  He describes expressive statutes as those
that “make a statement,” Sunstein, Expressive Function,  supra, at 2024, but his central concern
is with “norm management,” id. at 2045.  He points out that proponents of a constitutional
amendment to ban flag-burning “appear to want to make a statement about the venality of the
act of flag burning, perhaps in order to affect social norms, perhaps because they think that
making the statement is intrinsically good,” id. at 2023, and that “the Endangered Species Act
has a special salience as a symbol of a certain conception of the relationship between human
beings and their environment,” id. at 2024.  See also Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court, 1995
Term—Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4, 69 (1996) [hereinafter
Sunstein, Foreword] (describing the expressive function of law as “communicating certain mes-
sages,” and asserting that such laws “have major social effects just by virtue of their status as
communication”).
362. See GUSFIELD, supra note 361, at 11 (“Issues which seem foolish or impractical items
are often important for what they symbolize about the style or culture which is being recog-
nized or derogated.  Being acts of deference or degradation, the individual finds in governmen-
tal action that his own perceptions of his status in the society are confirmed or rejected.”).  The
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utes banning flag-burning, for example, are not really directed at
changing anyone’s behavior; there is too little of the activity to think
that flag-burners would be significantly responsive to the enactment
of a statute.  Nor are such statutes designed to change the values of
those who would, absent the statute, burn flags.  Instead, anti-flag-
burning statutes send a message of social disapproval, which fully
satisfies the statutes’ supporters.363
We do not contend that these three categories are sharply distin-
guishable.  Every statute is likely to contain a mix of instrumental,
expressive, and symbolic content.364  But, we believe, the larger the
symbolic content, the more problematic the statute is likely to be
when it is implemented as a real law.365  The difficulty with symbolic
statutes is captured by the Hollywood quip about movies with a mes-
sage: “If you want to send a message, use Western Union.”366  To un-
derstand the difficulty, it will be helpful to explore difficulties associ-
ated with instrumental and expressive statutes.367
term symbolic statute is sometimes used pejoratively.  See, e.g., Robert W. Gordon, The Inde-
pendence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1, 72 (1988) (referring to “symbolic laws never intended
to have any effect”); Carolyn McNiven, Comment, Using Severability Clauses to Solve the At-
tainment Deadline Dilemma in Environmental Statutes, 80 CAL. L. REV. 1255, 1295 (1992)
(describing “laws that express goals that we wish we could achieve, rather than what we can
realistically achieve”).  Except to the extent that we are concerned about the adverse effects
symbolic statutes have on the achievement of instrumental goals, we do not intend a pejorative
meaning.
363. The example may suggest that symbolic statutes are also simple ones, consisting of
straight-forward expressions about narrow topics.  Our examples of the AEDPA and the
PLRA demonstrate that we disagree: They are symbolic statutes in large part because they ad-
dress many issues the courts had already addressed, without substantially adverting to previous
judicial developments.
364. Indeed, even a purely instrumental law might be understood to symbolize the legisla-
ture’s commitment to instrumental rationality above all else.  See Sunstein, Expressive Func-
tion, supra note 361, at 2022-25 (describing the inevitable expressive dimensions of legislation).
365. Although the categories are, to some degree, simply ideal types designed to help us
think about statutes, we think they describe something substantive in the statutes legislatures
enact.  We note that acknowledging the symbolic dimensions of enacted statutes is an analytic
dead end.  As we have said, whatever our legislatures enact expresses who we are.  Nothing
more can be said, except perhaps to express the hope that someday we will be something else.
366. One version of this statement is quoted in Central States Motor Freight Bureau, Inc. v.
ICC, 924 F.2d 1099, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (Silberman, C.J., dissenting).
367. John P. Dwyer offers a perspective on environmental legislation similar to the one we
develop here.  He argues that symbolic statutes allow legislators to “reap the political benefits
of voting for ‘health and the environment’ . . . and successfully sidestep the difficult policy
choices that must be made.”  Dwyer, supra note 7, at 233.  Those choices “are passed on to the
regulatory agency or to the courts.”  Id.  Our perspective leads us to suggest that symbolic stat-
utes are fully effective upon their enactment.  They leave none of Dwyer’s difficult policy
choices to be made, and the courts can therefore interpret them so as to harmonize them with
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1.  First-Order Instrumental Statutes.  Most laws are designed to
accomplish some goal.  They provide incentives to encourage beha-
vior that conforms to the statutory standards they establish.  These
statutes are concerned with behavior, not values or attitudes.  The
legislature is quite indifferent to the feelings of the laws’ targets, as
long as the targets act appropriately.
a.  Direct effects on incentives.  Instrumental statutes can directly off-
set the costs and benefits of their targets’ courses of action.  They can
increase the benefits and decrease the costs of the behavior the
legislature prefers, and decrease the benefits and increase the costs of
disfavored behavior.  For example, some pretrial hearings require a
prisoner’s attendance. A prisoner who might otherwise not care
enough to file a lawsuit may decide to do so, anticipating enjoyment
from briefly leaving the institution.  One provision in the PLRA,
however, authorizes courts, “[t]o the extent practicable,” to conduct
pretrial hearings at which a prisoner’s attendance is required by
telephone or video conference.368  Telephonic or video hearings
decrease the potential benefits of filing lawsuits, and may reduce the
number filed.  Similarly, requiring prisoners to pay filing fees in
installments out of their institutional accounts369 increases the costs
associated with filing lawsuits: Prisoners can no longer enjoy both
lawsuits and prison amenities, and some may choose the amenities
over the lawsuits.
More interesting are the PLRA provisions barring consent de-
crees in institutional litigation.370  Here too the aim is to increase the
costs of institutional litigation.  Of course no one can force any de-
fendant to fight hard, and discouraging consent decrees does not
eliminate the possibility of a lawsuit in which the defendants accede
to the plaintiffs’ demands.  But under the PLRA, judgments must
contain an admission of liability.371  This potentially increases the
costs of settlement in two ways.  The first is rather unlikely: An ad-
mission of constitutional liability might form the predicate of a dam-
other aspects of law, or to achieve the judges’ own policy preferences, without violating any
normative constraints the statutes impose on them.  Cf. Sunstein, Foreword, supra note 361, at
71 (referring to “beneficial expressive effects” of a decision in the short run).
368. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1997e(f)(1) (West Supp. 1997).
369. See supra  notes 320-27 and accompanying text.
370. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3626(a)(1)(A).
371. See id.
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age action seeking compensation from the institution’s warden.372
The other is more interesting: Admitting liability may be more costly
for the institution in political terms than consenting to the entry of a
judgment without an admission of liability.
First-order instrumental statutes can misfire, however.373  They
may not identify their targets’ values and preferences with enough
precision to have much effect, even on the margin.  If the prospect of
attending a court hearing plays a small role in a prisoner’s decision to
file suit, for example, authorizing telephonic hearings will have little
effect on the number of suits filed.  Similarly, if prisoner demand for
litigation is not especially price-sensitive, the primary effect of the
PLRA’s ifp fee provisions may be to shift some of the costs of litiga-
tion from attorneys generals’ budgets to prison budgets, as correc-
tions departments are forced to absorb the costs of administering the
installment payment system.374
First-order instrumental statutes may also miss their targets.
Consider here a PLRA provision we have not yet mentioned.  The
Court in Lewis v. Casey appeared to disparage the appointment of “a
law professor from Flushing, New York,” in a case involving the Ari-
zona prison system.375  The PLRA structures the process of choosing
special masters,376 and limits the hourly rate of compensation for spe-
cial masters, directing that the special master be paid “with funds ap-
372. This is unlikely for two reasons.  An admission of liability need not eliminate a possi-
ble defense that the warden’s actions were taken in good faith, which would protect the warden
against damage liability.  Further, nothing in the PLRA bars the plaintiffs from making an en-
forceable agreement not to seek damages from specific defendants.  There might, however, be
ethical problems, or problems under the class action rule, from the side of the plaintiffs’ law-
yers, in negotiating such an agreement.  But see Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 730-38 (1986)
(finding no statutory or Rule barrier to negotiating an agreement in which an attorney forgoes
statutory fees).
373. Our concept of misfiring is a close cousin to Justice Breyer’s “mismatch,” which he
defines as “a failure to correctly match the tool to the problem at hand.”  STEPHEN BREYER,
REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 191 (1982).
374. See Jim Thomas, Inmate Litigation: Using the Courts or Abusing Them?, COR-
RECTIONS TODAY, July 1988, at 124, 126 (asserting that “there is little evidence that attempts
to curtail litigation by imposing or [sic] filing fees have succeeded, and this may only penalize
indigent litigants with meritorious claims while doing little to deter abuse by filers who are suf-
ficiently clever to circumvent established policies” (citation omitted)).
375. 116 S. Ct. 2174, 2186 (1996).
376. Plaintiffs and defendants are to submit lists of up to five proposed special masters, and
each side can strike up to three from the other’s list. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3626(f)(2)(A), (B)
(West Supp. 1997).  The judge must select the special master from those who remain.  See id. §
3626(f)(2)(C).  Either side has a right to an interlocutory appeal to challenge the choice of the
special master “on the ground of partiality.” Id. § 3626(f)(3).
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propriated to the Judiciary.”377  Students of the administrative process
have sometimes emphasized the importance of budgetary considera-
tions in structuring an agency head’s incentives, but their models
treat an agency as having a single decisionmaker at its head, who re-
sponds to these incentives.378  The federal courts lack such a deci-
sionmaker, and it is unclear why any individual federal judge should
care much about the effects of his or her actions on the general
budget for the federal judicial branch.
b.  Indirect effects on incentives: reconstitutive law.  Instrumental
statutes can affect costs and benefits indirectly, without affecting
underlying values and preferences.  Building on the earlier work of
German social and legal theorists Nicklas Luhmann and Gunter
Teubner,379 Richard Stewart has described a species of regulatory
legislation that he calls reconstitutive law.380  Reconstitutive statutes
change decisionmaking structures, sometimes with the effect of
altering the decisionmaker’s calculation of costs and benefits; they do
not “dictat[e] conduct.”381  For example, a statute might mandate that
all corporations employing more than 100 persons have a health and
safety officer.  Once such an officer is a regular part of the corpor-
ation’s decisionmaking structure, she can be expected to voice
concerns about health and safety, which at least occasionally may
change the corporation’s course of action.382
377. Id. § 3626(f)(4).
378. The origin of incentive-based analyses of agency action is WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR.,
BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT (1971).  For a criticism of Niskanen’s
model as treating all agencies as “command organizations run in a completely top-down man-
ner,” see PATRICK DUNLEAVY, DEMOCRACY, BUREAUCRACY AND PUBLIC CHOICE:
ECONOMIC EXPLANATIONS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE 156, 162-65 (1992).
379. See NICKLAS LUHMANN, A SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY OF LAW, 227-54 (Martin Albrow
ed. & Elizabeth King & Martin Albrow trans. 1985); Gunter Teubner, After Legal Institution-
alism? Strategic Models of Post-Regulatory Law, 12 INT’L J. SOC. L. 375 (1985).
380. For discussions, see Richard Stewart, Reconstitutive Law, 46 MD. L. REV. 86, 86-89,
92-93 (1986); Richard Stewart, Madison’s Nightmare, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 335, 352-55 (1990)
[hereinafter Stewart, Madison’s Nightmare].  For a version of reconstitutive law from the left
side of the political spectrum, see Jerry Frug, Administrative Democracy, 40 U. TORONTO L.J.
559, 562 (1990) (proposing a four-part reform of government: 1) the transformation of internal
governmental organization to promote workplace democracy; 2) more effective public control
of government administration; 3) decentralization of political power; and 4) more democrati-
cally run agencies of newly decentralized government).
381. Stewart, Madison’s Nightmare, supra note 380, at 352.
382. We do not intend to romanticize this sort of solution.  Understanding that their long-
term prospects depend on not rocking the boat too often, health and safety officers might be
captured by higher corporate officials.  Still, the bureaucratic phenomenon that people try to
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Both the AEDPA and the PLRA have modest reconstitutive
elements.  The provisions authorizing shorter time limits in capital
cases in states with acceptable capital representation systems may
change structures within the states.383  Perhaps a better example,
however, is the PLRA provision that authorizes a wide range of state
officials to reopen institutional decrees after they have been in place
for two years.384  A local sheriff, supported by a sympathetic state at-
torney general, might be willing to let the decree operate unimpeded.
But, under the PLRA, the sheriff and the state attorney general can-
not make the decision themselves.  They must be sure that the local
district attorney agrees.  This provision thus expands the decision-
making structure at the local level.  The increased cost of sustaining a
decree’s operation should be clear.
Reconstitutive law solutions, like first-order instrumental stat-
utes, may misfire.  The new decisionmaking structures may be inef-
fective, as their processes are absorbed into more resilient bureau-
cratic structures.  They may alter cost-benefit calculations in
unexpected ways.  Perhaps prison bureaucrats have been too willing
to roll over in the face of litigation, seeing it as a way to prod their
state legislatures to increase prison budgets.385  It is less clear that the
incentives of state governors and attorneys general are so skewed as
to require the introduction of local mayors and prosecutors into the
decisionmaking structure.
2.  Expressive or Second-Order Instrumental Statutes.  Expressive
or second-order statutes are another form of instrumental statutes.
do the jobs to which they are assigned suggests that this sort of solution may occasionally make
a difference.  Thomas Emerson’s observation that censorship is problematic in part because
“the function of the censor is to censor,” and that censors therefore seek out occasions to do
their job, seems apt here.  Thomas Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1955, at 648, 659.
383. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2261 (West Supp. 1997) (outlining what constitutes an “acceptable”
capital representation system).
384. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3626(b)(1)(A)(i).
385. As stated by Peter M. Shane:
It is by no means unthinkable that an administrative agency might find a consent de-
cree a useful device for “binding” itself to something it wants to do anyway, perhaps
to avoid conspicuous responsibility for an unpopular policy initiative, to prevent a
change of policy by a subsequent administration, or as leverage in inter- and intra-
branch negotiations over budgeting.
Shane, supra note 74, at 273; accord McConnell, supra note 68, at 316 (describing a case in
which a court speculated that officials “frustrated by their inability to win political approval for
the construction of a new city hall” entered a consent decree requiring construction of a new
jail and city hall complex (quoting Dunn v. Carey, 808 F.2d 555, 560 (7th Cir. 1986))).
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They too are designed to change their targets’ behavior, but they
operate by changing their targets’ values and preferences rather than
by changing the costs and benefits associated with the targets’
existing values and preferences.386  Liberals are often appropriately
nervous about the ineffectiveness of expressive statutes in ways that
illuminate our concerns about symbolic statutes.
Expressive statutes do not take the targets’ values and prefer-
ences as given.  Instead, they attempt to change those values.  In this
sense they are second-order instrumental statutes.  Exactly how they
change values is something of a puzzle.  Some targets may wish to
conform their behavior to what a majority of the population desires,
but may simply be ignorant of what that is.  An expressive statute
may serve as a public statement of the majority’s values, thereby
clarifying the situation for these otherwise clueless targets.  As Sun-
stein puts it, such laws may “signal[ ] appropriate behavior” and lead
their targets to believe correctly that failure to act in the indicated
way will subject them to criticism by others.387  An expressive statute,
then, is a means of public education.388
Why, however, need such a statute be reinforced by sanctions?
Perhaps the educational message will not be taken seriously unless it
is backed up by a sanction.389  Or perhaps once targets change behav-
ior to avoid the sanction, they may change values as well, to avoid
being continually in a state in which their behavior conflicts with
their values.390
As Sunstein demonstrates, well-designed expressive statutes can
be instrumentally effective.391  Libertarians and liberals have tradi-
386. Neither the AEDPA or PLRA has significant expressive components, and we discuss
problems with expressive statutes only to provide background for our discussion of symbolic
statutes.  None of their provisions seem aimed at changing prisoners’ preferences as to the con-
ditions in which they live, or at changing the degree to which criminals regard their incarcera-
tion as justified.
387. Sunstein, Expressive Function, supra note 361, at 2032.
388. A slight variant occurs when people have a large number of divergent preferences, but
know they would be better off if they all had a single preference.  The difficulty lies in selecting
which of the various preferences everyone should embrace.  An expressive statute can serve as
a focal point, arbitrarily selecting the preference on which all immediately converge.  Sunstein
discusses this as an example of law serving to solve collective action problems.  See id. at 2031.
389. See id. (stating that some regulatory laws employ the “moral weight” of sanctions to
“work directly against existing, [undesirable] norms”).
390. Cf. Pildes, supra note 361, at 2065 (describing de Tocqueville’s analysis of how “local
participatory associations become the mechanism for generating general social norms organ-
ized around principles of reciprocity”).
391. See Sunstein, Expressive Function, supra note 361, at 2045 (stating that “good expres-
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tionally been uneasy about expressive statutes, however.  Libertari-
ans oppose efforts by one adult to change another’s values by any
method other than rational persuasion, and believe that any sanction
associated with an expressive law violates this condition.392  Liberals
have been concerned that expressive statutes will rarely be so well-
designed as to satisfy the dual requirements that they be effective on
the instrumental level without being excessively coercive.393
Expressive statutes may fail to achieve first-order instrumental
effects for two reasons.394  Real laws are detailed because they are the
result of political processes in which demands from many sources are
articulated.395  Those details can adversely affect their first-order in-
strumental effects.396  This is particularly true where the targets of the
expressive statutes are sophisticated enough to understand what the
legislation is about.  The target’s self-consciousness that results from
being subjected to the process may undermine the law’s expressive
sivists are consequentialists too”); id. at 2046 (rejecting expressivist concern about a statute
with good consequences); id. at 2047 (accepting criticism of an expressive statute with bad con-
sequences).
392. See Pildes, supra note 361, at 2057 (criticizing the view that approval of expressive laws
entails “a more expansive conception of the proper ends of government”).
393. The latter concern is straightforward.  The United States War in Vietnam was some-
times said to be a struggle for the hearts and minds of the Vietnamese.  Some who sought to
increase the level of U.S. military involvement pointed out accurately enough, “Once you have
them by the balls, their hearts and minds will follow.” JONATHON GREEN, SAYS WHO? A
GUIDE TO QUOTATIONS OF THE CENTURY 349 (1988).  There is little doubt that severe sanc-
tions can sometimes change values, but at a high cost.  Well-designed expressive laws probably
ought to incorporate only modest sanctions at most.  Yet there appears to be no safeguard in
principle against escalating the sanctions if the mild ones fail.  And, in practice, the political
pressures that generate expressive statutes in the first place may lead to increased sanctions in
cases of failure rather than abandonment of the attempt.  Liberals worry that there are politi-
cal-structural reasons to think that expressive statutes will not be well-designed.  Cf. Sunstein,
Expressive Function, supra note 361, at 2033 (describing the use of expressive laws when “the
intrinsic utility of the [targeted] act is low” and the target engages in the act primarily because
of its effect on reputation).  Sunstein appears to set the limit at the point where coercion
“invade[s] rights,” id. at 2049, and presumably would invoke some sort of proportionality stan-
dard linked to notions of cruel and unusual or otherwise excessive punishment.  The Supreme
Court has been reluctant to develop a robust law of proportionality in the context of constitu-
tional adjudication.  See, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 965 (1991) (“[T]he Eighth
Amendment contains no proportionality guarantee.”).
394. For a discussion of how some parts of the 1996 welfare law, understood as an expres-
sive statute, might be instrumentally ineffective or have effects its sponsors probably did not
desire, see Susan Frelich Appleton, When Welfare Reforms Promote Abortion: “Personal Re-
sponsibility,” “Family Values,” and the Right to Choose, 85 GEO. L.J. 155, 165-85 (1996).
395. See supra notes 243-45 and accompanying text (describing the origins of the PLRA
provision allowing intervention by a wide range of state and local officials).
396. See Pildes, supra note 361, at 2073 (emphasizing the complexity of the set of norms
affected by a single expressive statute).
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effects.  Moreover, to the extent that judges themselves are both tar-
gets and interpreters of the law, they have opportunities to deal with
the statutes in ways that limit first-order effects.
a.  Searching for “loopholes” in the details.  The details may simply
overwhelm second-order calculations.  Instead of changing values,
targets will seize upon exceptions that allow them to continue as they
always have.  Consider here intricate taxation statutes that fill some
gaps, but also create new ones to be exploited by incorrigible
taxpayers whose zeal for evading liability never wavers.  In the classic
illustration, Congress limited the percentage depletion allowances
that oil companies could deduct each year, but failed to specify a
maximum over time.397  As a result, some oil and gas deposits could
be depleted more than once.398 Although this behavior is sometimes
pejoratively described as exploiting loopholes, it results from fair
interpretations of the statutes Congress has enacted.  So, for example,
in response to the PLRA, a federal judge who does not want an
outside expert to be paid from the court’s budget can invoke the
Federal Rules of Evidence and call a court-appointed expert with the
same powers a special master would possess. 399
b. Obscuring the message through the details.  Statutory detail may
also undermine the clarity of the message expressive statutes are
thought to send.400  Consider here anti-discrimination laws that ex-
empt employers with fewer than fifteen employees.401  Does such a
jurisdictional requirement tell targets—both large and small
employers—how strong the anti-discrimination principle is?  Or does
it tell them something different, about the importance of principles
limiting the state’s power to regulate quasi-intimate associations?
Suppose a different anti-discrimination law contains a different
jurisdictional limit.  What message is then sent?  Muddled messages
do no instrumental good.402
397. See Rex G. Baker & Erwin N. Griswold, Percentage Depletions—A Correspondence,
64 HARV. L. REV. 361, 376 (1951).
398. See id.
399. See FED. R. EVID. 706(a).
400. See Sunstein, Expressive Function, supra note 361, at 2050-51 (discussing problems as-
sociated with the effective communication of expressive laws’ messages).
401. See  42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1994).
402. Cf. Pildes, supra note 361, at 2073 (noting that social norms may be “finely calibrated”
and implicitly suggesting that real laws may not be as well calibrated).
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3.  Symbolic Statutes.  Symbolic statutes are not truly instru-
mental.403  They do not have targets in the way first- and second-order
instrumental statutes do.  Rather, symbolic statutes define—or
express—who we are as a society.  In an important sense symbolic
statutes cannot misfire as instrumental and expressive statutes can.
Because symbolic statutes have nothing to accomplish, they can
hardly fail.  Whatever they express, they tell us who we are.
Symbolic statutes can have undesirable effects.404  As real laws,
they must be administered and integrated into a legal system with
many instrumental laws as well.  But proponents of symbolic statutes
are likely to have been relatively indifferent to their proposals’ first-
order effects.405  Judges have to make the symbolic statutes compati-
ble with the first-order instrumentalism of the rest of the law.  In so
doing, courts may produce some peculiar results.406
In the main, however, courts will reconcile symbolic laws with
the prevailing order.  In the cases we have been exploring, courts are
likely to read the AEDPA and the PLRA to make only modest ad-
justments to the policies the judiciary had already adopted.  The ef-
fect is that the new laws will have no systematic first-order effects.407
This may serve two apparently conflicting interests.  Prisoners and
their advocates will not see the AEDPA and PLRA as desirable stat-
utes on the whole, but they will not find them insuperable barriers ei-
ther.408  Politicians who sponsored the statutes may benefit as well
403. Again, a purely symbolic statute might affect values and preferences simply as a public
statement of the majority’s views.
404. Dwyer describes the undesirable effects of symbolic environmental statutes in these
terms: “By making promises that cannot be kept, and by leaving no middle ground for accom-
modation, the legislature makes it more difficult to reach a political compromise . . . that would
produce a functional regulatory program.”  Dwyer, supra note 7, at 234.  Dwyer’s interest in
ensuring that the regulatory program be functional is compatible with our concern about the
adverse effects symbolic statutes have on instrumental goals.
405. But see Dennis Chong, Values Versus Interests in the Explanation of Social Conflict,
144 U. PA. L. REV. 2079, 2129 (1996) (arguing that instrumental concerns may be implicit in
“social theories” held by those supporting apparently symbolic statutes).
406. The choice between unconstitutionality and ineffectiveness stands as the core example,
but the search for loopholes we have described is another.  Cf. Dwyer, supra note 7, at 281-82
(describing how symbolic statutes may “Undermin[e] the Integrity of the Regulatory Process”).
407. It might be thought that the statutes will have the effect of freezing the judicially de-
veloped law as it was in 1996, guarding against the possibility that a future Supreme Court
more receptive to claims by prisoners and criminal defendants would start revising the law in a
more liberal direction.  We acknowledge this possibility, but note as well that some provisions
in the statutes use terms like necessary and unreasonable that such a court could readily inter-
pret to allow liberalization.
408. They may, however, have to develop new litigation strategies, calling on the talents
TUSHNETPPFINAL.DOC 03/31/98  2:12 PM
1997] SYMBOLIC STATUTES 85
from their symbolic nature: The statutes’ redundancy in practice may
keep the issues that their sponsors purported to address alive and
available for further political exploitation.409
At the same time, however, we do not contend that these two
statutes will be meaningless.  As we have said, some judges may not
be inclined to do the interpretive work that would be necessary to in-
tegrate the statutes into a coherent body of law.  Other judges may
dismiss as insubstantial the constitutional concerns that we believe
ought to influence interpretation.  The result will be that the statutes
will occasionally have essentially random adverse effects, serving no
discernible public purpose.410
Finally, the consequences that flow from symbolic statutes—
their first-order effects—are not intrinsic to the statutes themselves.
The statutes only “send a message,” but the instrumental effects arise
from the laws as they are interpreted and applied.  The symbolic na-
ture of a law influences judges’ interpretation of the law, and there-
fore will influence its effects.
CONCLUSION
Our argument in this Article is a simple one: The broad thesis is
that although symbolic laws are not undesirable in the abstract, they
do have real consequences, and their consequences generally ought
to count heavily in our assessment of their wisdom; the narrow thesis
applies that argument to the AEDPA and the PLRA.  Because they
are symbolic statutes, the AEDPA and the PLRA are unlikely to
have large-scale, systematic effects on the outcomes in habeas corpus
and prison cases.
Because they are real laws, however, the AEDPA and the
PLRA will affect individual cases in an essentially random way.  A
handful of prisoners who might have gotten some relief from uncon-
stitutional conditions before the PLRA was enacted will not get it
associated more with tax lawyers than with public interest litigators.
409. Within months after the enactment of the PLRA, for example, and well before one
could reasonably expect the statute to have had any significant effects, if for no reason other
than the existence of unresolved retroactivity questions, some of the PLRA’s primary sponsors
held hearings on the statute’s implementation.  See The Role of the U.S. Department of Justice
in Implementing the Prison Litigation Reform Act: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 1996 WL 556489 at *1 (Sept. 25, 1996) (Introductory Statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch).
410. These effects will visit some harms on particular litigants, but there is no reason to
think that the ones who suffer deserve to do so more than any other prisoner.  It is in that sense
that we think the random results serve no public purpose.
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now.  They will continue to live in conditions that may threaten their
lives.  And some of them will die from unconstitutionally inadequate
medical care or unconstitutionally inadequate protection of personal
security.
Sometimes randomness is itself a constitutional concern.  The
Supreme Court appears to remain committed to the proposition that
the freakish imposition of the death penalty violates the Eighth
Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishments.411  Under the
AEDPA someone randomly chosen from the population of criminals
will be executed who would not have been in the absence of the stat-
ute.412  That itself might violate the Constitution.
411. See McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 454 (1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
412. Identifying that person will be extraordinarily difficult.  The easiest case would be one
in which the Supreme Court acknowledged that the habeas petitioner would have received a
new trial or a new sentence under pre-AEDPA law but cannot under the AEDPA.  The psy-
chological pressures against such an acknowledgment are obvious, and are likely to be reduced,
when necessary, by statements to the effect that the Court will assume without deciding that the
petitioner would not have received relief under pre-AEDPA law.
